Comment: Implications of the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) on electoral politics. (2009, 20 Marks)
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) replaced the paper ballot in India through a gradual, court-disciplined process. They changed more than the mechanics of polling. They changed who could vote freely, how parties compete and how results are accepted. Their implications run along two lines: a gain in electoral integrity, and a new politics of trust and verifiability.
From experiment to universal use
| Year | Step |
|---|---|
| 1982 | First used in some polling stations of Parur, Kerala |
| 1984 | A. C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai: the ECI could not replace the ballot paper without legal authority, and the result was set aside |
| 1988 | Section 61A inserted in the RPA 1951, in force from 1989 |
| 1998–2001 | Used in selected assembly and Lok Sabha seats |
| 2004 | The first general election held entirely on EVMs |
The sequence itself shows that Article 324 fills gaps in the law but cannot override an express statutory scheme.
Implications for electoral politics
- The end of booth capturing. Machines are standalone and one-time programmable, and they cap the rate at which votes can be cast. This broke the rigging economy of Bihar and parts of Uttar Pradesh.
- Wider participation by the weak. Sisir Debnath, Mudit Kapoor and Shamika Ravi, studying state assembly elections from 1976 to 2007, found that EVMs sharply reduced electoral fraud. Illiterate voters, women and SC/ST voters reported being better able to vote, and fewer reported being prevented by violence. Recorded turnout fell by about 3.5%, which the authors read as the removal of stuffed ballots. This reinforced Yogendra Yadav‘s second democratic upsurge.
- Sharper competition. The same study found that incumbent parties’ vote shares fell after EVMs arrived, most of all in high-fraud states. Electricity provision improved as competition intensified.
- No invalid votes and fast counts. Rejected ballots virtually disappeared, results now arrive within hours, and repolls have become rare: 39 in 2024, against 540 in 2019.
- Changed campaign strategy. Once force could not win a booth, parties turned to mobilising voters booth by booth.
- A new secrecy problem. Booth-wise counting reveals how each locality voted, which enables targeted reward or reprisal. The ECI’s proposal of a totaliser to aggregate votes across machines is still unimplemented.
The politics of trust
- Distrust changes sides. L. K. Advani questioned EVMs after the BJP’s 2009 defeat. Opposition parties have done so since 2014. Doubt tracks losing, not evidence.
- VVPAT. Subramanian Swamy v. ECI (2013) held a paper trail indispensable, and VVPAT was universal by 2019. N. Chandrababu Naidu (2019) raised slip-matching to five machines per assembly segment.
- ADR v. ECI (26 April 2024) rejected paper ballots and 100% VVPAT counting. Symbol-loading units must be stored for 45 days, and a candidate placed second or third may seek verification of the burnt memory in up to 5% of machines.
- NOTA. PUCL (2013) added “None of the Above” to the machine. It drew about 0.99% of the 2024 vote, and a record 2.18 lakh votes in Indore, but it has no legal consequence.
- The critique that remains is about verifiability, not proven tampering. A small audit sample and source code that has not been independently examined ask voters for trust rather than proof.
Assessment
Paper is no safe haven. The Chandigarh mayoral election of 2024, where the presiding officer defaced ballots, shows how manual counting can be manipulated. But legitimacy depends on the losers accepting the result, and so a sound machine still needs auditable transparency.
Conclusion
EVMs have been a net democratising force: they ended capture, empowered marginal voters and made results quick and credible. What remains is institutional, not technological. Wider statistically designed VVPAT audits, open protocols and a trusted Election Commission would turn acceptance by habit into verified trust.