“EU – India relations have a long way to go before they can purposely be termed strategic.” Discuss. (2014, 10 Marks)
India and the EU declared a Strategic Partnership at The Hague summit of 2004, resting openly on future potential. A partnership is strategic when the partners converge on security and the shape of world order, not merely on trade. Judged that way, the statement was accurate in 2014; by 2026 it is only partly so.
Why the label rang hollow in 2014
- Values without interests: democracy and pluralism were shared, yet little beyond commerce held the two together. Ummu Salma Bava (2008) argued that ideational proximity had still to be converted into interest convergence.
- The security gap: Delhi doubted that Brussels grasped its concerns over cross-border terrorism and China, or could help. The EU had no army, decided foreign policy by unanimity, and had little leverage in Asia.
- Ritual over substance: set-piece summits and over thirty dialogues produced few everyday links, and no summit was held between 2012 and 2016.
- Trade stalled: the Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, launched in 2007, was suspended in 2013 over cars, wines, patents, data adequacy and professional mobility.
- Aid ended: India’s graduation from EU bilateral development aid removed what had long been the core of the relationship.
- Normative friction: the Italian marines case (2012), European Parliament resolutions and lingering post-1998 non-proliferation lectures. Gauri Khandekar (2011) called it “a loveless arranged marriage”.
What has changed since
- The 2016 and 2017 summits restarted the process, and the EU Strategy on India (2018) called India an emerging global power, seeking security cooperation.
- The Roadmap to 2025 (2020), the Porto Leaders’ Meeting (2021) and the Trade and Technology Council (2023) added substance, while the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021) named India a priority partner.
- At the New Delhi summit of 27 January 2026 the two concluded an FTA, signed a Security and Defence Partnership, and adopted a strategic agenda to 2030 with security as a full pillar.
What still falls short
The FTA, sent to the EU Council only in September 2026, is not yet in force; the two still diverge on Russia, which Europe sees as an existential threat while India’s pacing threat is China (EU sanctions reach Indian refiners); and Europe’s CBAM and due-diligence rules are applied to Indian firms without Indian consent. India also does its real security business with Paris and Berlin rather than Brussels.
Conclusion
In 2014 the relationship was strategic in name only. The pressures since then—China’s coercion, Russia’s war and American tariffs—have given it strategic structure. Its claim to be strategic in practice will rest on ratification and on whether the two can disagree, over Russia or carbon, without stalling.