Discuss the implications of ethnicity and nation-building in South Asia, and their impact in the relations of states within South Asia. (2011, 30 Marks)
Nation-building is the effort to turn a population inside inherited borders into a political community loyal to the state; Karl W. Deutsch (Nationalism and Social Communication, 1953) tied it to dense social communication. Urmila Phadnis (Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia, 1989) argued that in this region ethnic assertion is not a residue that nation-building failed to clear but a product of nation-building itself. Because ethnic groups straddle borders, the domestic dialectic becomes an inter-state one.
The dialectic of ethnicity and nation-building
- Constructed, not primordial: against Clifford Geertz’s “primordial attachments”, Paul R. Brass (Ethnicity and Nationalism, 1991) shows elites selecting and politicising markers such as language or religion. South Asia’s record fits him: Bengali Muslims mobilised first as Muslims (1940s), then as Bengalis (1950s–71).
- Donald L. Horowitz (Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985) explains why the region’s unranked, territorially concentrated groups produce secessionist demands and why ethnic party systems reward outbidding.
Two models and their domestic implications
| State | Nation-building model | Ethnic outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | Centralised, Urdu as sole national language (1948) | Secession of Bangladesh (1971); Baloch insurgency |
| Sri Lanka | Sinhala Only (1956), unitary 1972 constitution | Civil war to 2009; Tamil question open |
| Nepal | One-language Hindu monarchy | Madhesi and Janajati revolt; 2015 constitution contested |
| Myanmar | 1982 citizenship law | Rohingya made stateless |
| India | “State-nation”: linguistic states, Sixth Schedule, asymmetric federalism | Accommodation, with lapses in Kashmir and the North-East |
Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav (Crafting State-Nations, 2011) credit India’s state-nation model with turning secessionist movements, as with the Mizos (statehood 1987), into federal bargaining. Elsewhere the implications were militarised states, emergency rule and refugee outflows; Ayesha Jalal links Pakistan’s to an army that left no political machinery for ethnic bargains.
Impact on relations among South Asian states
- Kin-state involvement: Tamil Nadu’s sympathy drew India into Sri Lanka’s war, from training militants to the 1987 Accord and the IPKF. Devolution still shapes ties; in 2026 India pressed Colombo to implement its Constitution and hold provincial council elections.
- Secession and war: about ten million refugees from East Pakistan brought India into the 1971 war, the region’s only completed ethnic secession.
- Ethnicity fused with territory: Kashmir structures India–Pakistan hostility. The Pashtun question and the unrecognised Durand Line turned Pakistan’s “strategic depth” into open war with the Taliban from October 2025, renewed in late September 2026.
- Sanctuary and accusation: North-East insurgents used Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar, while Pakistan blames India for Baloch violence; co-ethnic rebels become bargaining chips.
- Refugees as disputes: Myron Weiner showed how refugee flows become security issues; over a million Rohingya burden Bangladesh–Myanmar ties.
- Nationalism defined against India: Madhesi protests over the 2015 constitution led to a border blockade blamed on India, Nepal’s 2016 transit deal with China and its 2020 map. The Maldives’ “India Out” campaign and Bangladeshi anger after 2024 show smaller states building identity against the large neighbour.
- Regionalism stalled: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver classify South Asia as a conflict formation; SAARC has held no summit since 2014.
Beyond the region, diasporas and outside powers extend the effect: Tamil lobbying at the UN Human Rights Council, the 2023 India–Canada crisis over Khalistani activism, and Chinese investment in Balochistan.
Conclusion
Ethnicity does not divide states by itself; exclusionary nation-building does. Where states accommodated difference, grievance became federal bargaining; where they imposed uniformity, it crossed borders and poisoned neighbourly relations. India’s leverage as a regional model depends on practising the plural state-nation at home, which Manipur since 2023 has tested.