Write a brief analysis of the ethnic conflicts and cross-border migrations along India-Myanmar and India-Bangladesh borders. (2021, 15 Marks)
Both frontiers are colonial or Partition lines laid across continuous ethnic landscapes; Willem van Schendel (The Bengal Borderland, 2005) shows how such lines created borderland societies rather than separating peoples. On the 1,643 km Myanmar border kinship drives movement; on the 4,096 km Bangladesh border economy and demography do. Myron Weiner’s “sons of the soil” thesis (1978) explains why arrival becomes conflict: locals fear losing land, jobs and political control.
India–Myanmar border: kinship, insurgency and civil war
- Divided peoples: Nagas and the Kuki-Chin-Zo-Mizo peoples live on both sides; the Free Movement Regime let residents cross up to 16 km without visas.
- Sanctuary: NSCN-K, Manipur valley groups and ULFA-I use Myanmar’s Sagaing region; arms and methamphetamine enter through Moreh and Champhai.
- Migration after the 2021 coup: tens of thousands of Chin refugees sheltered in Mizoram, which refused central directions to collect biometrics because it treats them as kin. India also hosts about 40,000 Rohingya, some 22,500 registered with UNHCR.
- Manipur since May 2023: the Meitei–Kuki-Zo conflict (over 200 dead) was framed by the state government as illegal entry, while arms looted in Myanmar’s war flowed in. President’s Rule ended in February 2026 and the first direct Meitei–Kuki-Zo talks met in March 2026.
India–Bangladesh border: demography and identity
- Economic migration follows land scarcity, river erosion and floods on one side and labour demand on the other; social networks sustain each corridor.
- Nativist conflict: the Assam Movement (1979–85) ended in the 1985 Accord. The 2019 NRC excluded 19,06,657 people, and the Supreme Court upheld Section 6A by 4:1 on 17 October 2024. Tripura’s tribal insurgency grew from the fear of becoming a minority.
- Reverse flows: Chakmas and Hajongs displaced by the Kaptai dam reached Arunachal Pradesh; Jumma refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts stayed in Tripura until the 1997 accord.
- Sanctuary: ULFA and the NDFB kept camps in Bangladesh until Dhaka’s crackdown from 2009.
Analysis
| Criterion | Myanmar border | Bangladesh border |
|---|---|---|
| Main driver | Kinship, civil war | Economy, demography |
| Form of conflict | Inter-ethnic violence, insurgent transit | Nativist politics, border violence |
| Neighbour’s capacity | Junta controls little of its side | Capable state; cooperation tracks Dhaka’s government |
- Kinship decides perception: Mizoram reads Chin arrivals as reinforcement, Assam reads Bengali arrivals as dilution.
- Securitisation has limits: the FMR was scrapped in February 2024, yet only about 30 km of the Myanmar border is fenced; about 3,232 km of the eastern border was fenced by early 2025. Over two thousand push-backs since May 2025 and border killings strain ties with Dhaka.
- India has no refugee law and is not party to the 1951 Convention; the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 hardened enforcement without creating protection.
Conclusion
On both borders ethnic conflict and migration feed each other, and fences regulate movement, not allegiance. Durable management needs smart border policing, sanctuary denial negotiated with Naypyidaw and with Tarique Rahman’s government in Dhaka, regulated border trade and movement, and development in the North-East.