Discuss the basic assumptions of behaviouralism. In what way post behaviouralism differs from behavioural theory? (1996)
Behaviouralism shifted the study of politics from institutions to the observable behaviour of individuals and groups, and from description to explanation modelled on the natural sciences. Its roots run from Charles E. Merriam and the Chicago School to Harold D. Lasswell; its canonical statement is David Easton‘s eight “intellectual foundation stones”, restated in A Framework for Political Analysis (1965).
The philosophical premises
Beneath the eight stones lie three assumptions: empiricism (knowledge comes from observation), logical positivism (only verifiable statements are meaningful), and methodological individualism (the individual and group, not the state, are the units of analysis). Politics is treated as behaviour that recurs and can therefore be explained, predicted and, in principle, measured like any natural phenomenon.
Easton’s eight foundation stones
- Regularities: political behaviour shows discoverable uniformities that can be generalised.
- Verification: generalisations must be testable against behaviour.
- Techniques: data collection and interpretation must be rigorous, self-conscious and refined.
- Quantification: measurement wherever it is possible and meaningful.
- Values: ethical evaluation and empirical explanation are distinct and kept apart.
- Systematisation: research must be theory-oriented; facts without theory are not knowledge.
- Pure science: understanding precedes application.
- Integration: politics cannot be severed from sociology, psychology and economics.
Traditionalists contested almost every stone. Leo Strauss held that the value-neutrality of the fifth made the difference between good and bad regimes unthinkable, and critics noted that quantification confined inquiry to the measurable, mainly electoral behaviour.
How post-behaviouralism differs
Post-behaviouralism, announced by Easton in “The New Revolution in Political Science” (1969), keeps stones 1–4, 6 and 8 but rewrites values and pure science, and with them the discipline’s purpose.
| Criterion | Behavioural theory | Post-behaviouralism |
|---|---|---|
| Place in the discipline | Revolt against traditionalism | Reform within behaviouralism |
| Priority | Technique and precision | Substance and relevance |
| Fact and value | Kept separate; value-free science | Values integral to inquiry |
| Aim | Pure, contemplative knowledge | Applied, action-oriented knowledge |
| Stance on the status quo | Implicitly conservative | Oriented to social change |
| Role of the scholar | Detached observer | Responsible intellectual |
Indian scholarship shows the difference at work. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph‘s The Modernity of Tradition (1967) treated caste associations as vehicles of democratic participation, an empirical finding about how caste became a political resource. A post-behavioural question goes further: does such mobilisation restore dignity? Gopal Guru‘s edited Humiliation: Claims and Context (2009) makes humiliation, an evaluative category, the object of inquiry, joining fact to value.
How deep is the difference?
The difference is one of emphasis and purpose, not method. Post-behaviouralists still use surveys, statistics and systems frameworks; what changes is why they use them. Marxists and radicals therefore dismissed it as behaviouralism with a conscience, while traditionalists saw a vindication of their old case that political science cannot escape evaluation.
Conclusion
Behaviouralism assumed that politics could be known as nature is known, from outside and without judgement. Post-behaviouralism accepted the methods but denied the neutrality, making the difference one of the scientist’s responsibility rather than the science’s tools.