Development has overshadowed the influence of caste in electoral behaviour in recent elections. Discuss. (2019, 20 Marks)
The 2014 verdict prompted the claim that the Indian voter had moved from jati to vikas — from caste to development. Rajni Kothari had long argued that caste and politics transform each other rather than one displacing the other, and the survey evidence since 2014 bears him out. Development has not overshadowed caste; it has changed the terms on which caste is bargained and the scale at which it operates.
The case for development
- Flattening of class gradients: Christophe Jaffrelot (“Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election”, 2019) found that in 2009 and 2014 the poorer the voter, the less likely a BJP vote, whereas in 2019 the Prime Minister was about equally popular across all income strata.
- Saturation of quota politics: the Mandal-era offer of reservations for votes has lost force. With the 10% EWS quota (103rd Amendment, 2019), central reservation touches about 60%, and a new quota story would need reservation in the private sector — not a realistic prospect.
- The neo-middle class: post-1991 growth produced an aspirational stratum of first-generation, often rural-to-urban, earners who respond to growth, infrastructure and national standing.
- The labharthi voter: named, individually attributable benefits — free grain, gas connections, houses, toilets and cash transfers to women — create a beneficiary bloc across caste lines. Women-targeted transfers in Madhya Pradesh (2023), Maharashtra (2024) and Bihar (2025) preceded decisive wins.
- Decline of single-caste parties: the BSP won no seats in 2014 or 2024 despite substantial vote shares.
The case for caste
- Identity gradients persist: Abhijit Banerjee, Amory Gethin and Thomas Piketty (2019) found that income and education play little role once caste is controlled for, while caste cleavages stayed strong and religious divisions widened.
- Caste at the jati level: Jaffrelot’s own finding is that caste works through specific jatis rather than broad blocs. The BJP’s advance rested on micro-caste engineering — non-Yadav OBCs, non-Jatav Dalits — and careful ticket distribution.
- 2024: the Lokniti-CSDS National Election Study found the NDA’s Dalit support down about five points and OBC support slipping in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. The Samajwadi Party’s PDA coalition and the “reservation in danger” campaign cost the BJP its majority (240 seats).
- The caste census: after Bihar’s caste survey (released 2 October 2023), the Union Cabinet decided on 30 April 2025 to count caste in Census 2027 — the first full count since 1931. No party now treats caste as electorally spent.
- Bihar 2025: the NDA’s 202 of 243 seats rested on an alliance of EBCs, upper castes and women beneficiaries, while Jan Suraaj’s caste-neutral governance pitch won no seat.
Reconciliation: development through caste
- Development is itself delivered and claimed through caste. The Maratha, Jat and Patidar quota agitations are development grievances in caste form — Kothari’s politicisation of caste, in which a ritual unit becomes an interest group.
- Class differentiation is growing within jatis, so the relevant unit is shrinking: the prosperous and the poor of one caste may now vote differently.
- Yogendra Yadav’s second democratic upsurge brought lower castes into politics as claimants; their demand now is recognition and delivery together. Identity sets the range of acceptable options, and performance decides the choice within it.
Conclusion
Development has not overshadowed caste; it has been added to it. Welfare builds a cross-caste floor of support, while caste — now counted at the jati level and about to be officially enumerated — still sets the boundaries of the coalition. Explaining recent elections needs both variables, weighted differently by state and election.