Critically examine John Rawl’s Argument for democratic equality. (2016, 15 Marks)
Democratic equality is John Rawls‘s name, in §§12–13 of A Theory of Justice (1971), for the reading of his second principle that joins fair equality of opportunity to the difference principle. It is his answer to both utilitarianism and the market liberalism of the classical tradition: inequality is acceptable only when it works for the least advantaged.
The four interpretations
The phrases “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open” each admit two readings, giving four schemes.
| Principle of efficiency | Difference principle | |
|---|---|---|
| Careers open to talents | Natural liberty | Natural aristocracy |
| Fair equality of opportunity | Liberal equality | Democratic equality |
The argument
- Elimination: natural liberty lets market shares follow prior social and natural fortune — factors “arbitrary from a moral point of view”. Liberal equality corrects social background through schooling but still lets the natural lottery of talent fix rewards. Natural aristocracy limits the gains of the gifted yet leaves class untouched. Only democratic equality treats both contingencies consistently.
- The natural facts: the distribution of talent is “neither just nor unjust”; what is just or unjust is how institutions deal with it. Talent becomes a common asset, and people “agree to share one another’s fate”.
- The contract: the same result is what parties behind the veil of ignorance, reasoning by maximin, would choose — so the conclusion claims to be rational and impartial, not merely intuitive.
- Mutual limits: it is not simple egalitarianism. Equal liberty is lexically prior, fair opportunity precedes the difference principle, and just savings qualifies the last; each principle checks the others. Its value is fraternity.
India shows both halves: Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Education Act, 2009, reserving a quarter of private-school entry seats for disadvantaged children, is fair opportunity at its source; the creamy layer and the sub-classification permitted in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024) are difference-principle targeting.
Critique
From the right:
- Robert Nozick: persons are entitled to their talents and their fruits; a “common asset” denies self-ownership and trades liberty for equality.
- Utilitarians: maximin sacrifices large aggregate gains for small improvements at the bottom.
From the left:
- G. A. Cohen: the incentive inequalities it permits exist only because the talented reject its fraternal ethos; justice must reach personal choice. Socialists call it a sophisticated justification of inequality.
- Amartya Sen: a primary-goods index ignores that the sick or disabled convert resources into capabilities less effectively, so the least advantaged are misidentified.
Rethinking the ideal:
- Ronald Dworkin‘s luck egalitarianism wants distribution sensitive to choice but not circumstance, which the difference principle ignores. Elizabeth Anderson‘s “What Is the Point of Equality?” (1999) reclaims “democratic equality” for a relational ideal: ending oppression and securing standing as equal citizens.
Conclusion
Attacked as too egalitarian and as not egalitarian enough, the argument survives both. Utilitarian critics forget the separateness of persons; libertarians forget that talents yield rewards only through social cooperation. Its real weaknesses are of scope — personal choice and capability — and Anderson’s successor view extends its democratic intent rather than abandoning it.