Critically analyze India’s nuclear policy. (2016, 10 Marks)
India’s nuclear policy rests on the doctrine approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 4 January 2003 and on a regime posture of non-discriminatory disarmament. Its organising idea is that nuclear weapons are political instruments whose only purpose is to deter a nuclear attack.
Core elements
- Credible minimum deterrence with no first use (NFU): nuclear weapons are used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere.
- Retaliation will be massive, and only the civilian Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority can authorise it.
- A nuclear option is reserved against a major chemical or biological attack; no use against non-nuclear-weapon states.
- Outside the NPT and CTBT, but with a voluntary testing moratorium, support for an FMCT, strict export controls and the 2008 NSG waiver.
The case for the policy
- Rajesh Rajagopalan (2019) calls NFU “deep realism”, not idealism: with no defence against nuclear weapons, only assured retaliation deters, and India faces no existential threat, fears no disarming surprise attack and has no allies to protect.
- Minimalism avoided an arms race, kept crises conventional from Kargil (1999) to Operation Sindoor (May 2025), and earned the 2005–08 accommodation.
Critique
- Credibility at the lower rungs. Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence and the short-range Nasr cover every rung, while massive retaliation against a low-yield battlefield strike may not be believed.
- Doctrinal drift. Shivshankar Menon’s Choices (2016) admits a “potential grey area” on first use against a nuclear-armed adversary about to strike. Vipin Narang and Christopher Clary (International Security, 2018–19) read canisterised missiles, the MIRVed Agni-5 (2024) and such hints as a counterforce temptation. Rajnath Singh’s 2019 remark that NFU’s future “depends on the circumstances” fed this reading.
- Capability gaps. Bharat Karnad argues the disputed 1998 thermonuclear yield leaves India short of a proven high-yield weapon. The submarine leg lags: three SSBNs are in service after INS Aridhaman (April 2026), but the 3,500-km K-4 is not confirmed as deployed.
- Posture change. SIPRI’s 2026 count of 12 deployed warheads out of about 190 strains the old separated posture.
- The disarmament diplomacy has become largely declaratory.
Conclusion
The policy reflects realism, not passivity: a small, civilian-controlled, retaliation-only force suits a preponderant regional power. Its weak point is credibility at the lower rungs of escalation. A transparent review of “massive” retaliation would serve India better than quietly diluting NFU.