Discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on international politics.

Discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on international politics. (2004, 2015, 15 Marks)

A superpower holding a sixth of the world’s land and more than thirty thousand warheads dissolved on 26 December 1991 without invasion or civil war, because its own republics decided it should. The collapse removed one pole of the post-1945 order, and its consequences are still unfolding.

Why the Union collapsed

  • Economic exhaustion: a command economy stalled at the information frontier; János Kornai’s “soft budget constraint” removed discipline, and the 1986 oil-price fall and the defence burden drained hard currency.
  • Reform sequencing: Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) delegitimised the regime’s history before perestroika (restructuring) delivered goods, so grievance found a voice before it found relief. Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning (The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1856) that reform is a bad government’s most dangerous moment fits exactly.
  • Nationalities and Russia’s defection: a federation of national republics broke apart once coercion was withdrawn. The Baltic states led, but Boris Yeltsin’s Russia was the decisive defector; the failed August 1991 coup discredited the Party, KGB and army, and the Belovezha Accords (8 December 1991) ended the Union.

Impact on international politics

  • From bipolarity to unipolarity: Charles Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment” described an America without a peer competitor, and great-power war receded as a risk.
  • End of the ideological contest: Francis Fukuyama read it as the “end of history”; Samuel P. Huntington predicted civilisational conflict instead. The 1990s favoured the first reading, the decades after 2001 the second.
  • Security Council unblocked, briefly: Moscow backed force against Iraq in 1990–91 and George H. W. Bush proclaimed a “new world order”, but Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) showed American freedom to act around the Council.
  • Asymmetric settlement in Europe: the Warsaw Pact and COMECON dissolved in 1991 while NATO survived and grew to 32 members; East European states regained sovereignty and adopted democracy and markets.
  • Unfrozen conflicts: Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Chechnya erupted once bipolar discipline vanished.
  • Nuclear succession: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gave up inherited arsenals under the Lisbon Protocol (1992) and Budapest Memorandum (1994).
  • Market universalism: the Washington Consensus became the price of finance, deepening Southern dependence on Western lenders.
  • India’s reorientation: India lost the partner of the 1971 treaty, its Soviet veto cover on Kashmir and the rupee–rouble trade in the year of its balance-of-payments crisis. C. Raja Mohan (Crossing the Rubicon, 2003) traces India’s turn to markets, the United States and East Asia to that shock.

The long shadow

Russia’s grievance over NATO enlargement fed Vladimir Putin’s revisionism: Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014 and the 2022 invasion. As of late September 2026 no ceasefire holds, Russia occupies about a fifth of Ukraine, and the expiry of New START on 5 February 2026 left the two largest arsenals unconstrained.

Conclusion

The collapse was a rupture in the structure of world politics, not merely the end of a rivalry. Unipolarity proved a moment rather than an era, and Russia’s attempt to reverse 1991 has instead accelerated the loss of its sphere, with Finland and Sweden now in NATO.