Comment: Coalition Governments in India at the Centre since 1998. (2005, 20 Marks)
The post-poll arrangements of 1989–98 gave India six Prime Ministers in under a decade. 1998 marks a break: coalitions became pre-poll alliances led by a core party, with a written programme. E. Sridharan traces the pattern to the first-past-the-post system, under which pooling votes before the election outweighs ideological distance. Since then, central coalitions have been more stable and more productive than the stereotype allows, and their weakness has been accountability more than survival.
The trajectory
| Government | Form | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| NDA 1998–99 | BJP (182) plus allies; TDP outside | Fell by one vote, 269–270, on 17 April 1999, when the AIADMK withdrew |
| NDA 1999–2004 | Over twenty parties; National Agenda for Governance | The first non-Congress government to complete a full term |
| UPA-I 2004–09 | Common Minimum Programme (May 2004); Left support from outside | Survived the Left’s July 2008 exit; won the trust vote of 22 July 2008, 275–256 |
| UPA-II 2009–14 | Larger Congress core | Full term, but TMC (2012) and DMK (2013) exits, and paralysis |
| NDA 2014–24 | BJP majorities (282, 303) | Allies arithmetically superfluous |
| NDA 2024– | BJP 240; TDP (16) and JD(U) (12) pivotal | Coalition constraint returns |
What made them work
- Pre-poll alliances. Partners had already shared seats and campaigned together, so the coalition carried a mandate and walking out had a cost.
- A dominant core. A party far larger than any partner made single defections survivable. The United Front of 1996–98 lacked one.
- Programmes that quarantine conflict. The National Agenda set aside the Ram temple, Article 370 and a uniform civil code. The CMP listed commitments, and its omissions signalled restraint.
- Machinery. The NDA’s coordination committee under George Fernandes, the UPA–Left Coordination Committee and Groups of Ministers settled disputes before they reached the floor.
The record
Coalition governments delivered Pokhran-II, the Golden Quadrilateral and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. They also passed the RTI Act, MGNREGA, the Forest Rights Act, the Right to Education Act and the Indo-US nuclear deal. The Left pushed the employment guarantee toward a statutory right, and Arend Lijphart would read such bargaining as inclusion rather than weakness.
The costs
- Diluted accountability. Telecom sat with the DMK, an ally the Prime Minister could not easily discipline, and the 2008 2G allocation became UPA-II’s defining scandal. Manmohan Singh invoked “coalition dharma” in 2011.
- Veto players. Retail FDI cost the government the TMC, and the GST stalled.
- Extra-constitutional centres. The National Advisory Council set the agenda outside the Cabinet. Critics called this a diarchy.
After 2014: dependence returns
In 2014–24 the NDA was a coalition in form only; the Shiv Sena’s exit in 2019 and the Akali Dal’s in 2020 cost Narendra Modi nothing. Since 2024 the arithmetic binds again, although the BJP kept Home, Finance, Defence and External Affairs. The effects show in policy:
- the July 2024 budget gave packages to Andhra Pradesh and Bihar;
- the lateral-entry advertisement was withdrawn;
- the Waqf Bill went to a JPC;
- a caste census was conceded.
The 131st Amendment Bill (April 2026), backed by the NDA, was defeated 298–230 by the opposition because the government lacked a two-thirds majority. The constraint now falls on policy, not on survival. The allies also stay for state-level reasons, which Sridharan calls a lock-in effect.
Conclusion
Since 1998, coalitions at the Centre have proved that India can be governed by alliance. When they were pre-poll, programmatic and anchored by a large core, they completed full terms and legislated boldly. Their failures, in UPA-II’s paralysis and scandals, came from exhausted programmes and blurred accountability, not from coalition itself. The 2024 NDA tests whether that discipline can coexist with a dominant core.