When there are multiple stakeholders of power, conversation and consensus become the natural ingredients of governance. Analyze with respect to coalition politics. (2026, 15 Marks)
Walter Bagehot called parliamentary rule “government by discussion” in Physics and Politics (1872). Arend Lijphart‘s Patterns of Democracy (1999) set the consensus model, with executive power shared in broad coalitions, against the majoritarian model. A coalition multiplies the stakeholders whose consent a government needs, so conversation becomes structurally necessary. Whether it produces genuine consensus depends on how the coalition is built.
Why coalition compels conversation
- Veto players. George Tsebelis (Veto Players, 2002) argues that every actor whose agreement is required for change narrows what a government can do. Under Article 75(3), any pivotal partner can end a ministry by withdrawing, so its views must be heard before decisions are taken.
- Heterogeneity. Indian coalitions are “rainbow” alliances of regional, caste-based and ideological parties. No shared doctrine settles disputes, so negotiation has to. The National Front of 1989, sustained by the BJP and the Left at once, shows how wide the gap can be.
- Federal stakes. Regional partners bring their states’ demands into the Union Cabinet, which makes Centre–state conversation a daily necessity.
The instruments of conversation
| Instrument | Example |
|---|---|
| Written programme | NDA’s National Agenda for Governance (1998) set aside Ayodhya, Article 370 and a uniform civil code; UPA’s Common Minimum Programme (2004) |
| Coordination bodies | NDA coordination committee under George Fernandes; the UPA–Left Coordination Committee |
| Pre-Cabinet brokering | Groups of Ministers; Joint Parliamentary Committees |
| Federal forums | Inter-State Council (1990) |
Evidence from 2024 onward
With the BJP at 240, the TDP and JD(U) became pivotal, and consultation followed:
- the Waqf Bill went to a JPC and passed in 2025 with amendments allies sought;
- lateral entry was withdrawn;
- the Unified Pension Scheme and a caste census were conceded.
The defeat of the 131st Amendment Bill (April 2026) showed that constitutional change still needs consensus beyond the coalition.
Links and tensions
- Bargaining is not deliberation. Much coalition “consensus” is transactional. The July 2024 budget packages for Andhra Pradesh and Bihar were the price of support, not the result of reasoned agreement. In Jürgen Habermas‘s terms this is strategic action rather than communicative action.
- Conversation can fail. The Left’s withdrawal over the Indo-US nuclear deal (July 2008) and UPA-II’s paralysis over retail FDI show that veto players can turn consensus into deadlock.
- Asymmetry thins consensus. A dominant core party consults on the margins but keeps the centre of power. The BJP retained Home, Finance, Defence and External Affairs.
- Consensus without coalition. Rajni Kothari‘s Congress was a “party of consensus” that settled disputes internally. The GST Council, created in 2016 under a majority government, has largely worked by agreement. The real variable is the dispersal of power, of which coalition is one source.
Conclusion
Multiple stakeholders make conversation necessary, but not natural. It becomes consensus only when it is institutionalised through pre-poll alliances, written programmes and standing coordination, which is what coalition dharma requires. Without them, coalition governance reduces to bargaining and veto. India’s coalitions have shown both outcomes.