Is there any linkage between a shift in China’s relations with Japan to a perceived shift in her relations with India? Examine in the light of China’s so- called ‘anti- encirclement struggle’. (150 words) (2012, 12 Marks)
Chinese strategic writing around 2010 described the US alliance system, Japan and India as a ring around China. PLA Air Force Colonel Dai Xu’s C-Shaped Encirclement (2010) is the best-known example. China’s “anti-encirclement struggle” means its effort to break that ring before it hardens. The question is whether, in that frame, a shift in China’s dealings with Japan carries over to its dealings with India.
The case for a linkage
- Shared trigger: Beijing reacted to India–Japan convergence as one problem: the 2007 Quad proposal (which drew Chinese protests), the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the first US–Japan–India trilateral (December 2011) and the first bilateral naval exercise, JIMEX (June 2012).
- Parallel hardening, 2009–13: China’s pressure over the Senkaku Islands (the 2010 trawler collision followed by rare-earth curbs, then the 2012 nationalisation crisis) came alongside stapled visas for residents of Jammu and Kashmir, the 2010 refusal of a visa to the general commanding India’s Northern Command, and the Depsang incursion of April 2013.
- Security dilemma logic: as John H. Herz argued, defensive moves look offensive to the other side. Because China reads India–Japan ties as encirclement, the ties themselves produce part of the Chinese assertiveness they are meant to answer.
- Kautilya in reverse: if Japan is India’s natural friend across China, then China treats the two fronts as connected.
The limits of the linkage
- Different drivers: with Japan the dispute is about wartime history, the East China Sea and Taiwan; with India it is the land boundary, Tibet and Pakistan. Each follows its own timetable, and economic interdependence with both partners also shapes Chinese choices.
- Wedge strategy: Beijing often eases on one front while pressing on the other. In 2025 it normalised relations with India after Narendra Modi’s Tianjin visit, but punished Japan with seafood and travel curbs after Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks.
- Indian autonomy: India stayed silent on the 2025 Japan–China row, and in 2020 Tokyo opposed unilateral change on the LAC without taking a side on the boundary, so Beijing faces two separate policies rather than a single front. Rohan Mukherjee (2018) notes that China’s ability to punish both economically is itself a brake on alliance.
Conclusion
There is a linkage, but it lies in Chinese perception more than in a mechanical policy rule. Because Beijing reads both states through the encirclement lens, pressure on one usually accompanies pressure on the other. Yet China also tries to split them. This argues for keeping India–Japan ties close, but below the threshold of alliance.