Bhutan has historically been an ally of India, but the China-Bhutan border related issues have become a security issue for India. Discuss. (2024, 10 Marks)
Bhutan is India’s most dependable neighbour. The 1949 Treaty of Friendship, revised in 2007, turned Indian “guidance” into a mutual pledge that neither territory will be used against the other; formal diplomatic ties date from 1968. Its unsettled 477 km boundary with China is a negotiation India is not party to but has a direct security stake in.
The dispute
| Sector | Area | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Western | about 269 sq km (Doklam and adjoining pastures) | Adjoins the Chumbi Valley and the trijunction |
| North-central | about 495 sq km (Pasamlung, Jakarlung) | Pastoral value to Bhutan; little Indian stake |
| Eastern | Sakteng, claimed from 2020 | Links Bhutan’s boundary to China’s Arunachal claim |
Why it is an Indian security issue
- Geography: the Chinese Chumbi Valley points south between Sikkim and Bhutan towards the Siliguri Corridor, about 22 km wide. Doklam is the shoulder of that salient.
- Package deal: China has long offered to accept Bhutan’s claim to the larger north-central valleys in return for the western tract; that suits Bhutan’s arithmetic and hurts India’s.
- Trijunction: India and Bhutan place it at Batang La, China further south at Gipmochi under the 1890 Convention; a 2012 India–China understanding requires all parties concerned to settle it.
- Doklam, 2017: in a 73-day standoff over a Chinese road, India’s Ministry of External Affairs warned that the construction would change the status quo with serious security implications for India.
- Facts on the ground: Robert Barnett (Foreign Policy, 2021) documented Chinese villages and roads built inside territory Bhutan claims.
- Momentum: 25 boundary rounds, a Three-Step Roadmap (2021), a joint technical team (2023) and talks in Beijing (March–April 2026) on alignment in undisputed areas.
The limits of the alarm
- Bhutan is not drifting towards China: it has no diplomatic relations with any permanent Security Council member, and it publicly protested the Doklam road-building in June 2017.
- Its motive is sovereign: an unsettled border makes it a theatre for others’ rivalry. Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s March 2023 remark that Doklam involves “three of us” unsettled New Delhi, yet conceded India’s seat.
- Visibly obstructing Bhutan–China normalisation would revive the image of an overbearing neighbour.
India’s response
- Deeper economic stakes: a ₹10,000 crore pledge for Bhutan’s 13th Five Year Plan, support for Gelephu Mindfulness City, and the first rail links (Kokrajhar–Gelephu and Banarhat–Samtse, announced in 2025).
- Border infrastructure under the Vibrant Villages Programme, and quiet consultation on the western sector.
Conclusion
The alliance holds; the risk lies in the terms of a settlement, not its existence. India’s aim should be that no Doklam deal is struck in its absence, secured through partnership rather than pressure.