Account for the changes in the socio-economic profile of legislators during last one decade in India. (2014, 15 Marks)
A legislature is often called a mirror of society, and in Hanna Pitkin‘s terms its composition measures descriptive representation. Between the 14th (2004), 15th (2009) and 16th (2014) Lok Sabhas, the profile of Indian MPs changed less in caste than in wealth, criminal records and occupation. The plebeian rise that Christophe Jaffrelot called India’s Silent Revolution (2003) levelled off.
The changes, 2004–2014
| Indicator | 2004 | 2009 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crorepati MPs | 30% | 58% | 82% |
| Average declared assets | — | ₹5.35 crore | ₹14.7 crore |
| MPs with criminal cases | 23% | 30% | 34% |
| Women MPs | 45 | 59 | 62 |
| Muslim MPs | — | 30 | 23 |
- Caste: among Hindi-belt MPs, Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers found the upper-caste share rising from 34% (2004) to 44.5% (2014), while the OBC share fell from its 2004 peak of 26% to about 20%.
- Occupation: lawyers had been the largest group in the first Lok Sabha and were now a small minority. MPs increasingly declared “agriculture” and “social work”, while business interests rose.
- Dynasty: Patrick French‘s survey of the 15th Lok Sabha found that two-thirds of MPs under forty had a near relative in politics.
Causes
- The cost of contesting. Party spending is uncapped, and campaigns now rely on money for media, vehicles and handouts. This favours self-financing candidates, so wealth became a qualification for a ticket.
- Criminality as an asset. Milan Vaishnav, in When Crime Pays (2017), shows that such candidates pay for their own campaigns and offer voters “protection” where the state is weak. Parties choose them because they win.
- Disclosure made the change visible. The affidavits required after ADR (2002) and PUCL (2003) produced the first comparable data, and showed that exposure without penalty did not deter.
- Politics as a profession. The post-liberalisation economy raised the value of office for contracts, land and licences, drawing businesspeople in as lawyers faded.
- Caste realignment. The Mandal-era advance of dominant OBCs (Yadavs, Kurmis) plateaued. In 2014 the BJP combined upper castes with non-dominant OBCs and Dalits.
- Weak party institutions. With no internal elections, the family name works as a brand and a guarantee of loyalty. Parties nominated few women despite rising female turnout.
Extending to 2024
The trends deepened. In the 18th Lok Sabha 93% of MPs are crorepatis, with average assets of ₹46.34 crore, and 46% have declared criminal cases, 31% serious ones. There are 74 women MPs (13.6%), a fall from 78, and 24 Muslim MPs. The average age dropped from 59 to 56, with the youngest members aged 25. Lawyers are about 7%, against 36% in the first Lok Sabha.
Conclusion
Over the decade, access to Parliament shifted from caste-based to capital-based filters. The social base broadened between 1989 and 2004, and then money, muscle and lineage narrowed entry again. The House became more plural in caste terms but more plutocratic. Only campaign-finance reform, intra-party democracy and the 106th Amendment’s women’s quota can correct the imbalance.