Examine the changing pattern of electoral behaviour in India. (2011)
Electoral behaviour is the study of who votes, how, and why. The early view of the Indian voter was of a captive of caste who, in the old aphorism, “votes his caste”. The survey record of the Lokniti-CSDS National Election Studies suggests a different sequence, from deference to assertion to evaluation. Each stage adds to the last rather than replacing it.
Three phases
| Phase | How the vote was produced | Model it fits |
|---|---|---|
| Deference (1952–67) | Dominant-caste notables delivered blocs; M. N. Srinivas coined “vote bank” for this (1955) | Columbia (sociological): the vote follows social location |
| Assertion (late 1960s–2004) | Castes voted as self-conscious actors for their own parties: the first and second democratic upsurges (Yogendra Yadav), Mandal and mandir | Group interest; Kanchan Chandra‘s patronage democracy |
| Evaluation (2004 onward) | Blocs fragment; voters judge delivery and leaders | Morris Fiorina‘s retrospective voting; Anthony Downs‘s rational voter |
Testing the claim against evidence
- Participation inverted. Dalits, Adivasis, the poor and rural voters now vote at rates equal to or above those of elites. Women’s turnout overtook men’s in 2019 and again in 2024 (65.78% against 65.55%).
- Party identification stayed weak. The Michigan model assumes inherited loyalty, but Indian parties split and realign too often to sustain it. The result is high volatility and dealignment.
- Anti-incumbency gave way to conditional pro-incumbency. Governments in Gujarat, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal won repeated terms on visible delivery. Labharthi (beneficiary) voting cuts across caste lines.
- Voters split their tickets. In Odisha’s simultaneous polls of 2019, the Biju Janata Dal swept the assembly while the BJP won 8 of the 21 Lok Sabha seats. Voters distinguished national from state questions.
- The contest became presidential. From 2014 national campaigns turned on the choice of Prime Minister, although the constitution is parliamentary.
- Religion consolidated on both sides. Hindu consolidation after 2014 was met by minority tactical voting: about 65% of Muslims backed the INDIA bloc in 2024.
- New channels opened. NOTA (from PUCL v. Union of India, 2013) allows formal rejection, and WhatsApp and short video now carry campaigns directly to voters.
Limits of the change thesis
- Caste has been reorganised, not retired. Parties now build coalitions of non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits, and Rajni Kothari‘s politicisation of caste describes this better than decline does.
- There is no national pattern. A general election is an aggregate of state verdicts; in 2024 the NDA lost ground in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra while gaining in Odisha.
- Supply constrains choice. In the 18th Lok Sabha 93% of MPs are crorepatis and 46% declare criminal cases, so voters choose from a menu that money has already filtered.
- The evidence is imperfect. Post-poll surveys are estimates that carry recall and disclosure bias.
Conclusion
The pattern has changed from delivered votes to negotiated and evaluated ones. Identity still determines which parties a voter will consider, and delivery and leadership now decide among them. Indian voters are more discriminating than the aphorism allows, but they choose within limits set by caste arithmetic and money.