Comment in 150 words: Aristotle’s Conception of Equality. (2015, 10 Marks)
For Aristotle equality is not a separate ideal but the core of justice: the just is the equal (Nicomachean Ethics, Book V). Equality is relational, however. The question is always “equal in what respect?”, and his answer shapes his theory of justice, his constitutions and his account of revolution.
Proportionate and Numerical Equality
- Justice is equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals, and inequality is just for unequals (Politics III.9). Hence the famous formula: treating equals unequally, or unequals equally, is unjust.
- Numerical (arithmetic) equality gives the same to all. Proportionate (geometric) equality gives shares in ratio to relevant worth.
- Distributive justice allots honours, office and wealth by proportionate equality, according to contribution to the city’s purpose, which is virtue, not wealth.
- Corrective justice uses numerical equality. The judge restores the balance between parties to a transaction or a wrong, ignoring who they are.
Two Partial Truths
Democrats infer from equal freedom a claim to equality in everything, and oligarchs infer from unequal wealth a claim to inequality in everything. Aristotle grants each a partial truth. That concession, more generous than Plato’s contempt for democracy, underlies polity and his defence of the collective judgment of the many. The stakes are political: inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Constitutions fall when either side feels its conception of equality denied, whether or not the grievance is real.
Limits
- The formula is a container. It forbids inconsistency but does not say which differences count. Aristotle counted free birth, sex and supposed rational capacity, and the formula then delivered natural slavery, female subordination and a citizenship confined to free men of leisure.
- Merit reflects circumstance. Rewarding contribution rewards prior advantage. John Rawls (A Theory of Justice, 1971) therefore rejects desert as a basis of distribution, and Amartya Sen (“Equality of What?”, 1979) asks which space equality should occupy.
The Indian Application
Article 14’s test of reasonable classification (Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendolkar, 1958) makes the formula operational: an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the law’s object. Articles 15(4) and 16(4) use its second edge for the disadvantaged. Historic deprivation, not natural incapacity, becomes the relevant inequality.
Conclusion
Aristotle’s conception survives as a method, since equality always requires a judgment of relevance. His substance does not. Modern democracy keeps his formula and reverses his list of relevant differences.