Do you think that India’s capacity building role in Afghanistan has shrunk the strategic space for Pakistan there? Discuss. (2018, 20 Marks)
Kautilya’s mandala theory holds that the neighbour is a natural rival and the state beyond it a natural friend. Afghanistan, Pakistan’s other neighbour, therefore matters to India’s dealings with Pakistan. After 2001 India chose to compete there not with troops but with capacity building. The honest answer is that this narrowed Pakistan’s soft space considerably, but not its hard space. When Pakistan’s space did shrink after 2021, the Taliban, not Indian projects, shrank it.
India’s model: building a state and a society
- Scale: commitments of over US$3 billion, making India the largest regional donor, under the 2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement, Afghanistan’s first with any country.
- Infrastructure with a political purpose: the Parliament building (2015) underwrote the constitutional order, the Salma Dam (2016) served the west, and the Zaranj–Delaram highway (218 km) linked Afghanistan to Iran and Chabahar, bypassing Karachi.
- Human capital: ITEC training for civil servants and ICCR scholarships, with thousands of Afghan students in India. By 2020 India counted 400-plus projects across all 34 provinces.
- Deliberate restraint: no troops, and only a few Mi-25 attack helicopters from December 2015 by way of lethal aid.
Where India did shrink Pakistan’s space
- Legitimacy and opinion: in a 2009 ABC/BBC/ARD survey, 74% of Afghans viewed India favourably, against a small minority for Pakistan, which was widely blamed for the insurgency.
- Elite alignment: Hamid Karzai and, after a failed opening to Rawalpindi in 2014–15, Ashraf Ghani both leaned towards Delhi; Ghani publicly blamed Pakistan-based sanctuaries after the August 2015 Kabul bombings.
- Economic routes: the air-freight corridor (2017) and Chabahar wheat shipments weakened Pakistan’s monopoly over Afghan transit.
- Perception: Pakistan’s constant complaint of “encirclement” from Indian consulates shows Islamabad felt its space contracting.
Why it did not shrink Pakistan’s hard space
- Instruments differ in kind: Pakistan worked through the Taliban and the Haqqani network, offering sanctuary in Quetta and Peshawar. Dams and scholarships cannot counter armed proxies.
- Geography: Pakistan controlled transit under APTTA and could close Torkham at will.
- The Doha process (2018–20) made Pakistan indispensable to Washington, while India had no seat. August 2021 exposed the limit, as India’s investment in a state vanished with the state.
- Realists argue that soft power without hard power cannot shape outcomes in a conflict. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk (RAND, 2012) judged that India had far more to offer Afghanistan in the long run, while Pakistan’s strategy aimed chiefly at blocking Indian influence. Liberal readings value goodwill as a long-term asset. Both were proved right, on different timescales.
The post-2021 inversion
Pakistan’s strategic depth has since produced the opposite of depth. The Taliban rejected the Durand Line, sheltered the TTP, and fought open war with Pakistan from February 2026, with cross-border clashes still recurring in late September 2026. Kabul then turned to Delhi. India restored its embassy (October 2025) and accepted a Taliban chargé d’affaires (January 2026). In 2025, Afghan exports to India overtook those to Pakistan for the first time. India’s two decades of goodwill made this re-entry possible. The shrinking of Pakistan’s space, however, was the Taliban’s doing.
Conclusion
India’s capacity building shrank Pakistan’s space in Afghan hearts, markets and governing elites, but not on the battlefield or at the border, which decided the outcome in 2021. It has proved a durable reserve, not a decisive lever. Pakistan’s strategic space has now contracted through its own doctrine’s failure, and India’s task is to turn that windfall into lasting access.