Mughal Theory of Sovereignty

Mughal Theory of Sovereignty

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• Indian political thought, as well as the Persian and Turco-Mongol traditions, attached considerable importance to the institution of sovereignty as essential for preserving order and stability in society, and for eradicating anarchy and lawlessness.
• Monarchy was considered the very keystone of medieval polity. As Abul Fazl put it: “If royalty did not exist, the storm of strife would never subside, nor selfish ambition disappear. Mankind being under the burden of lawlessness and lust would sink into the pit of destruction…”
• The nature of the state, and the complexion of an empire’s administrative structure, were determined largely by its underlying theory of sovereignty, and by the policies propounded and pursued by the king himself.
  • A study of the Central Asian theory of state and its various dimensions is, therefore, essential for a correct understanding of Mughal polity.

The Background

• The Mughal rulers of India were by no means new to the art of governance:
  • They brought with them nearly two centuries of dynastic experience ruling in Central Asia.
  • They carried with them well-tried and firmly established administrative principles.
  • The necessity of adapting to a new land had made them flexible enough to absorb the traditions of their new surroundings.
• Consequently, the general administrative structure and policies of the Mughals in India appear as a conglomeration of Indo-Islamic trends:
  • Their rich Central Asian heritage and Turco-Mongol legacy — in the form of practices, institutions, loanwords, and terminology — appear occasionally throughout Mughal governance.
  • Remnants of both Chingizi (Genghisid) and Timuri polity are frequently noticeable within the Mughal structure in India.
• Babur took pride in calling himself a “Turk,” though he was, more precisely, a Turco-Mongol — related to Chingiz Khan on his mother’s side, and to Timur on his father’s side.
  • Despite occasional outbursts against the Mongols, Babur held Chingiz Khan and his family in high esteem.
  • Akbar’s own attitude toward these “ancestors” is reflected in Abul Fazl’s description of Chingiz as “a great man.”
  • By thus elevating and glorifying the Mongols, the Mughals in India effectively added prestige to their own dynasty — extending their hereditary claim over Indian territory on the basis of carrying the blood of both Chingiz and Timur was, accordingly, both logical and politically expedient.
• Babur’s dynasty in India was variously described as “Chaghatai,” “Mughal,” and “Qarawanah,” with little regard for the finer genealogical distinctions or the fact that their relationship to Chingiz traced through the female line.
  • The significance of this ancestral relationship was not merely recognised but actively utilised and emphasised by Mughal rulers and their court chroniclers alike, appearing throughout biographies, historical accounts, royal letters, and other official documents.
  • This emphasis on kinship with the houses of Chingiz and Timur reveals the underlying Mughal anxiety to claim close relationship and equal standing with the ruling family of Chingiz Khan — whether their genealogical claims were, in fact, real or fictitious.
• To a considerable extent, the Mughals preserved this rich Central Asian legacy even while ruling over an alien and rather different region — India.
  • A number of Mughal institutions and terms bear similar nomenclature to their Central Asian counterparts, though often carrying different meanings or connotations in their new context.
  • A thorough process of adaptation of Central Asian terms and institutions, in accordance with local needs, circumstances, and surroundings, is equally evident throughout Mughal administration.

Nature of Central Asian Polity: Turco-Mongol Impact

• The Central Asian polity adopted by the Mughals bore both Turkish and Mongol traits in many respects, though considerable scholarly controversy exists over the relative magnitude of each influence.
  • Some scholars hold that Mongol traditions were predominant, while others argue that Turkish influence was so strong that the Mongol system had effectively been transformed into what can only be designated a Turco-Mongol polity.
• When Chingiz Khan first came to power in Central Asia, his army was composed mainly of Turks, with only a nucleus of ethnic Mongols. Several sources support the observation that prescribed Mughal norms, customs, and practices were often followed “in the fashion of Chingiz Khan.”
  • The empire of Timur was, similarly, a “unique combination of Turco-Mongolian political and military system” — the Barlas tribe, to which Timur himself belonged, was itself a Turco-Mongol tribe.

(1) Influence of the Turah

• Beyond its Turkish traditions, Central Asian administration was considerably influenced by the turah — the body of laws formulated by Chingiz Khan following his ascendancy.
  • The turah contained no religious element, dealing mainly with political principles and the organisation of civil and military government, and was regarded as an immutable code.
• Akbar himself took evident pride in his Central Asian connections and traditions — accordingly, a fine blend of Central Asian and Indian traditions, overlaid with a veneer of Perso-Islamic principles, is noticeable across various spheres of Mughal politics and administration under his rule.
  • References to the turah figure prominently in Jahangir’s autobiography, and continue to flicker through some of his administrative measures.
  • Such references, however, begin to fade during the reign of Shah Jahan, and are ultimately engulfed altogether by the wave of “religious revivalism” under Aurangzeb.
• Nevertheless, the principles of the turah and the wider Chaghatai traditions had only limited practical utility within the Indian context.
  • A survey of Mughal sources suggests that the continued emphasis on the turah was largely motivated by the realpolitik concerns of Mughal emperors, keen to highlight their links to the two great conquerors of India and empire-builders, Chingiz and Timur.
  • At best, the traditions of the turah continued to linger within the Mughal Empire mainly in the sphere of ceremonial law and etiquette.
  • Notably, the occasional references to “Chaghatai traditions” found in early Mughal sources are conspicuously absent from later-period sources.

(2) Turco-Mongol Concept of Sovereignty

• Although Chingiz Khan is said to have borrowed his divine theory of sovereignty from the Uighurs, the Mongols themselves appear to have believed firmly in the absolute power of the Khan — reflected in the words of one Mongol Khan: “In the sky there can only be one sun or one moon; how can there be two masters on earth?”
• Nonetheless, the division of the empire among a ruler’s sons — intended to facilitate administration and satisfy the governing ambitions of individual princes — remained the cardinal principle of the Mongol theory of sovereignty.
• Timur, by contrast, followed a concept of strictly absolute sovereignty, pronouncing that “the whole expanse of the inhabited part of the world is not worthy of two kings: since God is one, therefore, the vicegerent of God on earth should also be one.” Babur likewise confirmed that “partnership in rule is a thing unheard of.”
  • Despite these assertions, historians remain divided over the true nature of Timur’s absolutist tradition, given that Timur himself had formally accepted the nominal overlordship of a descendant of Chingiz Khan.
  • Timur never assumed any title higher than amir. Though his successor Shahrukh later adopted the titles Padshah and Sultan-ul-Azam, the underlying idea of nominal Khanid overlordship persisted.
  • The maintenance of puppet Khans was, in fact, a political necessity for Timur: since he did not himself belong to the royal family of Chingiz, and only members of Chingiz’s own tribe could legitimately claim the title of Khan, his own right of accession remained vulnerable to challenge from the Mongols.
  • These puppet Khans were confined to a particular locality, their sole royal prerogative being the issuance of manshurs (orders), while certain coins minted under Timur bore the names of these effective “prisoners.”
  • Even so, Timur continued to assert his real supremacy over these Khans. As soon as he had secured sufficient power and support from the Chaghatai nobles, he proclaimed himself sovereign in 1370, taking the title sahib-i-qiran (a title reserved for a ruler who had ruled for forty years); his coronation was celebrated with full royal grandeur, for Timur alone.
    • Timur never “rendered honours to the Khans in the presence of the troops and in solemn surroundings” — such honours, due to the true monarch, were always personally received by Timur himself.
  • As a firm believer in absolutism, Timur never attached particular importance to the consultative assembly (qurultai), considering himself both temporal and spiritual leader simultaneously — stretching the concept of sovereignty to its logical extreme by announcing that he “received direct revelations from the Almighty,” thereby granting his enterprise explicit divine sanction.
  • The practice of installing puppet Khans was, in essence, a political game played by Timur and his successors — a means of mobilising Mongol military support while ultimately using it to establish and legitimise their own rule over territory that had, in reality, been usurped from the Mongols themselves. Indeed, after the death of the puppet Khan Mahmud in 1402, Timur did not trouble to appoint any further Khan.

(3) Nature of the Political Structure

• Was the political structure of the Timuri rulers of Central Asia oriented towards greater centralisation? Scholarly opinion remains divided.
  • Some scholars discern clear trends towards greater centralisation, while others contest this reading — arguing that the fundamentally tribal character of Mongol polity did not permit the rise of an absolutism comparable to Turkish monarchy, since Chingiz Khan’s empire belonged not to the ruler personally but to the entire ruling family.
  • Others, however, point out that even as the Timuri state gradually declined and disintegrated, the underlying traditions of despotic and absolute monarchy nonetheless persisted.
• On balance, it seems fair to conclude that Timuri polity was fundamentally one of absolutism, and that minor deviations or exceptions do not fundamentally alter this basic characterisation.

(4) Custom of Succession

• While Chingiz Khan did nominate his own successor, he simultaneously emphasised that any son or grandson of the king could potentially succeed him, provided such a person proved genuinely worthy of the office.
  • This system of nomination based on merit appears to have persisted down through the Timuris. The Khan’s nomination was not always strictly respected, but demonstrated personal worth invariably allowed capable individuals to contrive their own enthronement.
  • Since “worth” thus remained the principal criterion for accession, the ambitions of numerous energetic and enterprising princes were repeatedly excited — consequently, civil wars, fratricide, and rebellion became a regular and recurring phenomenon, both in Central Asia and later in Mughal India.
• In keeping with old Turco-Mongol tradition, kingship was not reserved for sons of the king alone. With this opportunity extended even to grandsons and uncles of the reigning Khan, the pool of legitimate aspirants grew very large — with either demonstrated worth or popular support ultimately deciding the succession.
• In all three scenarios — nomination, contrivance, or selection — the final question of succession still required formal ratification by a qurultai (an assembly of princes and nobles), which symbolised a collective assurance of submission from all the assembled notables.

(5) Centre–State Relationship

• The king remained the pivot of the entire administrative system: the khutba was read, and coins struck, in his name alone throughout the empire.
  • Provincial rulers were appointed directly by the king, required to act strictly in accordance with his regulations and orders, and owed their entire status to the ruler’s own discretion.
  • Provincial rulership and associated land grants served as important sources of income for members of the royal family — nevertheless, final authority always rested firmly with the king, and provincial rulers were not permitted to interfere in the collection of the king’s own share of revenue.
  • For these and other administrative purposes, special deputies were appointed by the Khan within each khanate.
  • Any failure by a provincial ruler (sultan) to comply with the Khan’s orders, or to fulfil his military or financial obligations, carried potentially disastrous consequences for him.
  • While provincial rulers were permitted to maintain diplomatic relations with external powers, major decisions — such as the declaration of war or the signing of treaties — remained the personal prerogative of the king.
  • The king retained the authority to intervene directly in inter-state feuds, and could transfer or depose an unruly sultan at will.
• Some measure of division was clearly necessary to facilitate the administration of such a vast empire, and to satisfy the governing ambitions of individual princes — yet from all this, it can hardly be concluded that the king within the Chingizi or Timuri empire was merely “first among equals” relative to the other sultans.

(6) The Nobility

• The nobility, being essentially a creation of the king himself, was expected to serve as the principal source of his strength.
  • At the accession of each new Khan, the assembled nobility was required to take a formal oath of continued loyalty and subservience to the new ruler.
  • The Turco-Mongol political structure was, by design, built to keep the nobles subservient to the Khan, notwithstanding whatever conditional privileges they may have enjoyed.
• Nevertheless, some scholars argue that the widespread prevalence of hereditary privileges among a large section of the nobility discouraged the growth of genuine absolutism within the Mongol Empire.
  • While many rulers of Transoxiana did periodically assign special status to favoured amirs — some of these privileges even becoming hereditary — such privileges were, in practice, enjoyed only on a strictly reciprocal basis. In the event of any defiance, these privileges could always be withdrawn, and each new king retained full discretion to either renew or withhold all privileges granted by his predecessors.
  • The very fact that Chingiz Khan had prescribed a specific clause in his code — whereby nobles enjoying special status could be forgiven for no more than nine offences — itself demonstrates that the king continued to exercise ultimate, absolute power over the nobility.
  • Numerous examples exist of nobles who, despite high standing and hereditary privileges, were nonetheless dismissed, executed, punished, fined, or banished at the ruler’s discretion.

The Mughal Theory of State: Its Development

Let us now trace the development of the Mughal concept of sovereignty — from its early form under Babur and Humayun, through to its ultimate climax under Akbar.

(1) Babur and Humayun

• Some historians argue that Timuri polity, shaped decisively by Turco-Mongol influence, was fundamentally absolutist in nature and essentially oriented towards a highly centralised state structure — considered by these historians superior to the fragmented Afghan power structure, which had reduced the Delhi Sultanate to little more than a loose confederacy of tribes holding different regions.
  • Others contend that Mongol influence, while considerable in the beginning, gradually lost its centralising and absolutist character over time.
• Having traced how Timuri polity was shaped by both Turkish and Mongol structural elements, let us now examine precisely what legacy Babur inherited upon his arrival in India.
  • Regarding the absolutist character of Mughal polity, it has been argued that since the Timuri rulers down to Babur, despite considerable pressing circumstances, never thought it appropriate to formally assume the title khaqaan, this suggests they conceded a degree of special status to the Khans. This argument, however, risks oversimplifying a genuinely complex problem.
  • The division of the empire among a ruler’s sons remained the cardinal principle of Mongol kingship theory — yet Babur himself never approved of this concept: when, following the death of Husain Mirza, his two sons attempted to share sovereign power between them, Babur expressed clear surprise. He similarly rejected any notion of sharing sovereignty with his own begs (nobles).
• Even so, the early Mughals do not appear to have entirely alienated themselves from lingering Mongol influences.
  • The Mongol principle of dividing the empire was, in fact, put directly to the test soon after Babur’s death: Humayun divided his own empire among his brothers, though this arrangement ultimately failed.
  • In 1556, at the Battle of Ushtargram, Akbar and one of Kamran’s daughters were briefly placed jointly on the throne — though this represented only a short-lived, emergency measure rather than a genuine adoption of shared sovereignty.
• Nonetheless, Babur himself formally assumed the title of Padshah — a distinctly Turkish title.
  • Humayun’s own decision to briefly transfer sovereignty for a single day to a humble water-carrier who had once saved his life illustrates that the Mughals fundamentally regarded sovereignty as the personal property of the reigning Padshah.
  • Even the so-called hereditary privileges enjoyed by the nobility ultimately required the sanction of the ruling monarch — such privileges had to be formally renewed by each new ruler in turn. It is not, therefore, entirely accurate to infer that the prevalence of hereditary noble privileges discouraged the growth of absolutism within the early Turco-Mongol polity.
  • Later, both Babur and Humayun are known to have shown considerable respect for the Chaghatai code of laws (turah), itself fundamentally hostile to the notion of more than one ruler existing at any given time.

(2) Akbar

• Akbar’s own theory of kingship was shaped by a confluence of influences: the inherited Turco-Mongol theory of kingship, his liberal ancestral and paternal legacy, the broad-mindedness of tutors such as Abul Latif and Pir Muhammad, the generally liberal environment fostered by the Sufi and Bhakti movements, and the pressing political necessities of his own era.
• Akbar’s mature theory of kingship was formally articulated by Abul Fazl in the Akbarnama. As Abul Fazl wrote: “No dignity is higher in the eyes of God than royalty. Royalty is a remedy for the spirit of rebellion…”
  • Even the etymology of the word Padshah reflects this exalted conception — pad signifying stability and possession, and shah signifying origin, or Lord; a king is thus, quite literally, the “origin of stability and possession.”
  • The highly exalted status of kingship, as conceived by Abul Fazl, found expression through numerous symbols, metaphors, and miniature paintings — many depicting Akbar himself as a divine, enlightened, and essentially infallible figure.
• Abul Fazl presented the view that kingship is, fundamentally, the gift of God: the ruler was not, therefore, dependent for legitimacy upon the ulama, and all subjects were bound to submit to whoever genuinely possessed this divine gift.
  • Abul Fazl further wrote: “Royalty is a light emanating from God, and a ray from the sun” — a light termed, in the language of the day, farr-i-izidi (the divine light), and known to antiquity as kiyan khwarah (the sublime halo).
  • This kingship, as Farr-i-Izidi — divine light emanating directly from God — meant that no intermediary, human or otherwise, could stand between God and the ruler; it was communicated by God to kings without need of any human intermediary.
  • From the possession of this divine light, numerous excellent qualities were said to flow naturally, including:
    • A paternal love towards one’s subjects.
    • A large, benevolent, and generous heart — one that “receives little and gives more.”
    • Deep trust in God, along with regular prayer and devotion.
    • Equanimity in the face of adversity, alongside the punishment of tyranny and the exercise of moderation and reason.
  • Elsewhere, Abul Fazl similarly reiterates that “the shamsa of the arch of royalty is a divine light, which God directly transfers to kings, without the assistance of men…”
  • The king was thus deemed to be divinely appointed, divinely guided, and divinely protected — a dynastic ideology further linked to the supernatural, with Akbar’s own ancestors imagined as having descended from the heavens as kings, thereby establishing a clear notion of divine origin for Akbar himself.
  • Sight of the king was, accordingly, held to constitute a genuine act of divine worship in itself — beholding the emperor became a means of calling the Creator to mind, giving rise to distinctive court practices such as jharoka-i-darshan (the balcony appearance), sijda (prostration), and zamin-bos (kissing the ground) as recognised forms of courtly salutation.
• Abul Fazl’s underlying concept, in essence, was one of liberal absolutism — governance under a ruler of high personal endeavour, endowed with the highest moral and spiritual qualities, and enjoying a genuine mandate from heaven, such that he remained wholly independent of any particular religious establishment for his own legitimisation.
  • It is significant that this fusion of absolute sovereignty with the conjunction of spiritual and temporal rulership had developed at many royal courts, functioning essentially as a defence mechanism against undue encroachment upon royal authority by lesser figures.
  • The underlying philosophy and spirit behind concepts such as farr-i-izidi and kiyan khwarah remained essentially consistent: to guard decisively against any direct or indirect sharing of the king’s own authority.
• The theory of sovereignty propounded by Abul Fazl on Akbar’s behalf — as reflected in the mahzar and the A’in-i-Rahnamuni — appears to draw as closely upon Central Asian and Perso-Islamic conceptions of sovereignty as upon the older Chingizi tradition itself.
  • Where Alauddin Khalji had earlier attempted to abide by a general “law of expediency,” Akbar went considerably further still.
  • Through the mahzar (drafted by Shaikh Mubarak and his two sons), the emperor was formally certified as a just ruler (Imam Adil), and thereby assigned the elevated rank of mujtahid — an “infallible authority” in religious matters.
  • Through this mahzar, Akbar effectively became the supreme interpreter of the Shariat itself, subordinating the ulama to his own religious authority — the position of Imam Adil being explicitly declared superior even to that of an ordinary mujtahid. The “intellect of the just king” thus became, in itself, a valuable and legitimate source of legislation.
  • Akbar accordingly assumed the title Khalifa, and styled his capital Dar-ul-Khilafat (“the land of the Caliph”).
• Abul Fazl elaborates further: “When the time of reflection comes, and men shake off the prejudices of their education, the thread of the web of religious blindness break[s] and the eye sees the glory of harmoniousness… although some are enlightened, many would observe silence from fear of fanatics who lust for blood, but look like men…. The people will naturally look to their king and expect him to be their spiritual leader as well, for a king possesses, independent of men, the ray of Divine wisdom, which banishes from his heart everything that is conflicting. A king will, therefore, sometimes observe the element of harmony in a multitude of things…. Now this is the case with the monarch of the present age. He now is the spiritual guide of the nation.”

Other Aspects of Sovereignty, as per Abul Fazl

• It was the fundamental duty of the ruler to maintain social equilibrium, ensuring that people of one social rank or profession did not encroach upon the duties and obligations properly belonging to another.
• The state itself was grounded in the principle of Sulh-i-kul — “peace with all” — meaning the state encompassed all human beings equally, and their peaceful coexistence, regardless of creed, sect, or religion.
• The king was expected to display a broad outlook, responding positively to the needs of high and low alike, without bias or favour — remaining just, wise, fair, and the protector of the weak.
• Genuine talent was to be valued irrespective of an individual’s social background.
• Justice was upheld as the highest virtue of the monarch, and was given visual expression through several powerful symbols — most notably, the image of the lion and the lamb peacefully nestled together.
• The state maintained a broadly secular approach in its governance.
• The prevalence of morally corrupt elements within society was itself presented as a justification for a form of royal despotism — since only a king possessing the necessary divine qualities could effectively restrain such elements.
  • It was considered essential for a king endowed with farr-i-izidi to actively maintain social stability by preventing “the dust of sectarian strife” from ever being allowed to rise.
• Abul Fazl defined sovereignty itself as a contract, under which the emperor undertook to protect four essential aspects of his subjects’ lives:
  • Jaan (life).
  • Maal (property).
  • Namus (honour).
  • Din (religion).
  • In return, the ruler could rightfully demand obedience and a fair share of the realm’s resources. As Abul Fazl put it: “Only a just sovereign is able to honour this contract with power and divine guidance.”