International Relations Between Two World Wars

International Relations Between Two World Wars

  • International relations between the two World Wars fall into two distinct phases, with the dividing line at January 1933 — the fateful month in which Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany.
  • Before that, there was reasonable hope that world peace could be maintained, despite the League of Nations’ failure to curb Japanese aggression in Manchuria.
  • Once Hitler was firmly in control, there was little chance of preventing a war of some sort — whether limited or full-scale.
  • The first phase (before Hitler’s rise) can be divided roughly into three sub-phases:
    • 1919–23
    • 1924–29
    • 1930–33

Phase I: 1919 to 1923

  • In the aftermath of the First World War, relations were disturbed by problems arising from the peace settlement, while the newly-formed League of Nations struggled to sort things out.
  • Turkey and Italy were both dissatisfied with their treatment under the settlement:
    • Turkey was prepared to defy the settlement outright.
    • The Italians, soon to come under the rule of Mussolini (1922), showed their resentment first by the seizure of Fiume (which had been awarded to Yugoslavia), and then through the Corfu Incident; later, Italian aggression was turned against Abyssinia (1935).
  • The question of German reparations, and whether Germany could afford to pay them, strained relations between Britain and France, since the two powers held different attitudes towards German recovery:
    • France wanted a weak Germany.
    • Britain wanted an economically strong Germany that would be able to buy British exports.
    • An attempt by Lloyd George to reconcile France and Germany at the 1922 Genoa Conference failed miserably.
    • Relations deteriorated further in 1923 when French troops occupied the Ruhr (an important German industrial region) in an attempt to seize in goods what the Germans were refusing to pay in cash. This succeeded only in collapsing the German currency.
  • Meanwhile, the USA, though choosing to remain politically isolated, exercised considerable economic influence over Europe by, among other things, insisting on full payment of European war debts.
  • Russia, now under Bolshevik (Communist) rule, was viewed with suspicion by the Western powers, several of which — along with Japan — intervened against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War (1918–20).
  • The new states created by the war and the peace settlement — Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Poland — all faced serious internal problems and were divided among themselves, which had important effects on international relations.

Phase II: 1924 to 1929

  • This period saw a general improvement in the international atmosphere, caused partly by changes in political leadership:
    • Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand in France, Gustav Stresemann in Germany, and Ramsay MacDonald in Britain came to power, and all were keen to improve relations.
  • This new spirit of cooperation produced a series of landmark agreements:
    • The Dawes Plan (1924), worked out with American help, eased the situation regarding German reparations.
    • The Locarno Treaties (1925) guaranteed the frontiers of Western Europe fixed at Versailles, which seemed to remove French suspicions of German intentions.
    • Germany was allowed to join the League of Nations in 1926, and two years later 65 nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), renouncing war.
    • The Young Plan (1929) reduced German reparations to a more manageable figure — all seemed set fair for a peaceful future.

Phase III: 1930 to 1933

  • Towards the end of 1929, the world began to run into economic difficulties, which contributed to a deterioration in international relations.
  • It was partly for economic reasons that Japanese troops invaded Manchuria in 1931; mass unemployment in Germany was also crucial in enabling Hitler to come to power.
  • Against this unpromising backdrop, the World Disarmament Conference met in 1932, only to break up in failure after the German delegates walked out in 1933.

Attempts to Improve International Relations Between the Two World Wars

The League of Nations

  • The League played an important role in settling a number of international disputes and problems.
  • However, its authority was weakened by the fact that many states preferred to sign agreements independently of the League — a sign that they lacked full confidence in its prospects — and were unwilling to commit to providing military support to curb an aggressor.
  • (The League of Nations is discussed in greater detail in a separate topic.)

The Washington Conference (1921–22)

  • The Washington Conference (1921–22) was called by the United States to limit the naval arms race and resolve conflicting power interests in the Pacific. It was attended by nine nations — the USA, Japan, China, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
  • One of its central purposes was to improve relations between the USA and Japan.
    • The USA was increasingly suspicious of growing Japanese power in the Far East and of Japanese influence in China, especially since Japan had seized Kiaochow and the German Pacific islands during the First World War.
  • Key outcomes of the Conference:
    • To prevent a naval arms race, the Japanese navy was limited to three-fifths the size of the American and British navies.
    • Japan agreed to withdraw from Kiaochow and the Shantung province of China, which it had occupied since 1914, in return for being allowed to keep the former German Pacific islands as mandates.
    • The treaty forbade the construction of additional Pacific fortifications, and the Western powers promised not to build new naval bases within striking distance of Japan.
    • A Nine-Power Treaty was concluded on China, by which the signatories agreed to respect the “Open Door” principle and China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and administrative independence.
    • The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a long-standing source of unease for the USA and Canada (who felt British passive support had enabled excessive Japanese influence in the Far East), was due to expire in 1921; the USA insisted it not be renewed.
      • It was replaced by the Four-Power Treaty, signed by Britain, France, Japan, and the USA, pledging mutual respect for each other’s Pacific island possessions and agreeing to hold joint conferences to settle disputes — designed to preserve the status quo in the Far East and remove the danger of war there.
  • At the time, the Washington Conference was seen as a great success: it temporarily smoothed over differences on the Far Eastern Question.
    • America secured recognition of its “Open Door” policy and saw the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lapse.
    • China was safeguarded, at least on paper, against further encroachment, and regained Shantung — a political setback for Japan’s China policy.
  • However, in trying to check Japan, the Conference unwittingly strengthened its position in the Far East:
    • Fixing the naval strength ratios, combined with the agreement not to increase Pacific fortifications, assured Japan naval supremacy in the region.
    • Japan possessed the world’s third-largest navy, which it could concentrate entirely in the Pacific, while the larger British and American navies were spread more widely.
    • This made it difficult to maintain the status quo in the Pacific should Japan turn aggressive — a problem that had unfortunate consequences for China in the 1930s, when the USA refused to intervene against Japanese aggression.

The Genoa Conference (1922)

  • This was the brainchild of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who hoped it would resolve:
    • Franco-German hostility (the Germans were threatening to stop paying reparations),
    • European war debts owed to the USA, and
    • the need to resume proper diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
  • The conference failed:
    • The French refused all compromise and insisted on full reparations payments.
    • The Americans refused even to attend.
    • The Russians and Germans withdrew, moved to a resort about 20 miles from Genoa, and signed a mutual agreement there.
  • The following year, when the Germans refused to pay the amount due, French troops occupied the Ruhr, and a deadlock quickly developed as the Germans responded with a campaign of passive resistance.

The Dawes Plan (1924)

  • Worked out at a London conference in 1924, this was an attempt to break the general deadlock over reparations.
  • The three newcomers to international politics — MacDonald, Herriot, and Stresemann (German Foreign Minister, 1924–29) — were eager for reconciliation; the Americans were persuaded to take part, with the conference chaired partly by the American representative, General Dawes.
  • No reduction was made to the total reparations owed, but Germany was to pay annually only what it could reasonably afford until it grew more prosperous.
  • A foreign loan of 800 million gold marks, mostly from the USA, was extended to Germany.
  • The French, now assured of at least some reparations, agreed to withdraw their troops from the Ruhr.
  • The plan succeeded: the German economy began recovering on the strength of American loans, and international tensions gradually eased, paving the way for further agreements.

The Locarno Treaties (1925)

  • The Locarno Treaties, signed in 1925, were a series of agreements involving Germany, France, Belgium, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, all aimed at guaranteeing peace in Europe.
  • The most important agreement bound Germany, France, and Belgium to respect their joint frontiers; if any of the three broke the agreement, Britain and Italy would assist the state under attack.
  • Germany signed separate arbitration agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia over possible disputes, but declined to guarantee her eastern frontiers with them in the same way; France, in turn, agreed to help Poland and Czechoslovakia if Germany attacked them.
  • The treaties were greeted with enthusiasm across Europe, giving rise to what many called the “Locarno honeymoon” — regarded as Stresemann’s greatest success to date. Later historians, however, were far less enthusiastic about Locarno.

Criticism of the Locarno Treaty

  • The Locarno Treaty was, in effect, destructive of both the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant:
    • It drew a distinction between Germany’s eastern and western borders as defined at Versailles: Germany accepted her western frontier with France and Belgium, along with the permanent demilitarisation of the Rhineland, as final, but refused to treat her eastern border with Poland and Czechoslovakia with the same finality — and did not rule out seeking its revision.
    • Germany renounced the use of force to alter her western frontiers but agreed only to arbitration regarding her eastern frontiers.
    • This implied that only those parts of the Versailles settlement willingly accepted by Germany were truly binding — making the legally binding Treaty of Versailles effectively less authoritative than the voluntarily accepted Locarno Treaty.
    • Britain promised to defend Belgium and France, but neither Britain nor Germany gave any guarantee over Germany’s eastern frontiers with Poland and Czechoslovakia — precisely the areas most likely to see trouble — leaving the impression that Britain might not act if Germany attacked its eastern neighbours.
      • As Polish leader Jozef Beck put it, “Germany was officially asked to attack the east, in return for peace in the west.”
    • In the long run, this effectively undermined the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant, which had promised peace and the containment of German aggression.
    • Locarno reinforced two damaging assumptions — that Versailles lacked binding force, and that governments could not be expected to defend frontiers in which they had no direct interest — assumptions on which nearly all governments appeared to act barely a decade later.
    • The implications became clearer with time: Germany followed the ratification of Locarno by signing a new treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1926 — a power hostile to the League system — and later went on to violate several Versailles provisions through eastward aggression and expansion.
  • For the time being, though, amid a period of economic prosperity, such concerns were set aside: Germany entered the League in 1926 with a seat on the Permanent Council.
    • Stresemann and Briand (French Foreign Minister, 1925–32) met regularly for friendly discussions, often joined by Chamberlain (British Foreign Minister, 1924–29); the three were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
    • In September 1926, Stresemann and Briand agreed on the withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland.
    • This “Locarno spirit” culminated in the next major agreement — the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928).

The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)

  • The idea originated with Briand, who proposed that France and the USA sign a pact renouncing war.
  • Frank Kellogg (American Secretary of State) proposed extending it worldwide; eventually 65 states signed, agreeing to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.
  • The Pact sounded impressive but proved largely useless, since it included no provision for sanctions against any state that broke its pledge.
    • Japan signed the Pact, yet this did not stop it from waging war against China just three years later.

The Young Plan (1929)

  • This initiative aimed to settle the remaining reparations question, since the Dawes Plan had left the total payable amount uncertain.
  • In the improved atmosphere of the time, the French were willing to compromise, and a committee chaired by American banker Owen Young decided to reduce reparations from £6,600 million to £2,000 million, payable on a graded scale over the next 59 years.
    • This was the figure Keynes had urged at Versailles, and its acceptance a decade later amounted to an admission of error by the Allies.
  • The plan was welcomed by many in Germany, but the Nazi Party campaigned against it, believing it offered Germany far too little and demanding a quicker, more radical revision of the peace settlement.
  • Even before the Young Plan could be put into operation, a rapid succession of events destroyed the fragile harmony of Locarno:
    • Death of Stresemann (October 1929): This removed one of the outstanding “men of Locarno,” a German leader committed to peaceful change in Europe who had hoped that economic recovery would keep extremists of both right and left from gaining power in Germany.
    • The Wall Street Crash: Occurring the same month, this soon developed into the worldwide economic crisis of the Great Depression; by 1932, over six million people were unemployed in Germany.

The World Disarmament Conference (1932–33)

  • Although all League members had committed to reducing armaments under the Covenant, only Germany had made real moves towards disarmament; the rest, in fact, increased arms spending — world expenditure on arms rose from $3.5 billion to around $5 billion between 1925 and 1933.
  • The World Disarmament Conference met in Geneva to work out a formula for scaling down armaments, but if little progress had been possible during the Locarno honeymoon, there was even less chance of it in the disturbed atmosphere of the 1930s:
    • The British argued they needed more armaments to protect their empire.
    • The French, alarmed by the rapid rise of Nazi support in Germany, refused either to disarm or to allow Germany equality of armaments with them.
    • Hitler, aware that Britain and Italy sympathised with Germany, withdrew from the conference in October 1933, dooming it from that moment; a week later, Germany also withdrew from the League.
  • In retrospect, these attempts to improve international relations achieved only limited success. Even the “Locarno spirit” proved illusory, since it depended so heavily on continued economic prosperity. Once that prosperity evaporated, the old hostilities and suspicions resurfaced, and authoritarian regimes willing to risk aggression rose to power.

Relations Between the USSR and Britain, Germany and France Between the Two World Wars

  • For the first three years after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia (November 1917), relations between the new Soviet government and the Western powers deteriorated to the point of open war — mainly because the Bolsheviks sought to spread revolution further, especially in Germany.
    • As early as December 1917, they flooded Germany with propaganda aimed at turning the masses against their capitalist rulers.
    • Lenin convened representatives of communist parties worldwide at a conference in Moscow in March 1919, known as the Third International or Comintern, aimed at bringing the world’s communists under Russian leadership and organising strikes and uprisings.
      • Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern, confidently predicted that “in a year the whole of Europe will be Communist.”
    • Britain, France, the USA, Czechoslovakia, and Japan intervened half-heartedly in the Russian Civil War to help the anti-Bolshevik “Whites.”
    • The Russians were not invited to the Versailles Conference (1919).
  • By mid-1920, circumstances were gradually changing:
    • The countries that had intervened in Russia admitted failure and withdrew their troops.
    • Communist revolutions in Germany and Hungary had failed.
    • Russia itself was too exhausted by the civil war to pursue further revolutionary efforts for the time being.
  • At the Third Comintern Congress (June 1921), Lenin acknowledged that Russia needed peaceful coexistence and cooperation — in the form of trade and investment — with the capitalist world.

The USSR and Britain

  • Relations blew hot and cold depending on which government held power in Britain: the two Labour governments (1924 and 1929–31) were far more sympathetic to Russia than the Conservative governments.
  • After the failure to overthrow the communists, Lloyd George (British PM, 1916–22) was prepared for reconciliation, which suited Lenin’s own desire for improved relations with the West to attract foreign trade and capital.
    • This resulted in the Anglo-Russian Trade Treaty (March 1921), significant for Russia not only commercially but because Britain was among the first states to acknowledge the Bolshevik government — paving the way for similar agreements and full political recognition by other countries.
  • The new rapprochement was soon shaken when, at the Genoa Conference (1922), Lloyd George suggested the Bolsheviks pay war debts incurred by the tsarist regime.
    • The offended Russians left the conference and signed the separate Treaty of Rapallo with the Germans, alarming both Britain and France.
  • Relations improved briefly in 1924, when MacDonald’s new Labour government extended full diplomatic recognition to the communists and signed a new trade treaty, but relations worsened again under the Conservatives (1924–29).
  • By 1933, Stalin, growing nervous about the potential threat from Hitler, was prepared to work towards improving relations with Britain.

The USSR and Germany

  • Soviet relations with Germany were more consistent and friendly than those with Britain, because:
    • the Germans saw clear advantages in cultivating friendship with the USSR, and
    • the Bolsheviks were keen to maintain stable relations with at least one capitalist power.
  • A trade treaty was signed in May 1921, followed by the granting of Russian trade and mineral concessions to some German industrialists.
  • The Treaty of Rapallo (1922), signed after both Germany and Russia withdrew from the Genoa Conference, marked an important step forward:
    • Full diplomatic relations were resumed, and reparations claims between the two states were cancelled.
    • Both sides stood to benefit from the new friendship: they could cooperate to keep Poland weak, and the USSR gained Germany as a buffer against any future Western attack.
    • Germany was permitted to build factories in Russia to manufacture aeroplanes and ammunition — circumventing the Versailles disarmament terms — with German officers trained in Russia in the use of these forbidden weapons, while Russia in return received German grain supplies.
  • The Treaty of Berlin (1926) renewed the Rapallo agreement for a further five years, with both sides agreeing to remain neutral if the other were attacked and to refrain from using economic sanctions against each other.
  • Around 1930, relations began to cool:
    • Some Russians grew concerned at Germany’s growing power.
    • Germany’s attempt to form a customs union with Austria in 1931 was viewed as an ominous sign of rising German nationalism.
    • Russian concern turned to alarm as the strongly anti-communist Nazi Party grew in strength, prompting Russia to make approaches to Poland, France, and Britain.
    • In January 1934, Hitler abruptly ended Germany’s special relationship with the Soviets by signing a non-aggression pact with Poland.

The USSR and France

  • The Bolshevik takeover of 1917 was a serious blow to France, which had relied on Russia as an ally to keep Germany in check; France now viewed the Bolsheviks — who called for revolution across all capitalist states — as a menace to be destroyed as soon as possible.
  • French troops helped the anti-Bolshevik “Whites” in the Civil War, and it was at France’s insistence that the Bolsheviks were excluded from Versailles.
  • France also intervened in the Russo-Polish War (1920), helping to repel a Russian advance on Warsaw, and claimed credit for stemming the westward spread of Bolshevism.
    • The subsequent Franco-Polish Alliance (1921) appeared directed as much against Russia as against Germany.
  • Relations improved in 1924 with the resumption of diplomatic ties, though the French remained lukewarm, particularly since the French Communist Party operated under orders from Moscow not to cooperate with other left-wing parties.
  • It was not until the early 1930s, with the rise of the German Nazis, that a genuine change of heart occurred on both sides.
  • As soon as the First World War ended, the French, after all they had suffered in two German invasions in less than 50 years, wanted security against possible German aggression in future. This remained the major concern of French foreign policy throughout the inter-war years.
  • At different times, depending on who was in charge of foreign affairs, the French tried different methods of dealing with the problem:
    • trying to keep Germany economically and militarily weak;
    • signing alliances with other states to isolate Germany, and working for a strong League of Nations;
    • extending the hand of reconciliation and friendship.
  • In the end, all three tactics failed.
  • Trying to keep Germany weak
    • Insistence on a harsh peace settlement
      • At the Paris peace conference the French premier, Clemenceau, insisted on a harsh settlement.
        • In order to strengthen French security, the German army was to number no more than 100000 men and there were to be severe limitations on armaments.
        • The German Rhineland was to be demilitarized to a distance of 50 kilometers east of the river.
        • France was to have the use of the area known as the Saar, for 15 years.
      • Britain and the USA promised to help France if Germany attacked again.
      • Although many French people were disappointed (many wanted France to be given the whole of the German Rhineland west of the river, but they were only allowed to occupy it for 15 years), it looked at first as though security was guaranteed.
      • Unfortunately French satisfaction was short-lived:
        • Americans were afraid that membership of the League might involve them in another war, and preferred a policy of isolation.
        • Consequently they rejected the entire peace settlement (March 1920) and abandoned their guarantees of assistance.
        • The British used this as an excuse to cancel their promises, and the French understandably felt betrayed.
    • Clemenceau demanded that the Germans should pay reparations
      • The figure to be paid for reparations was fixed in 1921 at £6600 million.
      • It was thought that the strain of paying this huge amount would keep Germany economically weak for the next 66 years – the period over which reparations were to be paid in annual installments – and consequently another German attack on France would be less likely.
      • However, financial troubles in Germany soon caused the government to fall behind with its payments.
      • The French, who claimed to need the cash from reparations to balance their budget and pay their own debts to the USA, became desperate.
    • Attempts to force the Germans to pay
      • France decided that drastic methods were needed to force the Germans to pay and to weaken their powers of revival.
      • In January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr (the important German industrial area).
      • The Germans replied with passive resistance, strikes and sabotage. A number of incidents between troops and civilians resulted in the deaths of over a hundred people.
      • Although the French managed to seize goods worth about £40 million, the whole episode caused galloping inflation and the collapse of the German mark, which by November 1923 was completely valueless.
      • It also revealed the basic difference between the French and British attitudes towards Germany:
        • While France adopted a hard line and wanted Germany completely crippled, Britain now saw moderation and reconciliation as the best security; she believed that an economically healthy Germany would be good for the stability of Europe as well as for British exports.
        • Consequently Britain strongly disapproved of the Ruhr occupation and sympathized with Germany.
  • A network of alliances
    • Little Entente:
      • At the same time, the French tried to increase their security by building up a network of alliances, first with Poland (1921) and later with Czechoslovakia (1924), Romania (1926) and Yugoslavia (1927).
      • This network, known as the ‘Little Entente’, though impressive on paper, did not amount to much because the states involved were comparatively weak.
    • What the French needed was a renewal of the old alliance with Russia, which had served them well during the First World War; but this seemed out of the question now that Russia had become communist.
  • Astrong League of Nation:
    • The French worked for a strong League of Nations, with the victorious powers acting as a military police force, compelling aggressive powers to behave themselves.
    • However, in the end it was the much vaguer Wilson version of the League that was adopted.
    • French disappointment was bitter when Britain took the lead in rejecting the Geneva Protocol, which might have strengthened the League.
    • Clearly there was no point in expecting much guarantee of security from that direction.
  • Compromise and reconciliation:
    • By the summer of 1924, when the failure of France’s Ruhr occupation was obvious, France was prepared to accept a compromise solution to the reparations problem; this led to the Dawes Plan.
    • During the Briand era (Foreign Minister in 11 successive governments between 1925 and 1932), the French approach to the German problem was one of reconciliation.
      • Briand persevered with great skill to build up genuinely good relations with Germany, as well as to improve relations with Britain and strengthen the League.
      • Fortunately Stresemann, who was in charge of German foreign policy from November 1923 until 1929, believed that the best way to foster German recovery was by co-operation with Britain and France.
      • The result was the Locarno Treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Young Plan and the cancellation of most of the remaining reparations payments.
    • There is some debate among historians about how genuine this apparent reconciliation between France and Germany really was:
      • A. J. P. Taylor suggested:
        • Though Briand and Stresemann were sincere, ‘they did not carry their peoples with them’.
        • Nationalist feeling in the two countries was so strong that both men were limited in the concessions they could offer.
      • The fact that Stresemann was secretly determined to get the frontier with Poland redrawn to Germany’s advantage would have caused friction later, since Poland was France’s ally.
      • He was equally determined to work for union with Austria and a revision of the Versailles terms.
  • A tougher attitude towards Germany:
    • The death of Stresemann in October 1929, the world economic crisis and the growth of support in Germany for the Nazis, alarmed the French, and made them adopt a tougher attitude towards Germany.
    • When, in 1931, the Germans proposed an Austro-German customs union to ease the economic crisis, the French insisted that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, on the grounds that it was a violation of the Versailles Treaty.
    • Though a customs union made economic sense, the court ruled against it, and the plan was dropped.
    • At the World Disarmament Conference (1932-33) relations worsened, and when Hitler took Germany out of the Conference and the League, all Briand’s work was ruined. The German problem was as far from being solved as ever.

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