Sustainable Development, Climate Change and Indian Society

How UPSC asks this topic now. Paper 2 has asked about sustainability, environment and development in every year since 2019: green cover and global warming (2019), anthropogenic climate change and the movements it provoked (2020), displacement as inherent in development (2021), the “dialectics between development and environment” (2022), Chipko’s relevance amid climate concerns (2023), sustainability where livelihoods clash with conservation and the “trilogy” of environmental movement, development and tribal identity (2024), “Is it possible to have sustainable development in India?” (2025) and population policy for sustainability (2026), mostly for 20 marks. Paper 1 adds CSR amid environmental crises (2023), environmentalism as a new social movement (2022), the SDG framework of 2015 (2025, 20 marks) and geographical factors in social change (2026). This page covers the Indian-society side; the theory of development and the SDG framework are in Development and Dependency.

Why Sustainability Is a Sociological Question

  • Sustainable development was defined by the Brundtland Commission (Our Common Future, 1987) as development that meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. Its history, the 2030 Agenda and the 17 goals are covered in Development and Dependency.
  • Sociology asks what economics and ecology leave out: who uses nature, who pays for its loss, and who decides. Environmental harm is distributed along caste, class, gender, tribe and region, so sustainability is a question of social structure and power, not only of carbon.
  • Three Indian tensions run through every recent question: growth versus ecology (dams, coal, highways), livelihood versus conservation (forests, fishing, protected areas) and global versus local responsibility (India’s low historical emissions against its rising present ones).
  • Geography and society (Paper 1, 2026): climate, rivers and terrain shape settlement and livelihood, but sociologists reject strict environmental determinism; the same monsoon failure ruins a landless labourer and barely touches an irrigated landowner. The social mediation of nature is the point.

Sociology of Environment: Four Frameworks

Environmental sociology grew in the 1970s when William Catton and Riley Dunlap (1978) argued that sociology had ignored the biophysical world. Four frameworks now dominate answers.

Treadmill of Production (Allan Schnaiberg, 1980)

  • In The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity (1980), Allan Schnaiberg argued that modern capitalism runs on a treadmill: profits are reinvested in labour-saving, energy-hungry technology, which needs ever more output to stay profitable.
  • Every turn of the treadmill raises withdrawals (minerals, water, timber) and additions (pollution, waste). Damage is structural, not an accident of bad management.
  • Capital, labour (which wants jobs) and the state (which wants revenue and legitimacy) form a growth coalition; environmental protection is pushed to the margins.
  • India: coal output crossed 1 billion tonnes in 2024-25; mining in Hasdeo Arand (Chhattisgarh), sand mining and highway cutting in the Himalaya fit the model. Joshimath’s 2023 subsidence is a cost of the treadmill borne by residents.

Ecological Modernisation (Mol, Spaargaren)

  • Coined by Joseph Huber in Germany in the early 1980s and developed by Arthur Mol and Gert Spaargaren in the Netherlands in the 1990s (Mol’s The Refinement of Production, 1995).
  • Its claim is the opposite of the treadmill: modernity can repair the damage it causes. Cleaner technology, efficiency, green markets, state regulation and civil-society pressure can decouple growth from environmental harm.
  • Critique: it fits rich, high-capacity states better than the Global South; decoupling is often relative (less damage per unit) rather than absolute; and it can shift dirty production abroad.
  • India: non-fossil sources passed half of installed power capacity in 2025 and crossed 300 GW in July 2026; the Green Hydrogen Mission and Perform, Achieve and Trade energy-efficiency scheme are ecological-modernisation tools.
Treadmill of production versus ecological modernisationTwo columns. Left, the treadmill of production (Schnaiberg, 1980): profits are reinvested in labour-saving technology; more output needs more withdrawals of raw material; that creates more additions of pollution and waste; the state backs growth for jobs and tax revenue, and the cycle repeats. Indian example: coal output above one billion tonnes in 2024-25 and mining in forests such as Hasdeo. Right, ecological modernisation (Huber, Mol and Spaargaren): damage becomes a cost and a market signal; cleaner technology and efficiency decouple growth from damage; state regulation, markets and civil society steer industry; growth continues with less damage per unit. Indian example: non-fossil sources passed half of installed power capacity in 2025. Bottom strip: India runs both logics at once.Two Readings of Growth and NatureTreadmill of ProductionSchnaiberg, 19801. Profits reinvested inlabour-saving technology2. More output needs morewithdrawals of raw material3. More additions:pollution and waste4. State backs growth forjobs and tax revenuethe cycle repeatsIndia: coal output above 1 billiontonnes (2024-25); Hasdeo miningEcological ModernisationHuber; Mol and Spaargaren, 1990s1. Damage becomes a costand a market signal2. Cleaner technology andefficiency: decoupling3. State, markets and civilsociety steer industry4. Growth continues with lessdamage per unit of outputreform feeds backIndia: non-fossil sources passedhalf of power capacity (2025)India runs both logics at once: record solar and record coal.
Figure 1. The treadmill of production and ecological modernisation compared, with an Indian example for each.

Risk Society (Ulrich Beck)

  • Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft (1986; English Risk Society, 1992), written in the year of Chernobyl: industrial society distributed “goods”; late modernity also distributes “bads”, manufactured risks such as radiation, toxic chemicals and climate change.
  • These risks are often invisible, global and produced by science itself, which creates reflexive modernisation: society must now manage the side-effects of its own success.
  • Beck’s line “poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic” suggests risk cuts across class; Indian evidence shows a boomerang with a caste and class filter. The 1984 Bhopal gas disaster killed mainly poor slum dwellers near the Union Carbide plant, and Delhi’s smog hits construction workers and street vendors far harder than those with air purifiers.

Environmental Justice

  • Began in the United States with protests against a toxic-waste landfill in a mainly Black county of North Carolina (Warren County, 1982); Robert Bullard’s Dumping in Dixie (1990) showed hazardous sites cluster in poor and minority areas.
  • Key ideas: distributive justice (who bears harm), procedural justice (who has a say) and recognition (whose knowledge counts).
  • Joan Martinez-Alier’s The Environmentalism of the Poor (2002), building on his work with Ramachandra Guha (Varieties of Environmentalism, 1997), argued that much Southern environmentalism is a livelihood struggle over land, water and forests, not a “post-material” value. Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence (2011) names the gradual, unseen harm of degradation.
  • Climate justice applies this globally: the rich emitted most; the poor suffer most. India’s doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities is its diplomatic form.
  • Paper 1 (2022): environmentalism is often cited as a new social movement (Touraine, Melucci, Offe) concerned with identity and quality of life; Indian movements fit only partly, since most are about survival. See Environmental Movements in India.

Political Ecology in India

Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha

  • This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India (1992) traces four modes of resource use: gathering, nomadic pastoralism, settled cultivation and industry. Caste, they argue, once worked partly as an ecological adaptation, with groups specialising in distinct resources and so limiting competition.
  • Colonial forestry (the Forest Acts of 1865, 1878 and 1927) turned village commons into state property for timber and railways, criminalised customary use and produced a long history of forest protest. Guha’s The Unquiet Woods (1989) shows Chipko as the latest stage of this resistance.
  • Ecology and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in Contemporary India (1995) divides Indians into three groups:
    • Omnivores: urban elites, rich farmers and industry who draw resources from everywhere through the market and the state;
    • Ecosystem people: adivasis, small peasants, pastoralists and fishers who depend on local land, water and forest;
    • Ecological refugees: ecosystem people displaced by dams, mines and degradation, who drift to city slums as casual labour.
  • Their argument: development has transferred resources from ecosystem people to omnivores. Sustainability therefore needs equity: local control of commons and an end to subsidised resource use by the rich.

Vandana Shiva: Ecofeminism and “Maldevelopment”

  • In Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Survival in India (1988), Vandana Shiva called Western development a patriarchal project and “maldevelopment”: reductionist science treats nature and women as passive resources to be exploited.
  • Against it she sets the feminine principle (Prakriti, Shakti): Third World women, as providers of food, fuel and water, hold an ecological knowledge of life-sustaining production. Chipko, for her, was women defending this principle.
  • This is exactly the 2018 question “Western patriarchy which surrenders feminine principles is the development project in India”. With Maria Mies she wrote Ecofeminism (1993); later work attacks the Green Revolution, seed patents and monoculture.

Bina Agarwal: Feminist Environmentalism

  • Bina Agarwal, “The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India” (Feminist Studies, 1992), accepted that rural women bear the heaviest cost of degradation but rejected Shiva’s reasoning.
  • Her critique: ecofeminism treats “women” as one category and ignores caste and class; it locates women’s closeness to nature in ideology or essence, while it really comes from the material division of labour and property; and it romanticises pre-colonial India.
  • Her alternative, feminist environmentalism, explains women’s stake by their work (collecting fuel, fodder and water) and lack of land. A Field of One’s Own (1994) argued that land rights matter more than symbolism. The policy lesson: women’s seats in forest and water committees and land titles in their names.

Amita Baviskar and Mukul Sharma

  • Amita Baviskar, In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada Valley (1995), studied Bhilala adivasis facing the Sardar Sarovar dam. She shows that adivasi ecological identity is real but also partly constructed in the struggle; activists sometimes romanticised it.
  • Her later idea of bourgeois environmentalism (Delhi, early 2000s) describes middle-class campaigns for clean, green cities that pushed out slums, hawkers and polluting small industries: environmental concern used against the poor.
  • Mukul Sharma, Caste and Nature: Dalits and Indian Environmental Politics (2017), argues that Indian environmentalism often celebrates village harmony and ignores caste; for Dalits, nature has meant forced labour on others’ land, unclean work and exclusion from wells and commons.
ThinkerWork and yearCore ideaUse in answers
SchnaibergThe Environment, 1980Treadmill of productionWhy growth keeps damaging nature
Mol, Spaargaren1990sEcological modernisationCase for green growth in India
BeckRisk Society, 1986Manufactured riskBhopal, Joshimath, climate
Gadgil and Guha1992; 1995Omnivores and ecosystem peopleWho gains and who loses
ShivaStaying Alive, 1988Ecofeminism, maldevelopmentChipko, Green Revolution
AgarwalFeminist Studies, 1992Feminist environmentalismCritique of Shiva; land rights
Baviskar1995; 2000sAdivasi identity; bourgeois environmentalismNarmada; urban evictions

Climate Change and Indian Society

The Evidence

  • IPCC AR6 (Synthesis Report, 2023): human activity has “unequivocally” caused global warming; global surface temperature was 1.1°C above 1850–1900 in 2011–2020; about 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change, and those who contributed least are hit hardest.
  • IMD: 2024 was India’s warmest year since records began in 1901 (+0.65°C above the 1991–2020 average); 2025 was the eighth warmest (+0.28°C), with the warmest January–February on record; 2016–2025 was the warmest decade; India’s mean temperature has risen by 0.68°C per century since 1901.
  • Germanwatch Climate Risk Index 2027 (released at COP31, Antalya, November 2026): India ranks 10th most affected for 1996–2025, with 436 extreme events, more than 78,000 deaths, over 1.2 billion people affected and losses above USD 170 billion; it ranks 12th for 2025 alone. The previous edition (CRI 2026) placed India 9th for 1995–2024.
  • World Bank, South Asia’s Hotspots (2018): unchecked warming could cut India’s GDP by 2.8% and lower the living standards of nearly half its population by 2050.
  • Anthropogenic drivers (2020 question): coal power, transport, deforestation and land-use change, cement and steel, paddy methane and livestock; locally, urban heat islands, sand mining and Himalayan construction. India is now the third-largest emitter in absolute terms, yet its cumulative share of emissions from 1850 to 2019 is under 4% and its per capita emissions are about one-third of the world average (MoEFCC, Rajya Sabha reply, March 2025).

Who Bears the Cost

Climate change is a risk multiplier: it lands on top of existing inequality. IPCC AR6 treats risk as the product of hazard, exposure and vulnerability, and vulnerability is social.

Climate vulnerability matrix: who bears the cost in IndiaA table with five rows. Caste: Dalit hamlets lie on low, flood-prone land and households are landless with few assets; after the 2004 tsunami Dalits were pushed out of shared relief camps. Class: informal workers do outdoor work without cooling or paid leave; the World Bank says India may account for 34 million of 80 million heat-stress job losses by 2030. Gender: women fetch water, fuel and fodder, own little land and carry care work; drought lengthens water walks and women stay back as men migrate. Tribe: adivasi communities depend on forests and rain-fed farms and lose land to mines and dams; drought and forest loss hit the central Indian tribal belt. Coast: erosion, surges and cyclones hit fishers; in Odisha 571 families were moved from Satabhaya to Bagapatia in 2017. Footer: in IPCC AR6, risk comes from hazard, exposure and vulnerability together.Who Bears the Cost of Climate Change in IndiaAxisWhy more exposedIndian exampleCasteDalit householdsHamlets on low, flood-prone land;landless, few assets to rebuildDalits pushed out of shared reliefcamps after the 2004 tsunamiClassinformal workersOutdoor work, no cooling, no paidleave: lost hours are lost wagesWorld Bank: 34 million of 80 millionheat-stress job losses by 2030GenderwomenFetch water, fuel and fodder; fewown land; carry the care burdenDrought lengthens water walks;women stay back as men migrateTribeadivasi communitiesDepend on forests and rain-fedfarms; lose land to mines and damsDrought and forest loss in thecentral Indian tribal beltCoastfishers, island villagesErosion, surges and cyclones hithomes, boats and fishing groundsSatabhaya to Bagapatia, Odisha:571 families moved in 2017IPCC AR6: risk comes from hazard, exposure and vulnerability together.Sources: World Bank (2022); Odisha resettlement reports; Human Rights Watch (2005) on the 2004 tsunami.
Figure 2. The climate vulnerability matrix: caste, class, gender, tribe and coast, with an Indian example for each.
  • Caste: Dalit hamlets often lie at the low, flood-prone edge of villages; landless households have no assets to fall back on. After the 2004 tsunami, Human Rights Watch (2005) reported Dalits being kept out of shared relief camps in Nagapattinam.
  • Class: about three-quarters of India’s workforce, some 380 million people, depend on heat-exposed labour; the World Bank (2022) estimated India may account for 34 million of the 80 million global job losses from heat stress by 2030.
  • Gender: women collect water, fuel and fodder, rarely own land, eat last in food shortages and carry care work when men migrate. Drought adds hours to water collection; displacement raises the risk of trafficking and early marriage.
  • Tribal communities: forest and rain-fed farm dependence, plus land loss to mines and dams, make them doubly exposed: to climate and to climate-mitigation projects (solar parks, hydro, compensatory plantations) built on their land.
  • Coastal communities: fishers, salt-pan workers and island villages face erosion, surges and cyclones. In Kendrapara (Odisha), the sea swallowed most of the Satabhaya villages; in 2017 the state moved 571 families to Bagapatia, Odisha’s first resettlement colony for climate migrants, where farming and fishing are hard and many now migrate to Kerala for work.

Heatwaves and Informal Workers

  • For a construction worker, street vendor, farm labourer, gig rider or brick-kiln worker, a heat day is an unpaid day.
  • Heat Action Plans: Ahmedabad’s plan (2013) was the first in South Asia; a 2018 evaluation estimated about 1,190 deaths a year avoided in 2014–15 compared with 2007–10. Early warnings, cool shelters and shifted work hours are now promoted under NDMA guidelines, but plans rarely give wage compensation.
  • Official heatstroke death counts are widely regarded as undercounts, so heat remains a hidden disaster. The new Labour Codes (in force since 21 November 2025) set occupational safety norms, but few states have binding heat rules for outdoor work. See platform work and the Labour Codes.

Floods, Cyclones, Drought and Migration

  • Floods (Assam, Bihar, Kerala 2018) and cloudbursts and landslides (Wayanad 2024, the Himalayan states) destroy homes, crops and schooling; recovery is slowest for tenants and the landless.
  • Cyclones: Odisha shows adaptation can work. The 1999 super cyclone killed about 10,000 people; for Cyclone Phailin (2013), more than a million people were evacuated and deaths fell to a few dozen. But lives saved are not livelihoods saved: boats, nets and saline fields are lost.
  • Drought in Marathwada, Bundelkhand and western Odisha pushes seasonal migration to cane fields, kilns and cities. Climate stress mostly works through existing migration channels rather than creating new ones.
  • Sociologically, distress migration of this kind keeps the household alive but brings debt, broken schooling and the “double burden” on women left behind. India has no legal category for climate migrants. See the migration hub, rural labour and migration.

Climate and Agriculture

  • About half of India’s net sown area is rain-fed, so monsoon variability is a social fact. The Economic Survey 2017-18 estimated that climate change could cut farm incomes by 15–18% on average, and by 20–25% in unirrigated areas, without a policy response.
  • The Green Revolution model of water-intensive paddy and wheat, free power and heavy fertiliser has depleted groundwater in Punjab and Haryana; stubble burning adds to north Indian smog.
  • Responses: ICAR’s National Innovations in Climate Resilient Agriculture (NICRA, 2011), heat- and flood-tolerant seeds, micro-irrigation, crop insurance, millets, and natural farming. The 2020 question on green chemistry fits here: safer, biodegradable inputs and less toxic pesticides reduce harm to soil, water and farm workers’ health.

India’s Climate and Environment Policy

International Commitments: Panchamrit and the NDCs

  • Panchamrit (“five nectar elements”), announced at COP26, Glasgow, 1 November 2021: 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030; 50% of energy requirements from renewables by 2030; a cut of 1 billion tonnes in projected emissions by 2030; a 45% cut in the emissions intensity of GDP by 2030; and net zero by 2070.
  • NDCs under the Paris Agreement: the first (2015) promised a 33–35% intensity cut and 40% non-fossil power capacity by 2030. The updated NDC (August 2022) raised these to 45% and about 50%, and added LiFE as a mass movement.
  • NDC 3.0 (approved by the Cabinet in March 2026 and lodged with the UNFCCC on 24 April 2026) covers 2031–35: a 47% intensity cut from 2005 levels, about 60% non-fossil installed capacity (conditional on finance and technology) and an added forest and tree carbon sink of 3.5–4 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2035.
  • Progress: non-fossil sources reached about half of installed capacity in mid-2025, five years early, and crossed 300 GW in July 2026. Critics (Climate Action Tracker, Carbon Brief commentators) note that an intensity target lets absolute emissions keep rising and that the forest-sink claim rests on contested data.
India’s climate commitments, 2008 to 2070A vertical timeline. 2008: NAPCC launched with eight national missions. 2010: National Solar Mission begins. 2015: first NDC with a 33 to 35 per cent cut in emissions intensity; International Solar Alliance launched at Paris. 2021: Panchamrit and net zero by 2070 announced at COP26. 2022: updated NDC with a 45 per cent intensity cut and 50 per cent non-fossil power capacity by 2030. 2023: National Green Hydrogen Mission; Forest Conservation Amendment Act. 2025: non-fossil sources pass half of installed capacity. 2026: NDC 3.0 with a 47 per cent intensity cut and about 60 per cent non-fossil capacity by 2035. Future targets: 2030, 500 GW non-fossil capacity and 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen; 2035, the NDC 3.0 horizon with an added forest sink of 3.5 to 4 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent; 2070, net zero emissions.India’s Climate Commitments, 2008 to 20702008NAPCC launched with eight national missions2010National Solar Mission begins2015First NDC (33-35% intensity cut); ISA launched at Paris2021Panchamrit and net zero by 2070, announced at COP262022Updated NDC: 45% intensity cut, 50% non-fossil power2023Green Hydrogen Mission; Forest Conservation Amendment2025Non-fossil sources pass half of installed capacity2026NDC 3.0: 47% intensity cut, about 60% non-fossil2030Targets: 500 GW non-fossil capacity, 5 MMT green hydrogen2035NDC 3.0 horizon; added forest sink of 3.5-4 Gt CO2e2070Net zero emissionsOrange: future targets. Sources: MoEFCC, PIB, UNFCCC NDC registry (April 2026).
Figure 3. India’s climate commitments from the 2008 action plan to net zero in 2070.

NAPCC and LiFE

  • The National Action Plan on Climate Change (30 June 2008) set up eight national missions: Solar; Enhanced Energy Efficiency; Sustainable Habitat; Water; Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem; Green India; Sustainable Agriculture; and Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change. States followed with State Action Plans.
  • Its strength was mainstreaming climate into planning; its gaps are thin funding for adaptation missions, weak community participation and little attention to who loses.
  • Mission LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment), proposed at COP26 and launched by the Prime Minister and the UN Secretary-General at Kevadia, Gujarat, on 20 October 2022, asks individuals to become “pro-planet people” by saving energy and water and cutting waste and single-use plastic.
  • Sociologically, LiFE draws on Gandhian thrift and the line attributed to Gandhi that the earth provides enough for every man’s need but not every man’s greed. The critique: it moralises individual consumption while structural emitters (coal, cement, aviation and the affluent) face lighter rules.

International Solar Alliance and the Green Hydrogen Mission

  • International Solar Alliance: launched by India and France at COP21, Paris, on 30 November 2015, headquartered in Gurugram; a treaty-based body since 2017 with well over 100 member and signatory countries. It is India’s main tool of South–South climate diplomacy (“One Sun, One World, One Grid”).
  • National Green Hydrogen Mission: approved on 4 January 2023 with an outlay of ₹19,744 crore; target of 5 million tonnes a year of green hydrogen by 2030, with about 125 GW of added renewable capacity; the SIGHT programme gives incentives for electrolysers and production.
  • Gap: tenders had awarded about 8.6 lakh tonnes a year of capacity by mid-2026, but very little was commissioned. Large solar and hydrogen parks also need land, often common or tribal land, which repeats the old development–displacement tension in green form.

Forest and Environmental Law: FRA, CAMPA, EIA

  • Forest Rights Act, 2006 (Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act) admits a “historical injustice” and recognises individual, community and Community Forest Resource rights, with the Gram Sabha as the authority. By 31 August 2026, about 54 lakh claims had been filed, about 25 lakh titles distributed and over 18 lakh claims rejected (MoTA, as reported in October 2026).
  • CAMPA: the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016 (in force from 2018) puts money paid by projects that divert forest land into national and state funds; about ₹47,436 crore was released to states in August 2019. Critics point to monoculture plantations, plantations on village commons and weak survival of planted trees: forests are lost in one place and “replaced” on paper in another.
  • Environmental Impact Assessment: EIA notifications of 1994 and 2006 under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 require prior clearance and public hearings. The draft EIA notification of 2020 drew protest for allowing post-facto clearance. In Vanashakti, the Supreme Court first barred post-facto clearances (May 2025), recalled that ruling (November 2025), and finally (29 July 2026) held prior clearance mandatory, upheld the time-bound 2017 window and quashed the 2021 office memorandum with prospective effect, leaving earlier clearances intact.

The Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 and Its Controversy

  • Passed in August 2023 and in force from 1 December 2023, it renamed the 1980 Act the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam.
  • It applies only to land notified as forest under law or recorded as forest in government records from 25 October 1980. This narrows the dictionary meaning of forest laid down in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v Union of India (1996), which had covered all forest-like land, whatever its ownership.
  • It exempts strategic linear projects within 100 km of international borders, security infrastructure up to 10 hectares, and up to 5 hectares for public utilities in Left Wing Extremism areas; it permits zoos, safaris and ecotourism inside forests.
  • The controversy: critics say unrecorded “deemed forests”, possibly a large share of India’s forest, lose protection; the Northeast and Himalayan border forests are opened; Gram Sabha consent under the FRA is sidelined; and the law was passed without wide consultation. Supporters say it gives legal certainty, speeds defence and development projects and encourages tree planting on private land.
  • Courts: in February 2024 the Supreme Court told states to keep following the Godavarman definition while the challenge is heard; on 16 September 2026 it limited the case to the validity of the new definition of forest and asked states to prepare records of forest-like and community forest land.

Policy Gains and Gaps

PolicyGainsGaps
Panchamrit and NDCs (2021, 2022, 2026)Clear targets; non-fossil half of capacity by 2025; credible global voiceIntensity targets allow emissions growth; adaptation goals unquantified; finance-conditional
NAPCC (2008)Eight missions; state action plans; solar boomAdaptation missions underfunded; little community role
Mission LiFE (2022)Links climate to everyday ethics and Indian traditionsIndividualises a structural problem
International Solar Alliance (2015)South–South leadership; solar finance and trainingLimited money compared with need
Green Hydrogen Mission (2023)Industrial decarbonisation; export ambitionAwards far ahead of output; land and water demands
Forest Rights Act (2006)Recognises historical injustice; Gram Sabha power; CFR modelsOver 18 lakh claims rejected; slow CFR recognition
CAMPA (2016)Large dedicated fund for afforestationMonocultures; plantations on commons; poor survival
EIA regimePrior clearance and public hearingsPost-facto approvals; token hearings
Forest Conservation Amendment (2023)Legal clarity; faster strategic projectsNarrows forest definition; under Supreme Court review

SDGs in India: Localisation, Women and Tribes

  • SDG India Index (NITI Aayog): India’s composite score rose from 57 (2018) to 66 (2020-21) and 71 in the 2023-24 edition (fourth edition, July 2024), the latest available in November 2026. Goal 5 (gender equality) scored 49, the only goal below 50; Goal 13 (climate action) rose from 54 to 67.
  • Globally, the SDSN Sustainable Development Report 2026 ranked India 94th of 167 countries, its best position so far.
  • Localisation: states have SDG cells and district indices; the Ministry of Panchayati Raj grouped the goals into nine themes (such as a healthy village and a women-friendly village) and released a Panchayat Advancement Index baseline in 2025.
  • The women’s angle: low female labour-force participation, unpaid care work, violence and low land ownership keep Goal 5 lowest. Self-help groups under DAY-NRLM, Jal Jeevan Mission taps and clean cooking gas reduce the water-and-fuel burden that feminist environmentalism highlights.
  • The tribal angle: the furthest behind are often adivasis in mineral-rich districts. Targeted schemes include PM-JANMAN (2023) for Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups and the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan (2024). “Leave no one behind” fails if forest rights and consent are weakened at the same time.

CSR as a Sustainability Instrument

  • Under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, large companies must spend 2% of average net profit on CSR; Schedule VII includes environmental sustainability. CSR spending reached about ₹34,909 crore in 2023-24 (Ministry of Corporate Affairs).
  • Relevance (Paper 1, 2023): CSR funds afforestation, watershed work, clean energy and waste projects, and SEBI’s Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report adds environmental disclosure.
  • Limits: spending clusters in industrial states; projects can be greenwashing while the core business (mining, coal, cement) keeps polluting. CSR is a supplement to regulation, not a substitute.
  • The full treatment, with thresholds, data and a gains-vs-gaps table, is in Development and Dependency.

Sustainability Movements and Grassroots Practice

Each movement below is covered in depth in Environmental Movements in India; here is the one line an answer needs.

  • Chipko (Chamoli, 1973; Reni, 1974, led by Gaura Devi): hill villagers, mostly women, hugged trees to stop contractors’ felling; Chandi Prasad Bhatt and Sunderlal Bahuguna (“ecology is permanent economy”).
  • Appiko (Salkani, Uttara Kannada, 1983, Pandurang Hegde): carried Chipko’s method to the Western Ghats.
  • Narmada Bachao Andolan (from the late 1980s, Medha Patkar): against the Sardar Sarovar dam’s displacement of adivasis and peasants; it reframed dams as a question of rights.
  • Niyamgiri (Odisha): in April 2013 the Supreme Court left the decision on Vedanta’s bauxite mine to the Gram Sabhas; all 12 Dongria Kondh Gram Sabhas rejected it in July–August 2013, India’s first environmental referendum.

Chipko and Its Gandhian Tone in the Climate Era (2023)

  • Chipko’s methods (non-violent protest, fasting, padyatra) and its values (village self-reliance, limited wants, trusteeship of nature) are Gandhian. Bahuguna explicitly drew on Gandhi.
  • In the climate era its relevance lies in three lessons: forests are carbon sinks and livelihoods at once; the Himalaya is fragile (Joshimath 2023, the Char Dham road and hydropower debates); and local consent must precede “development”. LiFE borrows Chipko’s ethic of restraint.
  • Limits: Guha shows Chipko was first a peasant livelihood movement, not only a conservation one; Gandhian restraint is easier to ask of the poor than of high consumers.

Community Forest Management

  • Van Panchayats of Uttarakhand, formalised under rules of 1931, are among the oldest legal community forests.
  • Joint Forest Management (1990 circular) shared forest protection and produce between the forest department and village committees; critics say the department kept control.
  • Mendha Lekha (Gadchiroli, Maharashtra), a Gond village with the slogan “our government in Delhi and Mumbai, we are the government in our village”, was among the first to win Community Forest Resource rights (2009) and later the right to harvest and sell bamboo through its Gram Sabha.
  • Thousands of village forest-protection committees in Odisha, and sacred groves (devrai in Maharashtra, kavu in Kerala) show conservation through custom.
  • The lesson echoes Elinor Ostrom: local institutions can manage commons well when rights are secure.

The Trilogy: Environmental Movement, Development and Tribal Identity (2024)

  • Development brings dams, mines and protected areas into adivasi land; environmental movements resist; and tribal identity becomes the language of resistance: Niyamgiri as the Dongria Kondh’s sacred mountain, the Pathalgadi stone plaques of Jharkhand asserting Gram Sabha authority, and Hasdeo Arand’s forest protests.
  • The three reinforce each other: identity gives movements moral force; movements give tribes a national voice; and development is redefined as consent-based.
  • Caution (Baviskar): identity can be romanticised, and not every adivasi rejects development; many want roads, schools and fair jobs on their own terms.

When Livelihood Needs Conflict with Environmental Protection (2024)

  • Forms of the conflict: forest dwellers versus protected areas; fishers versus marine reserves and ports; coal-dependent districts versus the energy transition; urban hawkers and waste pickers versus “clean city” drives.
  • Fortress conservation, which removes people to protect nature, has displaced communities from tiger reserves; it often fails because it turns locals into opponents.
  • Ways to reconcile: rights-based conservation (FRA and CFR), payment for ecosystem services, eco-sensitive zones planned with residents, a just transition for coal workers in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, and green jobs in solar maintenance, waste recycling and restoration.
  • Gadgil’s Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel report (2011) proposed graded protection with local participation; its rejection and replacement by the narrower Kasturirangan report (2013) shows how hard political reconciliation is.

Population Dynamics and Sustainability (2026)

  • India became the most populous country in 2023. Its pyramid is narrowing at the base: the total fertility rate fell to 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21), below replacement, while the working-age bulge is at its peak.
  • Sustainability depends less on numbers than on consumption and distribution: a rich Indian’s footprint is many times a poor one’s.
  • Policy measures: use the demographic dividend through skills and green jobs; plan cities for heat and water; invest in women’s education and health (which lowers fertility and raises adaptive capacity); prepare for ageing; and avoid coercive population control. Details are in population size, growth and composition.

Can India Grow and Be Sustainable?

Asked directly in 2025 (“Is it possible to have sustainable development in India?”) and as a dialectic in 2022.

For

  • Non-fossil sources already supply over half of installed power capacity; solar is now the cheapest new power.
  • Low historical and per capita emissions give India room to grow while decarbonising.
  • Strong traditions of community conservation (Van Panchayats, sacred groves, Mendha Lekha) and a legal base in the FRA.
  • An active judiciary (Godavarman, Vanashakti) and a vigorous civil society.
  • Policy instruments are in place: NDCs, NAPCC, green hydrogen, LiFE, CSR and SDG localisation.

Against

  • Coal output is still rising; an intensity target lets absolute emissions grow.
  • Forest and environmental law has been diluted (the 2023 forest amendment, post-facto clearances).
  • Climate costs fall on Dalits, adivasis, women and informal workers who have least voice.
  • Groundwater depletion, air pollution and river degradation are already at crisis level.
  • Green projects themselves (solar parks, hydro, plantations) can displace the poor.

Verdict. Yes, but only if sustainability is treated as a question of justice and institutions, not just technology. Ecological modernisation is visible in India’s energy transition; the treadmill is visible in its coal, mines and forests. Growth can be sustainable if ecosystem people keep rights over the commons, the costs of transition are shared, and adaptation reaches the most exposed. Without that, India risks “green growth” for omnivores and slow violence for everyone else.

Measures and way forward.

  • Rights first: complete FRA claims, recognise Community Forest Resource rights and respect Gram Sabha consent, including for green-energy projects.
  • Adaptation for the most exposed: heat action plans with wage support for outdoor workers, flood-safe housing for Dalit and landless hamlets, cyclone-resilient livelihoods for fishers.
  • Just transition for coal districts: retraining, social security and new local industry.
  • Climate-smart agriculture: micro-irrigation, millets, crop diversification away from water-heavy paddy in Punjab and Haryana, and insurance that pays quickly.
  • Stronger environmental governance: meaningful EIA public hearings, no routine post-facto approvals, and a clear legal definition that protects unrecorded forests.
  • Gender-responsive policy: women in forest, water and disaster committees; land titles in women’s names.
  • Measure what matters: data on climate migration and heat deaths disaggregated by caste, gender and occupation.
  • Consumption, not only production: LiFE paired with rules for high emitters, public transport and efficiency standards.

Related notes: Development and Dependency (Brundtland, the 2030 Agenda and CSR); Environmental Movements in India; Crisis of Development (displacement and rehabilitation); rural labour and migration; population size, growth and composition.

Previous Year Questions

  • Draw the current population pyramid of India. What policy measures would you recommend for population dynamics to achieve sustainability? (2026)
  • Discuss the role of geographical factors in social change and development. [Paper 1] (2026)
  • Is it possible to have sustainable development in India? Cite major environmental issues and suggest a few measures to achieve the sustainability. (2025)
  • What are the Indian government’s schemes launched for poverty alleviation after the United Nation’s Declaration of ‘Sustainable Development Goals – 2015’? Briefly describe. (2025)
  • What do you understand by sustainable development? Discuss the elements of sustainable development as proposed in the UNDP’s Sustainable Development Goals Report-2015. [Paper 1] (2025)
  • What is sustainable development? How can sustainability be achieved in India where livelihood needs conflict with environmental protection? (2024)
  • Analyse the trilogy between environmental movement, development, and tribal identity. (2024)
  • In the face of rising global climatic concerns, how do you contextualize the relevance of Chipko Movement and its Gandhian tone? Answer analytically. (2023)
  • Citing some case studies, expand the concept of Development-induced Displacement? (2023)
  • Examine the relevance of corporate social responsibility in a world marked by increasing environmental crises. [Paper 1] (2023)
  • Critically examine the dialectics between ‘development and environment’. (2022)
  • Discuss how “environmentalism” can be explained with new social movements approach. [Paper 1] (2022)
  • The problem of displacement is inherent in the idea of development. Analyze the statement critically. (2021)
  • Evaluate the nature and scope of anthropogenic influence on Climate in India and also analyze the environmental movements arising out of it. (2020)
  • Point out the benefits of ‘green chemistry’ for agrarian transformation in India. (2020)
  • Highlight the main features of the ‘Inter-linking of Rivers’ project in India. What could be its probable advantages to Indian agriculture? (2019)
  • Has reduction of green cover affected ecological degradation leading to global warming? Elaborate your answer with illustration. (2019)
  • Western patriarchy which surrenders feminine principles is the development project in India. Do you agree with this view? Why? (2018)
  • Discuss some of the striking issues of development induced imbalances that need urgent attention. (2017)
  • Discuss the various forms of environmental movements waged in india. (2016)
  • Discuss the ‘Chipko movement’ as an example of eco-feminism. (2014)
  • How does the new Forest Act affect tribals? (2013)
  • Do you think that some policies and laws relating to environment have retarded the development process? Give examples. How can an ideal balance between environmental protection and development goals be brought about? (2012)
  • How do you define development? What are your suggestions to resolve the issues of displacement and environment related to development? (2008)

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