How UPSC asks this topic now. Digital questions now appear every year. Paper 1 asked whether social media has changed the forms of protest (2023, 20 marks, “argue your case”), the role of social media in contemporary movements and its challenges (2024, 20), digital ethnography and visual culture (2024, 20), the significance of movements in the digital era (2025) and Merton’s reference groups and identity-making in the digital world (2025). Paper 2 asked about social media and communal polarisation (2021, 20), social media and mass mobilisation in India (2023), and the shift from physical to virtual movements in 21st-century India (2026). This page is the LotusArise home for digital society and digital movements. AI, digital public infrastructure and the digital divide are on the science, technology and social change page, and general movement theory is on the protest, social movements and collective action page.
Key Terms
- Digital society: a society in which work, politics, intimacy, religion and identity are increasingly organised through networked devices, platforms and data.
- Digital social movement: sustained collective challenge in which digital media do part of the work of recruiting, framing, coordinating and publicising. Few movements are purely virtual; most are hybrid.
- Connective action: mobilisation built on personalised content shared across digital networks, rather than on formal organisations and a shared collective identity (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012).
- Hashtag activism: using a tag (#MeToo, #BlackLivesMatter) to name an injustice, collect testimony and link scattered supporters.
- Slacktivism (also clicktivism): low-cost online acts such as liking or sharing that may replace, rather than lead to, costly offline commitment.
- Internet shutdown: a government-ordered disruption of internet or mobile data in an area, for a period, to control the flow of information.
- Digital ethnography: long-term participant observation of social life on and through the internet.
Digital Society: Key Thinkers and Concepts
Castells: The Network Society and Networked Movements
- Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (1996), the first volume of The Information Age trilogy:
- The key social structure of the information age is the network: flexible, decentred, able to add or drop nodes.
- Power shifts to those who programme and switch networks. A space of flows (finance, data, elites) overrides the space of places where most people live, and timeless time breaks the routine clock of industrial life.
- Those with nothing the network values fall into a “fourth world” of exclusion.
- Communication Power (2009) adds mass self-communication: anyone can now produce messages that reach a mass audience, which weakens the gatekeeping of states and broadcasters.
- Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (2012) studies Tunisia, Egypt, Iceland, Spain’s Indignados and Occupy Wall Street. Features of networked social movements:
- They start online but become movements by occupying urban space, forming a hybrid “space of autonomy”.
- They are triggered by a spark of outrage and sustained by hope; emotion, not ideology, mobilises.
- They are leaderless or leader-light, viral, local and global at once, and aim more at changing values than at winning state power.
- Critique: Castells is accused of techno-optimism. Most of his 2011 cases did not achieve lasting structural change (Egypt returned to military rule in 2013), which is the starting point of Tufekci’s work below.
van Dijck: The Platform Society
- José van Dijck, Thomas Poell and Martijn de Waal, The Platform Society: Public Values in a Connective World (2018). (The thinker is José van Dijck, not Jan van Dijk, who wrote on the network society and the digital divide.)
- Platforms are no longer just apps; they are becoming the infrastructure of society. A few “Big Five” infrastructural platforms (Alphabet-Google, Apple, Facebook-Meta, Amazon, Microsoft) sit under sectoral platforms in news, transport, health and education.
- Three mechanisms run the platform society: datafication (turning activity into data), commodification (turning data and attention into revenue) and selection (algorithms deciding what is visible).
- The central question is about public values: who decides on fairness, privacy, accuracy and democratic control when private platforms run public life?
- For movements, this means visibility is set by algorithms the activists do not control. For work and the economy, see platform capitalism and gig work.
The Public Sphere Online: Habermas and His Critics
- Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962; English 1989): the bourgeois public sphere of coffee houses, salons and newspapers let private people reason together on public matters. Commercial mass media later “refeudalised” it, turning citizens into spectators.
- Optimists saw the internet as a new, open public sphere. Zizi Papacharissi (2002) answered more cautiously that it is a “virtual sphere”: more people can speak, but talk is fragmented and rarely deliberative.
- Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere” (1990): there was never one public; excluded groups form subaltern counterpublics to develop their own interpretations. Dalit, Adivasi, feminist and queer online spaces in India fit this idea well.
- Habermas himself, in A New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Deliberative Politics (2022; English 2023), argues that platforms have dissolved shared editorial filters, so the public sphere splits into semi-public, self-confirming fragments.
- Jodi Dean adds the idea of communicative capitalism: endless circulation of messages feels like participation but rarely turns into political decision.
Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers
- Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble (2011): personalised algorithms show users more of what they already like, so each person lives in an invisible, unchosen bubble.
- Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (2001) and #Republic (2017): people choose like-minded sources, forming echo chambers. His law of group polarisation says like-minded groups move to more extreme versions of their starting views.
- Critics: Axel Bruns (Are Filter Bubbles Real?, 2019) finds that most users see more diverse sources than the metaphor implies. A 2015 Facebook study in Science (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic) found that users’ own choices narrowed exposure more than the algorithm did. The safer claim is that algorithms amplify existing polarisation rather than create it.
- Indian application (2021, Paper 2): caste, religious and party groups on encrypted messaging apps, outrage-rewarding feeds and doctored videos feed communal polarisation. Sahana Udupa’s idea of extreme speech (with Matti Pohjonen, 2017) studies such online vitriol in its cultural context. Ways to combat it are on the science, technology and social change page; the communal context is in communalism and religious revivalism.
Digital Identity and the Presentation of Self (2025)
- Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956; US edition 1959): social life is a performance with a front stage and a back stage, managed through impression management. Profiles, filters and curated feeds are front-stage work made permanent.
- Bernie Hogan (2010) refines this: much of social media is an exhibition, a stored display that others view later, not a live performance.
- danah boyd (“Social Network Sites as Networked Publics”, 2010; It’s Complicated, 2014): networked publics are spaces restructured by technology. Their four affordances:
- persistence (posts last),
- visibility (large potential audiences),
- spreadability (easy sharing), and
- searchability (content can be found).
- These produce context collapse (Alice Marwick and boyd, 2011): family, employer and strangers become one audience, so users write for an “imagined audience” and self-censor.
- Merton’s reference groups (asked in 2025): online, the reference group is no longer limited to people one meets. Influencers and distant peers become comparison points, widening anticipatory socialisation and relative deprivation. Likes and followers act as a public scoreboard of the looking-glass self (Cooley).
- A second meaning of digital identity is the state’s: biometric and numeric identities such as Aadhaar, which shape access to welfare. This, and its exclusions, is covered on the science, technology and social change page.
Digital Religion and Digital Caste
- Digital religion: Heidi Campbell’s idea of a blended online and offline religious life (online darshan, live-streamed aarti, gurus on video platforms) is covered in types of religious practices.
- Digital caste: caste does not disappear online. Matrimonial platforms carry caste filters, caste pride songs and pages circulate on video apps, and caste abuse shapes who feels safe speaking. Against this, Dalit and Ambedkarite users build counterpublics (see Indian cases below). The movement history is in backward classes and Dalit movements.
Digital Social Movements: From Collective to Connective Action
- Classic theory (Mancur Olson’s free-rider problem, resource mobilisation, political process) assumes that movements need formal organisations to gather resources, build a collective identity and overcome the cost of participation. These theories are covered in protest, social movements and collective action.
- W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The Logic of Connective Action” (2012; book 2013), argue that digital media allow a second logic, connective action:
- People join through personal action frames, open slogans that each person can fill with their own story (“We are the 99%”, “Me too”).
- Sharing is itself the act of participation and is self-motivating, so the free-rider problem shrinks.
- Digital platforms take over much of the organising work that formal organisations once did.
- They give a three-part typology: organisationally brokered networks (collective action), organisationally enabled networks and crowd-enabled networks (both connective action).
| Dimension | Collective action | Connective action |
|---|---|---|
| Core logic | Shared collective identity; join the group | Personal expression shared across networks |
| Organisation | Formal organisation, leaders, members, dues | Loose networks; platforms coordinate; few or no leaders |
| Frame | One ideology or programme, negotiated in advance | Personal action frames, hashtags, memes |
| Cost of joining | High: time, risk, membership | Low: a post, a share, a signature |
| Free-rider problem | Central (Olson); solved by selective incentives | Weakened; sharing is its own reward |
| Communication | Media publicise decisions made elsewhere | Media are the organising structure |
| Strengths | Discipline, negotiation, durability | Speed, scale, reach to the unorganised |
| Weaknesses | Slow, hierarchical, can exclude | Fragile, hard to negotiate, easy to ignore |
| Indian example | Trade union strikes; the 2020–21 farmers’ unions’ morcha | #MeToo India (2018); #JusticeFor campaigns |
Tufekci: Capacity, Signals and the Tactical Freeze
- Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest (2017), draws on Egypt (2011), Occupy, Turkey’s Gezi Park protests (2013) and Hong Kong.
- The paradox: digital tools let movements gather huge crowds quickly, but they skip the slow, tedious organising that builds capacity. She contrasts this with the 1963 March on Washington, which took months of logistics and left a durable organisation behind.
- Capacities that movements need:
- narrative capacity: telling their story and having it heard;
- disruptive capacity: interrupting business as usual;
- electoral or institutional capacity: threatening those in power through votes or institutions.
- Signals: a big crowd used to signal great underlying capacity, because it was hard to assemble. Now crowds are cheap, so states read them as weaker signals and wait them out.
- Tactical freeze: without leaders or decision-making structures, a networked movement cannot change tactics, negotiate or step back when conditions change, so it keeps repeating the same occupation until it fades or is crushed.
- The state learns too: censorship is joined by information glut, distraction, troll campaigns and harassment, which drown out rather than block dissent.
Hashtag Activism, Slacktivism and Its Defence
- The critique:
- Evgeny Morozov popularised “slacktivism” (2009) and argued in The Net Delusion (2011) that authoritarian states use the internet for surveillance and propaganda as skilfully as activists use it for freedom.
- Malcolm Gladwell (“Small Change”, 2010): high-risk activism needs strong ties; social media builds weak ties, good for spreading information but not for sacrifice.
- Jen Schradie, The Revolution That Wasn’t (2019): a digital activism gap by class and organisation; well-resourced, hierarchical groups (often conservative) use the internet better than leaderless left networks.
- The defence:
- Sarah Jackson, Moya Bailey and Brooke Foucault Welles, #HashtagActivism (2020): hashtags let Black women, trans people and others outside mainstream media set agendas, build counter-narratives and force coverage.
- Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody (2008): falling costs of group formation let “organising without organisations” happen.
- Paolo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets (2012): social media works as a “choreography of assembly”, steering people into physical gatherings; online and offline are linked, not rival.
- Online acts often act as a ladder: a share leads to a petition, then a donation, then a march.
The Digital Movement Cycle
Most Indian digital campaigns follow a recognisable cycle. The trigger is usually a single image, video or death; the hashtag frames it; online mobilisation turns attention into crowds and money; offline action creates the pressure; and the state responds with reform, negotiation, policing or a shutdown. Each outcome feeds the next cycle.
Media and opportunity structures (2019, Paper 2). Media do not cause movements on their own; grievances and organisation come first. But media shape the political opportunity structure: Bart Cammaerts (2012) calls this the mediation opportunity structure, the chances that media coverage, self-produced media and networked communication open or close for activists. Journalism as the “fourth pillar” (2018) and mass media as an agent of change (2017) are on the agents of social change page.
Global Cases
- Arab Spring (2010–12): Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia (17 December 2010) spread through phone videos and Al Jazeera; President Ben Ali fled on 14 January 2011. In Egypt, Wael Ghonim’s Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” helped call the 25 January protests; the government cut the internet from 28 January, but crowds grew, and Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011. Lesson: digital tools helped mobilise, but in Egypt organised forces (the army, the Muslim Brotherhood) decided the outcome, and the military took power again in 2013.
- #MeToo (2017): Tarana Burke began “Me Too” in 2006 as survivor support among Black women. Actor Alyssa Milano’s tweet of 15 October 2017, after the Harvey Weinstein reports, turned it into a global hashtag. Lesson: a personal action frame lets millions add their own story; critics note that it centred celebrities and raised due-process questions.
- Black Lives Matter (2013– ): the hashtag was created by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi in July 2013 after George Zimmerman’s acquittal in the killing of Trayvon Martin. It grew through Ferguson (2014) and became one of the largest protest waves in US history after George Floyd was killed on 25 May 2020; bystander video was central. Lesson: a hashtag became a decentralised network of chapters, combining connective and collective action.
Indian Cases: Social Media and Mass Mobilisation (2023, Paper 2)
| Case | Digital role | Offline action | Outcome and limits |
|---|---|---|---|
| India Against Corruption (2011) | Missed-call number, Facebook pages, SMS chains, alongside heavy television coverage | Anna Hazare’s fasts at Jantar Mantar (from 5 April 2011) and Ramlila Maidan (August 2011) | Joint drafting committee; Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013; Aam Aadmi Party formed in November 2012. Urban, middle-class base |
| Nirbhaya protests (December 2012) | Facebook, SMS and early Twitter spread outrage; pre-hashtag era, so television still led | Students and women’s groups at India Gate and Raisina Hill | Justice Verma Committee (report 23 January 2013); Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 |
| #MeToo India (2017–18) | A crowdsourced list of academics (2017), then a wave of testimonies on X and Instagram from September–October 2018 | Little street action; complaints, inquiries and court cases | Minister M.J. Akbar resigned (October 2018); Priya Ramani acquitted of defamation (17 February 2021). Mostly urban, English-speaking professionals |
| Anti-CAA protests (December 2019–March 2020) | Protest art, readings of the Preamble and live streams; supporters of the Act ran rival online and offline campaigns | Campus protests; the Shaheen Bagh sit-in on a Delhi road (15 December 2019 to 24 March 2020) | Act stayed in force; Rules notified March 2024. In Amit Sahni (7 October 2020) the Supreme Court held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely; internet was suspended in several areas |
| Farm-law protest (2020–21) | Unions’ own IT cells, YouTube channels and the Trolley Times newsletter; the “toolkit” controversy (February 2021) | Sit-ins at Delhi’s borders from 26 November 2020 | Three laws repealed in November 2021. A union-led, organisationally brokered movement with a digital layer; see peasants’ and farmers’ movements |
Dalit Digital Assertion
- Counterpublics: Ambedkarite websites, YouTube channels such as Dalit Camera, and Facebook and Instagram pages give Dalits a voice that mainstream newsrooms, with few Dalit journalists, rarely provided.
- Rohith Vemula (died 17 January 2016, University of Hyderabad): his letter circulated widely online; #JusticeForRohith fed campus protests across India and a debate on caste discrimination in higher education.
- Una (July 2016): a video of Dalit men being flogged in Gujarat for skinning a dead cow went viral and led to the Dalit Asmita Yatra and a mass refusal to dispose of carcasses.
- Bharat Bandh of 2 April 2018, called largely through social media against the Supreme Court’s March 2018 ruling diluting the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; Parliament restored the provisions by amendment in August 2018.
- Limits: online caste abuse, uneven access in rural areas, and a risk that visibility substitutes for organisation. See backward classes and Dalit movements.
#JusticeFor Campaigns
- A recurrent Indian form: a named victim, a hashtag, candle marches and demands for a fast trial or a central inquiry. Examples: #JusticeForAsifa (Kathua, 2018), the Hathras case (September 2020), where the night-time cremation by police caused national outrage, and the RG Kar Medical College case in Kolkata (August 2024), which led to the “Reclaim the Night” marches of 14 August 2024.
- Strengths: they force police and political response, keep cases alive and link local crimes to national debates on caste and gender violence.
- Problems: they personalise structural issues, can reveal victims’ identities against the law, invite trial by media, and are selective: some victims trend and many do not. Women’s movement context: women’s movement in India.
The State and the Digital
Internet Shutdowns
- Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (2025 report, released 31 March 2026) counted at least 313 shutdowns in 52 countries in 2025. India had 65, second only to Myanmar (at least 95). India’s count fell from 84 in 2024 and was its lowest since 2017, but it remained the highest among democracies.
- SFLC.in’s tracker (internetshutdowns.in) has recorded 935 shutdowns since 2012, as of November 2026. Jammu and Kashmir accounts for 454 (48.6%). The peak was 2018 (136), and 2026 had 33 up to 9 November. About 70% were preventive (ordered before any unrest) rather than reactive. Counts come mainly from media reports, so they are minimums.
- Uses: protests, communal tension, exams and elections. Manipur’s long shutdown from May 2023 showed the cost to livelihoods, education and the reporting of violence.
- Law: in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (10 January 2020) the Supreme Court held that free speech and trade over the internet are protected under Article 19, indefinite suspension is not allowed, and orders must be proportionate and published. The Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, under the Telecommunications Act 2023, cap an order at 15 days and require reasons; SFLC.in argues that practice has changed less than the wording.
IT Rules 2021, the DPDP Act 2023 and Deepfakes
- IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (notified 25 February 2021): due diligence by platforms, grievance officers, extra duties for significant social media intermediaries (a chief compliance officer, tracing the “first originator” of messages on court or government order) and an oversight code for digital news and OTT content.
- Later changes: Grievance Appellate Committees (2022); a government fact-check unit added in 2023 was struck down by the Bombay High Court in Kunal Kamra (September 2024), and the Union’s appeal is before the Supreme Court. X Corp’s challenge to the government’s Sahyog takedown portal failed before a single judge of the Karnataka High Court in 2025 and is on appeal.
- Deepfakes: the IT Amendment Rules, 2026 (notified 10 February, in force 20 February 2026) define “synthetically generated information”, require platforms to label it prominently, oblige AI tool providers to obtain user declarations, and shorten takedown times, to as little as 2 hours for non-consensual intimate and deepfake sexual content.
- Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: consent-based processing, rights of data principals, a Data Protection Board, and broad exemptions for the state. The DPDP Rules, 2025 were notified on 14 November 2025 and phase in over 18 months: the Board first, consent managers from November 2026, and most duties by May 2027. Journalists’ groups object that the Act also narrows the Right to Information by amending Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
| Measure | Gains | Gaps |
|---|---|---|
| IT Rules 2021 | Grievance redress for users; faster removal of non-consensual intimate images; accountability of large platforms | Traceability weakens end-to-end encryption; executive takedowns without court review; chilling effect on journalists and activists |
| IT Amendment Rules 2026 (synthetic content) | First binding rules on labelling deepfakes; fast takedown protects women and voters | Over-removal risk; satire and art may be caught; detection tools are imperfect |
| DPDP Act 2023 and Rules 2025 | First general privacy law after Puttaswamy (2017); consent, breach notice, children’s data | Wide state exemptions; Board appointed by the executive; RTI narrowed; slow phase-in to 2027 |
| Telecom Suspension Rules 2024 | Written, reasoned, time-bound orders; review committee | Preventive shutdowns continue; publication is weak; no compensation for losses |
Misinformation, Lynchings and Communal Polarisation (2021, Paper 2)
- In 2018, rumours of child-lifters spread through WhatsApp forwards led to a wave of mob killings of strangers, migrants and nomads. On 1 July 2018 five men from a nomadic community were killed in Rainpada, Dhule district, Maharashtra. Press counts of deaths that year differ (roughly 20 to 30), as India keeps no official lynching statistics.
- Responses: WhatsApp limited forwarding to five chats at once in India (July 2018) and labelled forwarded messages. In Tehseen S. Poonawalla v Union of India (17 July 2018) the Supreme Court condemned “mobocracy” and set preventive, remedial and punitive directions, such as a nodal police officer in every district. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 treats murder by a group of five or more on grounds such as caste, community or religion as a separate offence.
- Sociological reading: rumours spread along existing lines of distrust (outsiders, minorities, lower castes). Technology speeds them up; it does not create the prejudice. This links to Gustave Le Bon’s crowd and to Durkheim’s collective effervescence, now produced through screens.
Way forward: a healthier digital public sphere
- Rights-based shutdown practice: publish every order, limit shutdowns to narrow areas and hours, and prefer targeted action against specific accounts.
- Platform accountability: transparency reports in Indian languages, audits of amplification algorithms, and fast action on hate speech and deepfakes, with appeal to an independent body.
- Judicial oversight of takedown and blocking orders, so that regulation of harm does not become control of dissent.
- Digital and media literacy in schools and for adults, and well-funded fact-checking in regional languages.
- Offline bridges: inter-community peace committees and local leaders, which algorithms cannot replace.
Digital Ethnography as Method (2024)
- Christine Hine, Virtual Ethnography (2000): the internet is both a culture (a place where social life happens) and a cultural artefact (a technology shaped by people’s ideas of it). The field site is followed, not fixed. Her later Ethnography for the Internet (2015) describes the internet as embedded, embodied and everyday.
- Robert Kozinets coined netnography in the 1990s (Netnography, 2010; revised 2015 and 2020): a structured method for online communities, from entry and data collection to interpretation, ethical standards and member checks.
- Tom Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life (2008): two years of fieldwork inside a virtual world as an avatar, showing that virtual worlds have their own norms, economies and intimacies.
- Others: the Why We Post project (Daniel Miller and colleagues, 2016), including Shriram Venkatraman’s Social Media in South India (2017); Sarah Pink and colleagues, Digital Ethnography (2016).
- Visual culture: memes, reels, protest art and photographs are both data and prompts (photo elicitation). Shaheen Bagh’s murals and the farmers’ protest videos are examples.
- Ethics online:
- “Public” is not the same as consent: a searchable post can identify its author if quoted.
- Informed consent in large or closed groups, and covert observation, are hard to justify.
- Protection of vulnerable users (activists, survivors, minors) and data security under the DPDP Act.
- The Association of Internet Researchers’ Internet Research: Ethical Guidelines 3.0 (2019) recommend case-by-case judgment rather than fixed rules.
- Assessment: digital ethnography widens the field site and reaches hidden groups, but it over-represents the connected, depends on platform access and algorithms, and is strongest when online traces are linked to offline lives. More on method: qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques of data collection.
From Physical to Virtual Movements (2026, Paper 2)
What Has Changed
- Cost and speed: mobilisation takes hours, not months; India has about 109 crore internet subscriptions (TRAI, March 2026; connections, not persons).
- Organisation: from cadres and committees to networks, influencers and WhatsApp groups (connective action).
- Repertoire: Charles Tilly’s repertoire of contention now includes hashtag storms, online petitions, live streams, crowdfunding and digital toolkits.
- Voice: women, Dalits, Adivasis, queer people and students can speak without gatekeepers (Fraser’s counterpublics).
- Scale: local cases become national and diasporic quickly.
What Continues
- Grievances still come from structure: caste, gender, land, jobs, state action. Smelser’s strains and the political process model still apply.
- Bodies in public space still matter most for pressure: Shaheen Bagh, the farmers at Delhi’s borders and the 2012 Raisina Hill crowds were physical.
- Organised groups (unions, student bodies, caste and farmers’ associations) still sustain and negotiate; the farm-law protest succeeded as a union-led movement with a digital layer.
- Melucci’s point holds: collective identity is built in latent networks between visible moments; online groups are a new form of such networks.
Limits of the Virtual
- Tufekci’s tactical freeze and weak signals; Gladwell’s weak ties.
- The digital divide by gender, class, caste and region, so the connected speak for the rest (data on the science, technology and social change page).
- Platform control of visibility (van Dijck) and state control through shutdowns, takedowns and surveillance.
- Counter-mobilisation: troll armies, misinformation and organised online campaigns against movements.
- Short attention cycles: hashtags fade before demands are met.
Answer frame: the shift is from physical to hybrid, not to purely virtual movements. Digital media lower the cost of the first steps (awareness, framing, gathering), but outcomes still depend on sustained offline organisation, alliances and institutional pressure.
Has Social Media Strengthened or Weakened Social Movements in India?
Strengthened
- Lower costs: groups without money or cadres can mobilise (Shirky; Bennett and Segerberg).
- Voice for the excluded: Dalit, Adivasi, women’s and queer counterpublics; #MeToo India named powerful men whom institutions had protected.
- Evidence: phone videos (Una 2016) make abuse hard to deny.
- Hybrid strength: the farm-law protest used its own media to answer hostile coverage and won repeal.
- Policy pressure: the Nirbhaya protests contributed to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, and IAC to the Lokpal Act 2013.
- Diaspora and global solidarity raise the cost of repression.
Weakened
- Fragility: quick mobilisation without capacity (Tufekci); many campaigns fade after the news cycle.
- Slacktivism: clicks replace commitment (Morozov, Gladwell).
- Polarisation and misinformation: echo chambers, deepfakes and rumour-driven violence (2018 lynchings) damage trust.
- State capacity: India led democracies in shutdowns in 2025 (65, Access Now); takedown orders and surveillance raise risk for activists.
- Inequality of voice: the digital divide and Schradie’s digital activism gap favour the resourced and organised.
- Selective outrage: #JusticeFor campaigns pick some victims and ignore many.
Verdict. Social media has strengthened the reach and voice of Indian movements and weakened their staying power when used alone. It is a powerful tool for the first stages of the movement cycle (trigger, framing, mobilisation) but not a substitute for organisation, leadership and negotiation, which still decide outcomes. Its effect depends on who uses it: marginal groups gain voice, but states and organised majorities gain equal or greater capacity to surveil, counter-mobilise and switch off. The best answer is that Indian movements have become hybrid: strongest where digital networks rest on offline organisations, as in the farm-law protest, and weakest where a hashtag is all there is.
Related notes: protest, social movements and collective action (movement theory, NSM, Tilly); science, technology and social change (AI, digital public infrastructure, the digital divide); platform capitalism and gig work; peasants’ and farmers’ movements (the 2020–21 farm-law protest); backward classes and Dalit movements; qualitative and quantitative methods (digital ethnography and visual culture); and types of religious practices (digital religion).
Previous Year Questions
- Examine the transiting social movements from physical movements to virtual movements in 21st century India. [Paper 2] (2026)
- Can Merton’s reference group theory be relevant in understanding ‘identity making’ in digital world? Explain. (2025)
- How can you assess the significance of social movements in the digital era? Explain. (2025)
- How do you view and assess the increasing trend of digital ethnography and the use of visual culture in sociological research? (2024)
- Underline the role of social media in contemporary social movements and describe its challenges. (2024)
- Critically examine the roles of science and technology in social change. What is your opinion on their increasing trend in ‘online’ education and teaching? (2024)
- Do you think that the social media has brought significant changes in the forms of protest? Argue your case. (2023)
- Analyse the sociological interconnections between Social Media and Mass Mobilization in India. [Paper 2] (2023)
- Discuss the role of social media in communal polarisation. Suggest ways to combat it. [Paper 2] (2021)
- Feminist scholars argue that ‘New media’ is masculine and hence reinforces structural hierarchies rather than reconfiguring them. Comment. (2019)
- Do you agree that social movements are caused by opportunity structures that are generated by media? Why? [Paper 2] (2019)
- Media is the fourth pillar of democracy. Discuss. [Paper 2] (2018)
- Assess the role of mass media as an agent of social change. (2017)
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