Give an account of the major contending issues in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Assess the prospects for greater cooperation between the two countries. (2004)
The relationship is a textbook case of asymmetry in Brantly Womack’s sense (2006): India, over twenty times Bangladesh’s area, gives the relationship far less attention than Bangladesh must, so Delhi’s help can read as intrusion and its inattention as disdain. Set at the low point of the BNP–Jamaat years, the question is topical again under Tarique Rahman’s BNP government.
The contending issues
| Issue | India’s concern | Bangladesh’s concern |
|---|---|---|
| Water | Kolkata port, needs of West Bengal and Bihar | Lean-season Ganga flows; Teesta unsigned since 2011; a new treaty before the 12 Dec 2026 expiry |
| Border | Smuggling, infiltration, fencing | BSF killings (the Felani Khatun acquittal); zero-line fencing |
| Migration | Illegal migration, NRC | Denial of the premise; CAA read as a slur |
| Security | Insurgent sanctuary (ULFA, NSCN) in 2001–06; radical networks | Indian “interference” in domestic politics |
| Trade | Market access, transit to the North-East | Roughly 6:1 deficit; non-tariff barriers; 2025 land-port curbs |
| China | Mongla, Teesta project, arms, submarine base | Freedom to hedge |
| Post-2024 | Minority safety, Jamaat’s 68 seats | Extradition of Sheikh Hasina, sentenced to death in absentia (Nov 2025) |
Most issues are old and structural, and Bangladesh’s India policy has swung with its party alternation: cooperation under the Awami League, distrust under the BNP. Smruti S. Pattanaik (Four Decades of India–Bangladesh Relations, 2012) traces this to Bangladesh’s internal political calculations rather than to Indian conduct.
Prospects: the case for optimism
- Proven settlements: the Ganga Treaty (1996), the Land Boundary Agreement (implemented 2015) and India’s acceptance of the adverse 2014 maritime award show hard issues can be closed.
- Security cooperation built after 2009 (ULFA leaders handed over, insurgent camps closed, the 2013 extradition treaty) has survived the change of government, at least in form.
- Deep interdependence: about 1,160 MW of Indian grid power, the Friendship Pipeline (2023), restored rail links, Chattogram and Mongla access for the North-East, and Nepali power wheeled through India since November 2024.
- New openings: West Bengal’s change of government (May 2026) removes the Teesta veto. The coming loss of LDC trade preferences (Dhaka has sought to defer graduation from 2026 to 2029) keeps a CEPA attractive. Visas were restored by about May 2026; on 24 August 2026 the two sides discussed reopening land ports and border haats in about US$13 billion of trade.
- Pragmatism in Dhaka: “Bangladesh First” asks for equality, not hostility, and Rahman backs SAARC revival.
Prospects: the constraints
- Hasina’s presence in India: a legal issue India cannot concede, a legitimacy issue Dhaka cannot drop.
- China and the Gulf: Rahman’s first major visit (June 2026) was to Beijing, where a BNP–CPC accord was signed, and in August 2026 Dhaka said it would consider “positively” an invitation to the Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey defence pact.
- Public opinion in Bangladesh has turned hostile over border killings, the Adani tariff and India’s association with one party.
- Federal and domestic veto players on both sides turn each issue into a two-level game.
Assessment
The prospects are good on functional cooperation and limited on strategic alignment: geography guarantees interdependence but not its terms. Cooperation will grow if India treats the country rather than a party as its partner.
Conclusion
India and Bangladesh cannot avoid each other, but they can choose how they deal. A generous Ganga renewal, a credible Teesta deal, border restraint and engagement across parties will decide whether the post-2024 reset becomes a durable, interest-based partnership.