“Domestic turmoil in neighbouring South Asian countries often constitutes a strain on Indian foreign policy.” Discuss with illustrations. (2007, 60 Marks)
South Asia is, in Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s terms (Regions and Powers, 2003), a regional security complex whose members’ security cannot be separated. Because India borders every member and dominates the region’s economy, a neighbour’s internal crisis rarely stays internal: India becomes a participant whether or not it acts. The statement holds, but the strain is partly of India’s own making.
Why turmoil strains Indian policy
- India as a domestic cleavage: in Robert D. Putnam’s two-level game (1988), leaders bargain abroad with one eye on domestic ratification. In an asymmetric region, anti-India positioning is cheap, and oppositions accuse incumbents of closeness to New Delhi.
- The interference–neglect dilemma: advice reads as pressure; restraint reads as neglect, and another power fills the gap.
- Spillover: refugees, insurgent sanctuaries and stalled projects turn a neighbour’s crisis into India’s internal security problem.
- Discontinuity: agreements signed with one government are inherited by successors who campaigned against them.
- Hedging: Darren J. Lim and Rohan Mukherjee (2019) show small South Asian states using China for bargaining room, so turmoil opens doors to Beijing.
Illustrations
- Sri Lanka: the Tamil conflict drew India into training militants, the 1987 Accord and the IPKF, which left in 1990 having satisfied neither side, with Tamil Nadu politics a lasting constraint. Shivshankar Menon (Choices, 2016) recounts how in 2009 India accepted Colombo’s military end to the war while pressing on civilians and devolution. The 2022 collapse required about US$4 billion in Indian support.
- Nepal: India facilitated the 12-point understanding between the parties and the Maoists (November 2005); the 2015 constitution crisis and a border disruption read as a blockade entrenched Nepali nationalism and pushed Kathmandu towards China. After the Gen Z uprising of September 2025 toppled K. P. Sharma Oli, India worked with Balendra Shah’s government (from 27 March 2026) without visible conditions.
- Bangladesh: the military-backed caretaker regime of 2007–08 and then Sheikh Hasina’s fall in August 2024 exposed a policy built on one party. Hasina, sentenced to death in absentia in November 2025, remains in India; Tarique Rahman’s government (from 17 February 2026) courted Beijing, and in August 2026 the MEA said it was “monitoring all developments” as Dhaka weighed joining the Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey defence pact.
- Maldives: Mohamed Muizzu’s “India Out” campaign forced Indian military personnel out by May 2024; repair came through currency swaps and credit.
- Myanmar: the 2021 coup and civil war stalled Kaladan after Paletwa fell to the Arakan Army (January 2024) and led India to scrap the Free Movement Regime, angering Mizoram and Nagaland.
- Pakistan and Afghanistan: civil–military imbalance in Pakistan sustains cross-border terrorism, from Kargil (1999) to Pahalgam (2025); the Taliban takeover (August 2021) forced India to engage a regime it does not recognise.
The other side
Turmoil is not always loss. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, from a party once hostile to India, made New Delhi his first foreign visit in December 2024, and Narendra Modi’s April 2025 visit yielded a first defence cooperation memorandum. S. D. Muni notes India’s long hesitancy as a regional leader; the Indira Doctrine’s interventions and India’s own veto players (West Bengal on Teesta until 2026, Tamil Nadu on fisheries) add strain that is self-inflicted.
Conclusion
The strain is structural rather than episodic: asymmetry makes India part of its neighbours’ politics. The Gujral Doctrine’s non-interference and non-reciprocity, engagement with states and oppositions rather than incumbents alone, and quick economic help in crises are the most durable answer.