Answer in about 150 words: What strategic options can India exercise as a response to the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan? (2026, 10 Marks)
Pakistan backed the Taliban for three decades to gain strategic depth against India; it got a second front. After border clashes in October 2025, Pakistan’s Defence Minister declared “open war” on 27 February 2026, and fighting resumed in late September 2026 after a lull. Kautilya’s mandala, in which the neighbour’s neighbour is a natural ally, suggests an opening, but the options differ in value.
Why the rupture matters
- Kabul rejects the Durand Line and will not act against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); the Global Terrorism Index 2026 ranked Pakistan first in the world.
- Pakistan has used coercion: border closures at Torkham and Chaman (October 2025) and mass expulsions of Afghans since 2023. This pushes Kabul to seek other routes and partners.
- The Taliban condemned the Pahalgam attack (April 2025), a signal New Delhi read as deliberate.
India’s options
| Option | Instrument | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Engagement without recognition | Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit (October 2025), embassy upgrade, a Taliban chargé d’affaires in New Delhi from January 2026 | Recognise with others, never ahead of them |
| Trade and aid | Wheat, medicines, scholarships; the trade working group of 1 September 2026; air freight corridors | Goodwill does not buy policy |
| Connectivity bypassing Pakistan | Chabahar, INSTC | The US waiver lapsed in April 2026 |
| Counter-terrorism | Assurances on Afghan soil; shared interest against ISKP | Needs intelligence channels to verify |
| Diplomatic leverage | Use the UN and FATF to expose Pakistan’s double standard on militant sanctuaries | Credible only if India stays out of the fighting |
| Multilateral cover | SCO, the Moscow Format | Pakistan and China can stall them |
What India should avoid
- Avinash Paliwal (My Enemy’s Enemy, 2017) shows India’s Afghan policy swinging between “partisans” and “conciliators”; the post-2021 opening is a conciliator gain that a military tilt would squander.
- Arming Kabul would confirm Pakistan’s charge that the Taliban act as an Indian proxy.
- A collapsing nuclear-armed Pakistan, or one pushed deeper into China’s embrace, does not serve India.
- The Taliban hedge among Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf and India, and their bans on girls’ education cap how close India can go. Engagement should therefore stay transactional, measured by what Kabul delivers on terrorism and access.
Conclusion
India’s best response is patient, non-belligerent engagement: trade, aid, connectivity and security assurances, with recognition held back as a bargaining card. Pakistan’s own conduct is doing the strategic work; India needs a distracted Pakistan, not a collapsing one.