Comment: Human Rights in the US foreign policy. (1992, 20 Marks)
Human rights in US foreign policy have always swung between two traditions. One is Wilsonian idealism, which treats the spread of liberty as part of the national interest. The other is realism, which subordinates morality to power. George F. Kennan (American Diplomacy, 1951) condemned the “legalistic-moralistic approach” to world affairs. The record shows a sincere commitment applied selectively, and the selectivity is the key to understanding it.
Foundations
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” (1941) and Eleanor Roosevelt’s chairing of the commission that drafted the UDHR (1948) made the United States an architect of the post-war regime. During the Cold War, though, anti-communism came first. Washington backed authoritarian allies such as Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, and helped topple elected governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954).
Congress and Carter: rights as policy
- In the 1970s, after Vietnam, Congress wrote rights into law. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act cut security aid to gross violators. The Jackson–Vanik amendment (1974) tied trade status to Soviet emigration, and annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices began in 1977.
- The Helsinki Final Act (1975) let dissidents in the Soviet bloc use Moscow’s own signature against it.
- Jimmy Carter made human rights “the soul of our foreign policy” and cut aid to Latin American juntas. He exempted indispensable allies, and was blamed for the fall of the Shah and of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua.
Reagan and the double standard
Jeane Kirkpatrick’s essay “Dictatorships and Double Standards” (1979) distinguished reformable authoritarian allies from irreversible totalitarian enemies. It justified pressure on the Soviet bloc and tolerance of friendly dictators, and it gave the “double standards” charge its precise form.
The post-Cold War moment (the 1992 context)
In 1992 the United States ratified the ICCPR, declaring it not self-executing so that it had no domestic effect. China’s trading status was debated annually after Tiananmen (1989), until Bill Clinton delinked trade from human rights in 1994. Clinton’s doctrine of “democratic enlargement” fused human rights with democracy and markets.
Continuities and contradictions
- Exceptionalism. Michael Ignatieff (American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 2005) describes exemptionalism: the United States promotes treaties it will not join. It has not ratified the ICESCR, CEDAW or the CRC, and it remains outside the ICC.
- Security over rights. After 9/11, Guantánamo, waterboarding and extraordinary rendition breached the Convention against Torture and weakened US moral authority.
- Instrumentalism. Realists see rights as tools against rivals, while Marxist and postcolonial critics, among them Noam Chomsky, see them as cover for hegemony. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are criticised mildly, Cuba and Iran harshly.
- Real effects. Magnitsky sanctions, the Country Reports, and support for the transitions in South Korea and Latin America show that the policy has also had genuine effects.
The current retreat
The second Trump administration withdrew from the Human Rights Council (February 2025), dismantled USAID, issued sharply pared-down Country Reports (August 2025), sanctioned ICC officials, refused to appear for its own Universal Periodic Review (November 2025) and in January 2026 announced withdrawal from 66 international bodies. India has felt both sides: US reports have criticised conditions in Kashmir and on religious freedom, and the US Commission on International Religious Freedom has urged a “country of particular concern” designation since 2020, yet strategic partnership has always come first.
Conclusion
Human rights in US policy are real but subordinate. They are pursued vigorously where they serve strategic interest and muted where they do not. Kirkpatrick’s distinction still describes the practice better than Carter’s rhetoric. Because Congress, courts and civil society keep the commitment alive even when the executive retreats, the tradition is likely to swing back again.