Examine the changing perspective of the US foreign policy towards South Asia in recent times and its implications for prospects of peace in the region. (1999)
For most of the Cold War, Washington saw South Asia through containment: Pakistan was an ally and India a non-aligned irritant. The May 1998 nuclear tests and the Kargil war (1999) made the region a nuclear flashpoint on the American agenda. US policy then moved from crisis management between “hyphenated” rivals to strategic partnership with India, and under the second Donald J. Trump administration it has partly swung back. Each shift altered the prospects for peace.
The changing perspective
1. From sanctions to engagement (1998–2000). The Glenn Amendment sanctions and Security Council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) sought to roll back both programmes. The Strobe Talbott–Jaswant Singh dialogue replaced rollback with restraint. At Blair House on 4 July 1999, William J. Clinton pressed Nawaz Sharif to withdraw behind the Line of Control, the first open US acceptance that Pakistan was the aggressor.
2. De-hyphenation (2000–2024). Clinton’s March 2000 visit opened the way to the 2005 defence framework and the 2008 civil nuclear agreement, which accepted India’s nuclear status. Ashley J. Tellis (“The Merits of Dehyphenation”, 2008) credited this success to dealing with each state on its own merits. C. Raja Mohan (Impossible Allies, 2006) read the nuclear deal as American acceptance of India in the global nuclear order, increasingly as a counterweight to China; Pakistan stayed a frontline state for Afghanistan.
3. Transactional re-hyphenation (2025–26). After the Pahalgam attack, Trump claimed to have brokered the 10 May 2025 ceasefire, which India says the two DGMOs agreed directly. He hosted Field Marshal Asim Munir in June 2025, and Pakistan mediated the April 2026 US–Iran ceasefire. India faced tariffs of up to 50% before a February 2026 understanding cut them to 18%. Saudi Arabia’s defence pact with Pakistan (September 2025), extended to Turkey in August 2026, adds a Gulf layer. In late September 2026 S. Jaishankar faulted American indifference to cross-border terrorism.
Implications for peace
Stabilising effects
- Washington is the region’s third-party crisis manager. Moeed Yusuf (Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments, 2018) shows that in Kargil, the 2001–02 stand-off and after Mumbai (2008) both sides turned to the US to cap escalation under the nuclear shadow.
- Partnership with India, and aid to Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, give the region alternatives to Chinese debt and leverage.
Destabilising effects
- The stability–instability paradox (Glenn H. Snyder, 1965): if Washington is expected to stop a war, Pakistan gains room for sub-conventional provocation, and mediation rewards the internationalisation of Kashmir, which India rejects under the Simla Agreement (1972).
- Transactional swings weaken US credibility with both states and push India towards strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
- US–China rivalry and the China–Pakistan axis turn South Asian disputes into proxies for a larger contest.
Assessment
Realists see balancing: India against China, Pakistan for access and leverage. Liberals stress the deterrent value of partnership and interdependence. The record shows US involvement can contain crises but not resolve them; Kashmir, terrorism and the boundaries remain bilateral problems.
Conclusion
The US perspective has moved from non-proliferation and parity to partnership with India, and now to a transactional, personalised style. Peace is better served by a Washington that prevents escalation and holds Pakistan to its counter-terrorism commitments than by one that seeks to mediate. Lasting peace still rests on India–Pakistan bilateralism and credible deterrence.