Examine the areas of cooperation and conflict in the Indo-American relations. (2003)
Indo-American relations are best described by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s idea of complex interdependence (Power and Interdependence, 1977): many channels of contact in which cooperation and conflict coexist, with disputes managed, not allowed to rupture the whole. Since 2000 cooperation has dominated in security and technology, while conflict persists over trade, third countries and India’s autonomy.
Areas of cooperation
- Defence: foundational agreements (LEMOA 2016, COMCASA 2018, BECA 2020), Major Defence Partner status (2016), over $20 billion of purchases (P-8I, C-17, MQ-9B), the Malabar and Yudh Abhyas exercises, and a new ten-year framework signed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025.
- Counter-terrorism: intelligence sharing since 26/11, Tahawwur Rana’s extradition (April 2025) and the US terrorist designation of TRF (July 2025).
- Nuclear energy: the 2008 civil nuclear deal ended India’s nuclear isolation and opened the way to membership of the MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group.
- Technology and space: iCET (2023), followed by TRUST (2025); the proposed co-production of GE F414 engines; semiconductors and critical minerals; the NISAR satellite launched in July 2025.
- Economy and people: two-way trade of about $210 billion (2024), a diaspora of about 5.4 million and 363,019 Indian students (2024–25).
- Indo-Pacific: the Quad, maritime awareness and balancing China.
Areas of conflict
- Trade: India’s removal from the GSP (2019); disputes over intellectual property and agriculture; tariffs that reached 50% in August 2025 before falling to 18% under the February 2026 interim deal.
- Russia: the S-400 purchase under the shadow of CAATSA, the 2025 tariff penalty for buying Russian oil (whether India pledged to stop remains disputed) and the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of September 2026, which authorises tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian energy.
- Iran and Chabahar: India’s port plans depend on American waivers; the Chabahar waiver, revoked in September 2025 and restored on conditions until April 2026, has since lapsed.
- Pakistan and Kashmir: American claims of mediating the May 2025 ceasefire collided with India’s insistence on bilateralism since the Simla Agreement (1972).
- Mobility: H-1B restrictions, including a $100,000 fee imposed in September 2025, struck down in court in June 2026 and not enforced since an appeals court refused a stay in July.
- Values and sovereignty: religious-freedom reports, and the Pannun case, in which Nikhil Gupta pleaded guilty in February 2026.
- Multilateral positions: climate finance, WTO food stockholding, and American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (effective January 2026).
Examination
- Realists explain cooperation by a shared threat: in Stephen M. Walt’s terms, China supplies the glue. They expect conflict wherever India’s other partners (Russia, Iran) enter.
- Constructivists point to India’s identity as an autonomous power. S. Jaishankar (The India Way, 2020) prescribes engaging America while reassuring Russia, which makes some friction structural.
- The conflicts are real but compartmentalised: the October 2025 defence framework was signed while the 50% tariff was still in force. Strategic convergence has kept economic quarrels from spilling over.
- The asymmetry remains: India needs American markets and technology more than the reverse, leverage Washington used in 2025.
Conclusion
Cooperation now outweighs conflict and is anchored in durable interests, chiefly China and technology, while conflict clusters around trade and India’s ties with third countries. The relationship is best seen as alignment without alliance: conflicts are managed within a partnership that neither side wants to lose.