Comprehensively examine the major developments/trends in Indo-US relations since the early 1990s. Do you visualise the strengthening of ties between the two nations? Substantiate. (2007, 60 Marks)
The end of the Cold War, India’s 1991 liberalisation and the later rise of China turned what Dennis Kux called “estranged democracies” into partners. Since the early 1990s the relationship has moved from suspicion to alignment without alliance: deep cooperation with no mutual defence obligation. The ties will probably keep strengthening, within limits India sets and that Washington’s transactional turn now tests.
Major developments
| Phase | Key developments |
|---|---|
| 1991–98: cautious opening | Kicklighter proposals (1991), first Malabar exercise (1992), Agreed Minute on Defence Relations (1995); friction over the NPT, CTBT and Kashmir |
| 1998–2000: rupture and dialogue | Pokhran II sanctions; Jaswant Singh–Strobe Talbott talks; US pressure on Pakistan over Kargil (1999); Bill Clinton’s visit (March 2000) |
| 2001–08: strategic turn | Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004); defence framework and the US aim “to help India become a major world power” (2005); civil nuclear deal and NSG waiver (2008) |
| 2009–20: institutionalisation | DTTI (2012); Joint Strategic Vision (2015); Major Defence Partner (2016); LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA; 2+2 dialogue (2018); Quad revived (2017); Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership (2020) |
| 2021–26: technology and turbulence | iCET (2023), TRUST and COMPACT (2025); 50% tariffs (August 2025); ten-year defence framework (October 2025); interim trade deal (February 2026); Javelin co-production deal (August 2026) |
Underlying trends
- De-hyphenation: Washington now treats India on its own terms rather than as one half of an India–Pakistan problem.
- Security as the engine: purchases worth over $20 billion since 2008 (P-8I, C-17, Apache, MQ-9B) and a dense exercise calendar (Malabar, Yudh Abhyas, Tiger Triumph).
- The China factor: in Stephen M. Walt’s balance-of-threat terms, a shared perception of Chinese power, not values alone, drives convergence.
- Economic depth: goods trade of about $149 billion in 2025 on US data, with India in surplus, and a “Mission 500” goal of $500 billion in total trade by 2030.
- Human bridge: a diaspora of about 5.4 million and 363,019 Indian students in 2024–25, the largest national group on American campuses.
- Persistent frictions: trade and WTO disputes, Russia (CAATSA, oil), Iran, visas and American comments on India’s domestic affairs.
Will ties strengthen?
Yes, structurally, but not into an alliance.
- Durable drivers: China’s rise, India’s need for technology and capital, America’s need for an Indo-Pacific partner, and over fifty dialogue mechanisms that survive political swings. The October 2025 framework was signed while 50% tariffs were in force.
- Liberal reading: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s complex interdependence (1977) suggests that many channels raise the cost of rupture.
- Indian reading: C. Raja Mohan’s picture of India as a swing state (2006) and S. Jaishankar’s preference for “convergences and issue-based arrangements” (2019) explain why India deepens ties without joining a camp.
- Limits: India’s Russian arms inventory, and a transactional Washington whose Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (September 2026) authorises tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian energy. Ashley J. Tellis (America’s Bad Bet on India, 2023) warns that India will not join a US war with China that leaves it untouched; Sumit Ganguly (2026) argues that a trade deal cannot restore the trust lost in 2025.
- Current tests: the full trade agreement is unsigned, and no Quad leaders’ summit has met since September 2024. Yet Narendra Modi and Donald Trump reviewed trade and defence by phone on 30 September 2026.
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s the relationship has moved from estrangement to a comprehensive global strategic partnership, surviving sanctions and a tariff war. Its strengthening is likely because it rests on converging interests, not sentiment. Its form will remain a partnership of independent states that cooperate without owing each other a guarantee.