Comment on the recent trends in Russia’s foreign policy. (2010, 20 Marks)
Andrei P. Tsygankov (Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 2006) traces post-Soviet policy to three schools: Westernisers seeking integration with Europe and America, Statists seeking great-power status through a balance of power, and Civilisationists casting Russia as a distinct civilisation opposed to the West. In 2010 the Statist line dominated and was still bargaining with the West. Since 2014, and decisively since 2022, it has hardened into civilisational confrontation.
The trends visible in 2010
- Multipolarity as doctrine. Yevgeny Primakov (foreign minister from 1996) sought a world of several poles with Russia as one of them, not Washington’s junior partner. It took shape in the RIC triangle, the SCO (2001) and BRIC.
- Assertion in the “near abroad”. Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech (February 2007) attacked unipolarity. The August 2008 Georgia war and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia preceded Dmitry Medvedev’s claim to “privileged interests” in the post-Soviet space.
- A pragmatic “reset”. Medvedev’s modernisation agenda produced New START (signed 8 April 2010), Afghan transit cooperation and support for UN sanctions on Iran (Resolution 1929, June 2010).
- Energy as an instrument. Gas cut-offs to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 turned Europe’s dependence into leverage.
The trajectory since: from bargaining to rupture
- Crimea (2014) ended the reset; Syria (2015) was Moscow’s first out-of-area intervention since Afghanistan.
- The February 2022 invasion made the rupture total. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept calls Russia a “state-civilisation” and names the US the main source of anti-Russian policy. A Trump–Putin meeting in Alaska (August 2025) produced no agreement; in late September 2026 Washington was trying to revive trilateral talks, with no ceasefire and Russia holding roughly a fifth of Ukraine.
- The pivot east becomes dependence. The “no limits” statement with China (February 2022) preceded settlement of most bilateral trade in roubles and renminbi, and a mutual-assistance treaty with North Korea (June 2024) brought North Korean troops to Kursk.
- Arms control unravels. Russia de-ratified the CTBT (2023), and New START expired on 5 February 2026 with no successor.
- Courting the Global South. BRICS expansion, Sahel military ties and the first recognition of the Taliban government (July 2025) seek partners beyond the West.
Interpreting the shift
- Structural realism. John J. Mearsheimer (“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”, Foreign Affairs, 2014) reads it as a response to NATO enlargement, the danger George F. Kennan foresaw in 1998.
- Liberal and constructivist accounts stress regime insecurity after the colour revolutions and an identity of lost status, with Ukraine claimed for a “Russian world”.
- Limits. Finland and Sweden joined NATO, and Stephen M. Walt (2018) already judged the system a “lopsided” multipolarity with Russia far behind the US.
Implications for India
S. Jaishankar calls India–Russia ties one of the steadiest major relationships since 1945. India abstains on Ukraine resolutions, held the 23rd annual summit in New Delhi (December 2025) with a $100 billion trade target for 2030, yet cut Russian crude imports after US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (October 2025). The Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (September 2026), authorising tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil, sharpens that squeeze, while Moscow’s tilt to Beijing weakens it as a counterweight on the Line of Actual Control.
Conclusion
The trend runs from bargaining for status within a Western-led order to revisionism against it. The war bought regional coercive power at the price of dependence on Beijing and fewer choices. Russia remains a nuclear veto power able to disrupt, but less able to build the multipolar order it invokes; India’s task is to keep the partnership without being caught in its costs.