Comment on the essential elements of India’s foreign policy that are required to secure energy and security in the Indian Ocean region. (150 words) (2012, 12 Marks)
Daniel Yergin (“Ensuring Energy Security”, 2006) defines energy security as sufficient supply at affordable prices; for India that supply crosses the Indian Ocean. Crude import dependence reached 88.7% in 2025-26, and most of it passes Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Malacca. Securing energy and securing the ocean are one task. Realists stress naval power, liberal institutionalists stress law and regional bodies; India’s policy needs both, in seven elements.
1. Sea-lane security and naval reach
A navy able to act as a net security provider, the role Manmohan Singh claimed for India in 2013. Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols (since 2008) and Operation Sankalp (escorts in the Gulf since 2019) show it in practice. The Andaman and Nicobar Command sits astride the Malacca approaches, giving India leverage as well as exposure.
2. Maritime domain awareness
Information is the cheapest sea power: white-shipping agreements and the IFC-IOR (2018) track the traffic energy depends on.
3. Supplier diversification
- Balanced ties with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Iran, plus Russia, the US, Africa and Latin America; overseas equity through ONGC Videsh; and strategic petroleum reserves of about 5.33 million tonnes.
- Russia’s share rose sharply after 2022, then fell below a quarter once US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil bit (November 2025): a single supplier is a political risk.
- When Iran restricted Hormuz from March 2026, India drew more crude from its 41-plus suppliers, a real-time test of diversification.
- Some nine million Indians live in the Gulf, so evacuation capacity is part of energy policy.
4. Littoral partnerships
SAGAR, now MAHASAGAR, offers radars, patrol vessels and training to Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (2008), the Colombo Security Conclave and IORA, which India chairs for 2025–27, make security collective rather than hegemonic.
5. Managing extra-regional powers
Hedging against China’s port access (Gwadar, Hambantota, Djibouti) through the Quad, whose New Delhi meeting (May 2026) launched an Indo-Pacific Energy Security initiative, and logistics access at Duqm and Agalega, without joining an alliance that could close Gulf, Iranian or Russian options.
6. Law and connectivity
Support for UNCLOS and freedom of navigation, with Chabahar, the INSTC and IMEC as alternative routes.
7. Reducing exposure itself
Renewables, nuclear power and the International Solar Alliance make cutting import dependence a foreign-policy goal.
Conclusion
Together these form a maritime-energy doctrine: diversify suppliers, protect sea lanes, enlist littoral partners and avoid dependence on one patron. The 2026 Hormuz crisis vindicated diversification but exposed thin reserves and limited reach; the weakest link is capability, not doctrine.