Can Israel be termed a ‘natural ally’ of India? (2010, 20 Marks)
An ally, in the technical sense, is a state bound by a commitment to act with another against a common threat; a natural ally is one whose interests and values converge so closely that the commitment seems to follow by itself. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee applied the phrase to the United States; his National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, addressing the American Jewish Committee on 8 May 2003, extended the logic to Israel, saying India, the US and Israel shared democratic values and that democracies targeted by terrorism should form an alliance. Whether the label fits depends on separating convergence from commitment.
The case for a natural ally
- Security capability: Israel supplies what India cannot buy elsewhere at comparable speed, from the Kargil munitions of 1999 to Phalcon radars, Heron drones and the co-developed Barak-8/MRSAM. On SIPRI’s 2021–25 data India took 29% of Israel’s arms exports.
- Shared threat of terrorism: the 2008 attack on Nariman House in Mumbai killed Israelis and Indians alike; the February 2026 joint statement condemned cross-border terrorism and the Pahalgam attack (April 2025).
- Food and water security: drip irrigation and 35 Centres of Excellence that have trained over a million Indian farmers.
- Political affinity: two democracies in hostile neighbourhoods, sceptical of regional solidarity and of international bodies that judge them. C. Raja Mohan argued in 2021 for an “Indo-Abrahamic” convergence of India, Israel and the UAE.
- Momentum: a Strategic Partnership (2017) and a Special Strategic Partnership (February 2026) covering AI, cyber and an FTA.
The case against
- No common adversary. On Stephen M. Walt’s balance-of-threat theory (The Origins of Alliances, 1987), alliances form against a shared threat. Israel’s is Iran; India’s are Pakistan and China. Neither would fight for the other, and no defence commitment exists.
- The entrapment risk. Glenn H. Snyder’s alliance security dilemma (1984) explains Indian caution: closeness to a state at war risks entrapment. When US–Israeli strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026, two days after Modi’s visit, India named no aggressor; Iran then listed India among states allowed through Hormuz.
- Larger interests elsewhere. India–GCC trade (US$178.56 bn, 2024-25) is roughly fifty times trade with Israel (US$3.75 bn); millions of Indians work in Arab states; Iran matters for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- Palestine: India still recognises the State of Palestine, funds UNRWA and voted for the New York Declaration (September 2025), which Israel opposed.
- Israel’s own hedging: Israel cancelled its Phalcon sale to China in 2000 only under US pressure and let a Chinese firm run Haifa’s new Bay Port from 2021, a year before an Adani-led consortium bought the old port.
- Doctrine: India avoids alliances; S. Jaishankar describes its method as “convergences and issue-based arrangements”.
A third reading
P. R. Kumaraswamy (India’s Israel Policy, 2010) shows India kept functional, deniable ties with Israel long before 1992, and Nicolas Blarel (2015) traces gradual, compromised change. The relationship has been driven by function rather than identity, which fits neither “natural ally” nor “mere transaction”.
Conclusion
Israel is better termed a natural partner than a natural ally. Convergence on terrorism, technology and agriculture is real and durable, but divergent threat maps, India’s Arab and Iranian stakes and its refusal of alliance commitments cap it. The relationship is valued precisely because it asks India for no exclusive loyalty.