To what extent is multi-lateralism a reality with regard to India’s ‘constructive strategic partnership’ with Central Asian states? (2011, 30 Marks)
Robert O. Keohane (1990) defined multilateralism nominally, as coordinating policies among three or more states. John Gerard Ruggie (1992) set a higher bar: coordination on generalised principles of conduct, with indivisible benefits and diffuse reciprocity rather than case-by-case bargains. India’s partnership with the five Central Asian republics passes Keohane’s test and largely fails Ruggie’s. Its strategic partnerships were built bilaterally, with Kazakhstan (2009), Uzbekistan (2011), Tajikistan (2012) and Kyrgyzstan (2019), and the regional layer added since is real in form far more than in content.
The multilateral architecture
- Connect Central Asia (2012), announced by Minister of State E. Ahamed at Bishkek, was India’s first region-wide policy: political contact, the SCO, a proposed CECA, connectivity, banking and education.
- The SCO: an observer from 2005, India became a full member at Astana (2017), sitting with four of the five republics; neutral Turkmenistan stays outside.
- India–Central Asia Dialogue: four foreign-minister rounds (2019, 2020, 2021, June 2025); the 2020 round carried a US$1 billion line of credit, the last endorsed Chabahar for regional trade.
- First India–Central Asia Summit (27 January 2022, virtual): a secretariat in New Delhi and a promise to meet every two years; the first meeting of national security advisers followed in New Delhi in December 2022.
- Sectoral tracks: a joint working group on Chabahar set up after the 2022 summit and the first India–Central Asia Rare Earth Forum (New Delhi, September 2024) gave the summit process working-level content.
- Connectivity regimes: the INSTC and India’s accession to the Ashgabat Agreement (2018). The SCO’s Bishkek summit (31 August–1 September 2026) also backed the Chabahar–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan corridor.
Form against substance
| Test | Multilateral form | Reality |
|---|---|---|
| Leaders | Biennial summit agreed (2022) | No second summit; 2024 and 2025 dates lapsed, 2027 now reported |
| Trade | CECA proposed (2012) | Never negotiated; talks run through the Russia-led EAEU (terms of reference, August 2025) |
| Big deals | Regional working groups | A US$4 billion Kazatomprom uranium contract (April 2026) and Uzbekistan’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (August 2026), both bilateral |
| Scale | Shared region | India’s trade about US$2–3 billion against China’s US$106.3 billion (2025) |
The SCO is also a compromised channel: it includes China and Pakistan, and Pakistan chairs it in 2026–27, turning counter-terrorism into a negotiation. China has held two summits with the five (Xi’an 2023, Astana 2025) to India’s one.
Explaining the gap
Theories of regionalism predict that institutions follow interdependence; India has architecture without traffic. Pakistan denies transit, Afghanistan is unstable, and the 2026 Iran war disrupted Chabahar and the INSTC. Alexander Cooley (Great Games, Local Rules, 2012) argues that Central Asian governments are agents, not pawns, who play rival patrons off and prefer bilateral bargains; Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality limits collective formats further. A constructivist reading adds that India still treats the region through civilisational and security lenses rather than as a market it is helping to build.
Conclusion
Multilateralism is real as a forum but not yet as substance. It gives India visibility, a secretariat and SCO language on corridors, yet the content remains five bilateral relationships under a regional roof. It will become multilateral in Ruggie’s sense only when a working corridor gives the region shared business to decide together; holding the long-promised second summit with a trade or connectivity instrument would be the first proof.