Discuss the realistic foreign policy initiatives taken by India to balance its relations between Israel & the Arab world. (2015, 15 Marks)
For four decades India practised equivalence in West Asia: it stayed out of the Arab–Israeli conflict, backed a negotiated two-State solution and kept Israel at arm’s length. Since 1992, and decisively since 2014, it has followed a realist method in the sense of Hans J. Morgenthau, interest weighed by prudence rather than sentiment, pursuing each relationship on its own merits. The method is called de-hyphenation.
Why balance is a realist necessity
- The Arab side carries the material weight: India–GCC trade was about US$178.56 bn in 2024-25 against about US$3.75 bn with Israel; some nine million Indians work in the Gulf, which also supplies a large share of India’s crude and LPG.
- Israel carries capability: niche defence technology (about 15% of India’s arms imports, 2021–25), counter-terrorism expertise, and water and agricultural systems.
- At the UN India cannot afford isolation in a General Assembly where most members oppose the occupation, and Israel’s own pragmatic diplomacy accepts that limit.
Initiatives that built the balance
- Normalisation without abandonment (1992): full relations after the Madrid Conference and the Soviet collapse, while the 1988 recognition of Palestine and aid to the Palestinian Authority continued.
- Separate visits: Narendra Modi went to Israel alone in July 2017; in February 2018 he visited Ramallah, the UAE and Oman, showing that each track stands by itself.
- Link West: the 2015 UAE visit (the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 years), the India–Saudi Strategic Partnership Council (2019), the India–UAE CEPA (in force 2022), the India–Oman CEPA (signed December 2025) and the launch of India–GCC FTA talks (February 2026).
- Minilaterals that bridge both: I2U2 with Israel, the UAE and the US (summit 2022) and the IMEC corridor (2023), which needs Gulf and Israeli ports alike.
- Calibrated voting: India condemned the 7 October 2023 attacks, yet funded UNRWA, condemned Israel’s strike on Doha and voted for the New York Declaration (12 September 2025). As BRICS host in September 2026 it endorsed a declaration backing a Palestinian state on 1967 lines and condemning starvation as a method of war.
What made the balance possible
- The Abraham Accords (2020) normalised Israel’s ties with the UAE and Bahrain, then Morocco and Sudan: Abu Dhabi cannot fault New Delhi for what it did itself.
- Gulf priorities of investment, technology and security against Iran leave little room for policing India’s Israel ties.
- C. Raja Mohan made the case in 2021 for an “Indo-Abrahamic” convergence of India, Israel and the UAE, and in 2026 argued that India’s interests are now too large for old ideological slogans.
Limits and critique
- Critics, including Global South voices, call de-hyphenation a polite name for abandoning a principled position, citing India’s 2023–25 abstentions.
- Events India does not control can overturn the balance: the 2026 US–Israeli war on Iran, and Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan (September 2025).
Conclusion
India’s balancing is realism without alignment: technology from Israel, energy and jobs from the Arab world, and Palestine commitments as inexpensive insurance. It needs both sides and has learnt to manage both, but the balance holds only while neither forces a choice.