Would you agree with the contention that India’s inclination to lean on a ‘more aggressive hyper-realist posture’ has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment. (2025, 10 Marks)
Hyperrealism is one of three schools Kanti Bajpai identified in Indian strategic thought (“Indian Strategic Culture”, 2002), beside Nehruvianism and neoliberalism. It holds that conflict is endemic, that adversaries yield only to cost imposition, and that force is the decisive currency of security. The Pahalgam massacre of 22 April 2025, which killed 26 civilians, gave this school its strongest moment; whether it now governs Indian policy is a separate question.
The staircase of retaliation
Nuclearisation was long assumed to cap India’s conventional options. Each crisis lowered that ceiling:
- 2001–02: ten months of mobilisation (Operation Parakram), no strike.
- 2008 (26/11): diplomatic isolation only.
- 2016 (Uri): publicly announced surgical strikes across the Line of Control.
- 2019 (Pulwama): the Balakot air strike inside Pakistan proper.
- 2025 (Pahalgam): the Indus Waters Treaty held in abeyance, then Operation Sindoor (7 May) on nine terrorist sites and, by 10 May, Pakistani airbases.
Why the contention largely holds
- Doctrine, not episode: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address of 12 May 2025 set a “new normal”: retaliation on India’s terms, no yielding to nuclear blackmail, and no distinction between terrorists and state sponsors. On 17 June 2025 he told the US President that India now treats terrorism as war itself, not proxy war.
- Coercion beyond force: water became leverage, and India rejected the Court of Arbitration award of 31 August 2026 that the treaty remains in force.
- Permissive structure: a weightier India, courted against China, expects a lower diplomatic price for punishment.
- Domestic reward: visible retaliation carries an electoral premium.
Why “hyper-realist” overstates it
- Sindoor was declared “focused, measured and non-escalatory”, ended within four days and sought no territory.
- The first test brought restraint: after the Red Fort car bombing of 10 November 2025, which killed at least 15, India called it a terrorist incident but neither blamed Pakistan nor struck across the border.
- Toward China, after the graver Galwan clash (2020), India chose disengagement and talks, culminating in the 25th Special Representatives’ round (August 2026): neoliberal and Nehruvian instruments.
- Seven all-party delegations toured 33 countries seeking legitimacy, which pure hyperrealism disdains.
Conclusion
Agree, with qualification. Pahalgam codified a lower threshold for punitive force toward Pakistan, where escalation is cheap. India’s grand strategy still blends Bajpai’s three schools, and the restraint after November 2025 shows the doctrine is stated more often than applied. It is a posture, not yet a worldview.