Comment: National Interest and Capability. (1993, 20 Marks)
National interest names what a state wants; capability decides what it can get. Walter Lippmann (U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 1943) defined sound foreign policy as bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power. The two concepts constitute each other: interests without capability are aspirations, and capability without defined interests is drift.
How capability shapes interest
- The policy chain. Interest is turned into objectives, goals and policy, and at each step capability sets the limit. Hence the same declared interest means different things for a great power and a small one.
- Morgenthau’s rule. Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948) required that foreign-policy objectives be defined in terms of the national interest and backed by adequate power. He counted tangible elements (geography, resources, industry, military preparedness) and intangible ones (national morale, quality of government) and called the quality of diplomacy the most important, if least stable, element of power.
- Kautilya made the same link in the Arthashastra: the choice among the six policies of the shadgunya depends on relative strength; the weaker king seeks peace, the stronger may make war.
- Interests grow with power. Robert Gilpin (War and Change in World Politics, 1981) argued that states expand until the marginal cost of expansion equals its gain. Fareed Zakaria (From Wealth to Power, 1998) showed the US widening its interests abroad as state capacity grew.
Two failures of mismatch
- Overstretch. Paul Kennedy (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 1987) traced the decline of great powers to commitments that outran their economic base. NATO’s 2025 pledge at The Hague of 5% of GDP by 2035 is partly an answer to US pressure to share burdens it no longer wishes to carry alone.
- Under-reach. A state whose idea of its interests lags behind its strength leaves influence and rule-making to others.
The Indian record
- 1962 exposed the gap between Jawaharlal Nehru’s expansive world role and India’s military capability on the Himalayan frontier.
- After the 1991 reforms and the 1998 nuclear tests, a stronger India widened its claims. SAGAR (2015), extended as MAHASAGAR in 2025, asserts an interest in security across the Indian Ocean; India is now the fifth-largest military spender (about $92 billion in 2025, SIPRI).
- Operation Sindoor (May 2025) and holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance redefined a vital interest that a weaker India could not have enforced.
- Gaps remain. The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index (2025) ranks India third with 40.0 points, just regaining major-power status, but records its largest-ever negative power gap: India exerts less influence than its resources predict. A small Indian Foreign Service and dependence on defence imports compound this. S. Jaishankar’s The India Way (2020) answers with multi-alignment that draws technology and markets from many partners.
Capability is more than material
- Small states compensate through coalitions: island states have shaped climate negotiations far beyond their weight, and Singapore converts diplomatic skill into influence.
- Joseph S. Nye’s soft power and constructivist accounts remind that legitimacy and identity are also capabilities, and that what a state chooses to call an interest is not set by power alone.
Conclusion
Interest and capability must be kept in step. Interests should be ranked so that vital ones are fully backed, while capability should be built for the interests a state expects to hold. The test of any declared vital interest is whether the state could defend it if challenged tomorrow.