“In a uni-polar world, non-alignment has lost its relevance.” Do you agree with this view? Give arguments in support of your answer. (1999)
Charles Krauthammer called the post-1991 dominance of the United States the “unipolar moment” (Foreign Affairs, 1990/91). Non-alignment, defined at Belgrade (1961) as refusing membership of rival military blocs, seemed to lose its object once one bloc vanished. I disagree with the view while accepting part of it: unipolarity weakened the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an organisation, but made the doctrine of independent judgement more necessary, not less.
Arguments for the view
- No one to be non-aligned between. Leverage once came from playing two superpowers against each other; with one, there was nothing to withhold.
- Dependence of members. Most developing states relied on Western markets, finance and technology, so the label outlived the condition.
- Collective silence. NAM had no common position on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) and played no role in Yugoslavia’s break-up, a founding member’s own collapse. At the Accra ministerial of 1991, T. P. Sreenivasan (2018) recalls, it was nearly wound up.
- India’s reorientation. Liberalisation (1991), outreach to Washington and the 1998 tests showed a state pursuing interest rather than movement solidarity.
- Indian scepticism. C. Raja Mohan (2016) calls NAM a movement “in coma”, dysfunctional even before 1991; Harsh V. Pant (2020) holds that India cannot afford to be non-aligned in the traditional sense.
Arguments against the view
- Unipolarity needs a counterweight of principle. A single dominant power tempts unilateralism. NATO’s 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia without Security Council authorisation, criticised by India, showed why sovereignty and non-intervention needed defenders.
- The doctrine was never about blocs alone. P. V. Narasimha Rao restated non-alignment as every nation’s right to independence and development, whether there is one bloc or more; India argued it stayed valid with one bloc or none. Its refusal to sign the CTBT (1996) was autonomy in action.
- The economic hegemon. A G-7 concert, the Washington Consensus and a new WTO (1995) made collective Southern bargaining on trade, debt and technology more urgent; the Jakarta summit (1992) had already turned NAM towards development and UN reform.
- Unipolarity is unstable. Samuel P. Huntington (“The Lonely Superpower”, 1999) already saw a uni-multipolar system, and Kenneth N. Waltz expected unbalanced power to provoke balancing. Hans Köchler (2024) concludes that the unipolar moment only temporarily stripped non-alignment of salience.
- Vindicated by multipolarity. With several suitors, staying unclaimed is worth more: India abstained on the February 2026 General Assembly resolution on Ukraine and chairs BRICS in 2026 while sitting in the Quad.
- Coercion persists. The 50% US tariff on India (August 2025), partly penalising Russian oil purchases and cut to 18% only under the February 2026 interim understanding, shows why NAM’s members still oppose unilateral coercive measures.
| Unipolar effect | |
|---|---|
| NAM as organisation | Weakened, competing with functional bodies |
| Non-alignment as doctrine | Reinforced as strategic autonomy |
Conclusion
Non-alignment did not lose relevance in a unipolar world; it changed its target from bloc rivalry to hegemony and inequity. NAM needed reform to stay useful, but the choice to keep one’s judgement unmortgaged has outlived unipolarity itself and now shapes India’s multi-alignment.