Do you endorse the view that the end of Bipolarity and the rise of multiple regional organisations has made Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) more or less irrelevant? (2017, 15 Marks)
The Non-Aligned Movement was founded at Belgrade in 1961 to give newly independent states a choice beyond the capitalist and communist blocs and a voice on decolonisation, apartheid and disarmament. I endorse the view only in part: it holds for NAM as an organisation, not for non-alignment as a doctrine or for the movement’s normative ethos.
The case for irrelevance
- Structural loss. Non-alignment named a position between two poles; the Soviet collapse removed the leverage of tilting towards the rival superpower. C. Raja Mohan (2016) goes further: the movement was dysfunctional well before 1991 and is now “in coma”.
- Agenda achieved. Decolonisation and the end of apartheid, its flagship causes, are completed campaigns.
- Regional competitors deliver. ASEAN, the African Union, the SCO, the OIC and an expanded BRICS offer trade facilitation, peace operations or development finance, which NAM, with no charter, secretariat or obligations, cannot. Members invest where returns are concrete.
- Silence in crises. NAM took no effective common position on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait or on Yugoslavia’s break-up, though both involved members.
- Declining seniority. India’s Prime Minister skipped the 2016 and 2019 summits; about 30 heads of state attended Kampala (2024). Harsh V. Pant (2016) read the 2016 absence as a pragmatic turn to partnerships with the United States, Japan and Australia.
Why the verdict is overstated
- The doctrine was never only about blocs. P. V. Narasimha Rao restated non-alignment as every nation’s right to independence and development, whether there is one bloc or more. Shashi Tharoor (2012) concedes there are no longer two blocs to stand between, yet NAM still lets developing states stake out their own positions.
- Neo-colonial pressures persist. NAM also arose against the effects of great-power rivalry on poor states. Debt distress, technology denial, carbon border measures and unilateral coercive measures, condemned by the Kampala mid-term ministerial (October 2025), are old grievances in new form; the WTO and IMF still tilt North.
- Regional bodies are regional. ASEAN or the AU cannot speak for Asia, Africa and Latin America together; NAM’s open membership, grown from 25 to some 120 states, is unique outside the UN.
- Multipolarity revives the doctrine. With several suitors, staying unclaimed is worth more. Hans Köchler (2024) argues the unipolar moment only temporarily stripped non-alignment of salience, and that NAM can act as a balancing force in a multipolar world.
- Soft balancing. T. V. Paul (2018) argues that renewed arms races and territorial assertion recreate the need for a normative coalition of the weak. M. K. Narayanan (2016) judged it premature to pronounce NAM dead, since it still resonates across the Third World.
| Object | After 1991 |
|---|---|
| Organisation | Weakened; outperformed by functional bodies |
| Doctrine | Strengthened in a multipolar system |
| Ethos | The working idiom of Global South diplomacy |
Conclusion
The end of bipolarity made NAM less central, not irrelevant. Regional bodies complement rather than replace a forum most states can enter without invitation. Its relevance now depends on reform towards a concrete economic agenda for a fairer order.