Discuss the consequences of Trump’s “America First” and Xi’s “Chinese Dream” on World Politics. (2018, 15 Marks)
Two nationalist projects launched within five years of each other have reshaped the operating rules of world politics. Xi Jinping‘s “Chinese Dream” (November 2012) promises the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, recovering the standing lost in the “century of humiliation”. Donald Trump‘s “America First” (2017) redefines the national interest narrowly and transactionally. Their consequences are best read together, because each fed the other.
The two doctrines
| America First | Chinese Dream | |
|---|---|---|
| Core idea | Trade deficits as losses; allies as cost centres | National rejuvenation; civilisational pride |
| Method | Tariffs, withdrawal, bilateral deals | BRI, state-led industry, parallel institutions |
| Stance on order | Unilateralist, sceptical of binding rules | Reformist: work inside institutions, build alternatives |
America First is often called isolationist, but it is better described as unilateralist nationalism: the United States did not leave the world, only the rules that constrained it.
Consequences for world politics
- Trade war and a weakened WTO. Section 301 tariffs from 2018 and Chinese retaliation began the trade war; blocked appointments left the WTO Appellate Body unable to function from December 2019.
- Retreat from multilateralism. Washington left the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal and the Human Rights Council; Xi cast himself as globalisation’s defender at Davos in January 2017.
- A vacuum and its filling. China advanced the Belt and Road Initiative, the AIIB and the Global Development, Security and Civilisation Initiatives, adding a Global Governance Initiative at Tianjin in September 2025.
- Rivalry as the organising axis. The 2017 National Security Strategy named China a strategic competitor; trade friction widened into technology controls, ending the convergence bargain of the 1990s.
- The liberal order hollowed from within. G. John Ikenberry (2018) reads the crisis of the liberal international order as a crisis at its American core, not only a challenge from outside.
- Allies pay more. Burden-shifting worked as a spending policy: by 2025 all 32 NATO allies met the 2% target, and the Hague summit set 5% of GDP by 2035.
- The developing world hedges. Many states turned to Chinese finance, while S. Jaishankar‘s The India Way (2020) treats the uncertainty as opportunity: engage America, manage China.
Continuity into the present
Trump’s second term intensified the pattern: tariffs on friends as well as rivals, including 50% on India until the February 2026 deal cut it to 18%, threats against BRICS de-dollarisation and withdrawal from 66 international bodies announced in January 2026. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration (September 2026) criticised unilateral tariffs. Yet the Busan truce (October 2025) and Xi’s state visit to Washington (September 2026), where he urged competition “within bounds”, show managed antagonism rather than rupture.
Conclusion
Both doctrines treat universal institutions as instruments rather than constraints, and multilateralism is their shared casualty. America First accelerated the relative rise of the Chinese Dream without converting it into leadership, since China still lacks allies of choice. The result is not a clean power transition but a fragmented, transactional order in which middle powers such as India gain room to manoeuvre.