In what way does the predominance of the USA in the UN funding affect its decision-making? (2019, 10 Marks)
The UN runs on assessed contributions, a legal obligation under Article 17(2) apportioned by the Assembly, and on voluntary contributions, which are far larger and mostly earmarked by donors. The United States is the largest funder in both: 22% of the regular budget (the ceiling), about 26% of peacekeeping, and more than US$14 billion across the system in 2024. Its predominance shapes decisions through the purse rather than the ballot.
How funding becomes influence
- Budget rules: the Kassebaum–Solomon amendment (1985) capped US payments at 20% unless budget votes were weighted. The developing majority refused weighted voting but conceded consensus budgeting in resolution 41/213 (1986), a de facto veto for major contributors.
- The ceiling: in 2000 the US share was lowered from 25% to 22% as the price of clearing US arrears, so others subsidise the largest economy.
- Policy-linked cuts: UNESCO lost US funding after admitting Palestine (2011); UNRWA and UNFPA have been defunded more than once; Washington quit the WHO and the Human Rights Council, and in January 2026 announced withdrawal from 66 organisations, 31 of them UN entities.
- Earmarking and conditions: donor-chosen projects set agency priorities more than governing bodies do; a US$2 billion humanitarian pledge (December 2025) came with a warning to adapt or die.
- Shape of the institution: mostly American arrears forced a 2026 budget of US$3.45 billion with about 2,900 posts abolished under UN80. September 2026 payments of US$827 million (regular and peacekeeping) still left about US$4.2 billion owed.
In Susan Strange’s terms (States and Markets, 1988) this is structural power: it sets the frame within which others decide.
Limits of that influence
- The Assembly remains one state, one vote. In December 2017 it rejected the US decision on Jerusalem 128 to 9 despite threats to cut funding.
- Council outcomes turn on the veto, not on money. China, assessed at about 20%, paid its 2026 regular dues in September, India in February.
- Withholding is a breach of Article 17, not a right. Article 19 bites only on two full years’ arrears, and the US times its payments to stay below that line.
- Exit cedes ground: when Washington leaves, others, including China, step in. As Robert O. Keohane argued in After Hegemony (1984), regimes can outlive the hegemon’s commitment.
Conclusion
US predominance gives Washington a veto over the purse, and so over the UN’s size, priorities and candour, but not over how members vote. Used as a weapon, it weakens both the Organisation’s independence and US leverage. A broader assessed base and a stronger Working Capital Fund are the structural remedies.