Examine the issues raised in the context of renewal of NPT both by its advocates and its critics. (1995)
The NPT was concluded for 25 years. Article X(2) required a conference, 25 years after entry into force, to decide by a majority of parties whether it should continue indefinitely or for further fixed periods. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference in New York (17 April–12 May), presided over by Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, made that choice. The debate set permanence against accountability.
What the advocates argued
- Permanence and predictability: an indefinite treaty gives a stable legal foundation. Fixed or rolling terms would turn each renewal into a crisis in which the regime could be held hostage. A Canadian draft for indefinite extension gathered 111 co-sponsors, a majority before any vote.
- Non-proliferation serves everyone: non-weapon states gain most from their neighbours’ restraint. South Africa’s accession (1991) and Argentina’s (1995) showed regional rivalries winding down under the treaty.
- The record: 15 to 25 nuclear states had been feared; there were five recognised ones and a few undeclared. The INF Treaty (1987) and START I (1991) were offered as proof that Article VI worked once the Cold War ended.
- New dangers: Iraq’s clandestine programme, North Korea’s 1993 withdrawal threat and loose Soviet material called for a stronger regime, not a provisional one. Liberal institutionalists added that permanence lengthens what Robert Axelrod called the “shadow of the future”, which sustains cooperation.
What the critics argued
- Inequality made permanent: many non-aligned parties warned that indefinite extension would legitimise five arsenals for ever and give away the only leverage non-weapon states had. Indonesia and other non-aligned states proposed rolling 25-year periods, keeping each renewal conditional on performance.
- Article VI without a timetable: critics wanted extension tied to concrete steps, namely a CTBT, a fissile-material cut-off and a time-bound plan for elimination.
- Weak security assurances: UNSC Resolution 984 (April 1995) repeated pledges that were political, not legally binding.
- Article IV eroded: supplier controls, including the NSG’s full-scope safeguards rule of 1992, were narrowing the promised right to technology.
- The Middle East: Arab states, led by Egypt, objected that Israel’s unsafeguarded arsenal went unaddressed.
- The view from outside: India, a non-party, saw extension as making the hierarchy irreversible. Jaswant Singh later wrote that it perpetuated the arsenals of the five (Foreign Affairs, 1998).
The compromise
- South Africa brokered “permanence with accountability”. Decisions on a strengthened review process, Principles and Objectives (a CTBT by 1996, an FMCT, systematic efforts towards disarmament) and indefinite extension were adopted without a vote on 11 May, with a resolution on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
Who was vindicated
- Advocates, partly: the treaty survived, Brazil joined in 1998, membership reached 191, and the 2000 conference agreed the Thirteen Practical Steps.
- Critics, largely: the CTBT was signed but has never entered into force, the FMCT was never negotiated, and Israel boycotts the UN conference on a Middle East zone held since 2019. India and Pakistan tested in 1998. Review conferences failed in 2005, 2015, 2022 and again in 2026, and New START lapsed in February 2026 with nothing to replace it.
Conclusion
The advocates won the decision and the critics won the argument. Indefinite extension secured the non-proliferation pillar but removed the pressure on the disarmament pillar; three decades on, the regime’s crisis of legitimacy is the price of that bargain.