In the context of developments on the nuclear weapons front in the neighbourhood, do you think that any change in India’s defence strategy is indicated? (2009, 20 Marks)
Defence strategy is wider than nuclear doctrine. Doctrine states when nuclear weapons would be used; strategy is how a state’s whole force, conventional and nuclear, is shaped to deter and fight. Developments in India’s neighbourhood, in 2009 and since, point to a clear answer: India’s strategy needs to change, but its 2003 doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use (NFU), first drafted by a board convened by K. Subrahmanyam (1999), does not.
Developments on the nuclear front
Pakistan:
- Expanding plutonium production at Khushab, the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network (2004) and the insurgency of 2007–09 raised fears about both the size and the security of its arsenal.
- Its answer to India’s Cold Start concept was the 70-km Nasr (tested 2011) and full-spectrum deterrence, built to lower the nuclear threshold.
- It now holds about 170 warheads (SIPRI 2026), has the Shaheen-III and a claimed-MIRV Ababeel, and in 2025 created a conventional Army Rocket Force Command, concentrated strategic command under its army chief and signed a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia (17 September 2025).
China:
- In 2009 China was fielding road-mobile DF-31 missiles and a ballistic-missile submarine force, and had tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2007.
- It now holds about 620 warheads; the Pentagon (December 2025) reports over 100 ICBMs loaded in three new silo fields, an early-warning counterstrike posture and a path to over 1,000 warheads by 2030.
- Its long support for Pakistan’s programme, and Chinese-supplied fighters and missiles in Pakistan’s hands during Operation Sindoor (May 2025), make this a two-front problem.
Why a change of strategy is needed
- The stability–instability paradox. Glenn H. Snyder (1965) showed that stability at the nuclear level can encourage conflict lower down. After Kargil (1999) and 26/11 (2008), Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella sheltered proxy war, and Operation Parakram (2001–02) showed how slow mobilisation wastes coercion.
- Survivability. Against a fast-growing China, a retaliation-only force is credible only if it can survive a first strike.
- Organisational risk. The Waltz–Sagan debate (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1995) frames the stakes: Kenneth N. Waltz held that more nuclear states bring caution, Scott D. Sagan that military organisations bring accidents and weak control, a warning that applies to a Pakistani arsenal moving towards battlefield weapons.
The changes indicated, and largely made
| Area | Change | Status (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Sea leg | Ballistic-missile submarines for an assured second strike | INS Arihant launched 2009; three in service with INS Aridhaman (April 2026); K-4 not confirmed as deployed |
| Land leg | Longer range and penetration | Agni-5 MIRV test, March 2024 |
| Missile defence | Interception against limited strikes | BMD Phase 2 tested in June 2026 |
| Conventional | Rapid, limited options below the threshold | Integrated battle-group trials; Balakot (2019), Operation Sindoor (May 2025) |
| Two fronts | Northern rebalancing and external balancing | Border infrastructure, the Quad |
Two adjustments were rightly avoided. India did not answer the Nasr with tactical weapons; Shyam Saran (2013) declared that the label on any nuclear weapon used against India is irrelevant. It also did not drop NFU, because first use would require alert forces, pre-delegation and an arms race, and would threaten nothing Pakistan would believe.
Limits
Every China-facing improvement looks offensive from Rawalpindi, and Vipin Narang and Christopher Clary (International Security, 2018–19) read MIRVs and canisterisation as a counterforce temptation. Confidence-building measures with Pakistan have weakened, and the 2005 missile-test notification pact still excludes cruise missiles.
Conclusion
A change was indicated, and it had to be in strategy, not doctrine: survivability, speed and conventional options below the threshold, with the same declaratory restraint. India has largely made that shift. Its unfinished task is an operational long-range sea-based missile, which would turn a stated second strike into an assured one.