‘Non-alignment’ has been the basic principle of India’s foreign policy since independence. Discuss its relevance in the contemporary context. (2015, 10 Marks)
In his broadcast of 7 September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru pledged to “keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another”. Non-alignment was meant to protect newly won independence in a polarised world and to buy a poor country time for development. Its relevance today depends on separating three things: a doctrine of autonomy, a practice of bloc-avoidance and a movement.
A principle bent in practice
- 1971: the Indo-Soviet Treaty brought India close to Moscow against a US–China–Pakistan alignment.
- 1991: liberalisation, ties with Israel and the turn to the United States marked what C. Raja Mohan‘s Crossing the Rubicon (2003) read as pragmatism replacing idealism.
- Every government nonetheless kept the language, which is why the principle survived its departures.
Where it remains relevant
- As strategic autonomy. Deciding each issue on its merits without an external veto is intact: India abstained on Ukraine resolutions (most recently in February 2026) and bore a US penalty tariff over Russian crude from August 2025 until the interim understanding of February 2026.
- As refusal of alliance. S. Jaishankar speaks of “convergences and issue-based arrangements” (2019); India sits in the Quad and also in the SCO and BRICS, whose summit it hosted in September 2026.
- As an ethos for the South. Opposition to unilateral coercive measures, demands for Security Council reform, the African Union’s G20 entry (2023) and the Voice of the Global South summits continue its reformist strand.
- In a multipolar order. With more powers competing for India’s favour, autonomy is worth more now than in the unipolar 1990s.
Where it has lost relevance
- Bloc-avoidance has no referent once the blocs are gone, and LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA give close interoperability with the United States.
- The vocabulary is retired: Vijay Gokhale said in 2019 that India had “moved on from its non-aligned past”, and Jaishankar called non-alignment “a term of a particular era” (2020).
- The movement is downgraded: no Prime Minister has attended a full NAM summit since 2012.
- Moral content such as disarmament leadership ended with the 1998 tests; the 2008 nuclear waiver came through a bilateral deal with Washington.
Conclusion
Non-alignment is relevant as a principle of autonomy, now carried by strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, but not as bloc-avoidance or movement diplomacy. Its endurance comes from flexibility: India has departed from its letter repeatedly while keeping its purpose, a purpose the US Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (September 2026) will test.