To what extent has the inadequate intraparty democracy affected the functioning of Indian Democracy? (2020, 20 Marks)
Intra-party democracy means that members choose leaders and candidates, and shape policy, through open, rule-bound procedures. Robert Michels predicted that organisation breeds oligarchy whatever a party’s creed, and Indian parties bear him out. The deficit has damaged the quality of Indian democracy, its representation, accountability and deliberation, to a considerable extent. It has not destroyed its competitiveness, which contest between parties keeps alive.
The shape of the deficit
- Notional internal elections. In 2022 Mallikarjun Kharge defeated Shashi Tharoor in the first contested Congress presidential poll since 2000. The 2023 Raipur plenary still left the Working Committee to nomination. BJP presidents, most recently Nitin Nabin (January 2026), are chosen by consensus and returned unopposed.
- Personal ownership. In 2022 the Election Commission called the reported move to make Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy the YSRCP’s permanent president anti-democratic. In 2023 it described the Shiv Sena’s 2018 constitution as “akin to a fiefdom”.
- Dynasty. Kanchan Chandra, in Democratic Dynasties (2016), counted dynastic MPs at about 20% of the Lok Sabha in 2004, 30% in 2009 and 22% in 2014. ADR’s September 2025 analysis put the current Lok Sabha at 31%. On her reading, family fills the succession vacuum that absent internal contest leaves.
- High-command tickets, settled in Delhi, often days before nominations close.
How far it affects democracy
- Narrower representation. Tickets are filtered by family, money and “winnability”. Some 47% of women legislators come from political families, and 46% of MPs now declare criminal cases, even though Rambabu Singh Thakur (2020) requires parties to publish why they chose such candidates. Grassroots workers and new talent are shut out.
- A weaker legislature. Backed by the Tenth Schedule, the whip turns MPs into delegates of the leadership. Leaderless opposition also costs the system: the Congress’s slump to 44 and 52 seats (2014, 2019) left the government little parliamentary check until the partial recovery to 99 in 2024.
- Exit instead of voice. In Albert O. Hirschman‘s terms, blocked voice produces exit, as in the Shiv Sena (2022) and NCP (2023) splits. Because party constitutions were undemocratic, the Commission fell back on counting legislators, which Subhash Desai (2023) held insufficient.
- Opacity and thin debate. Leaders unaccountable to members invite nepotism and opaque finance, and parties still ignore the 2013 Central Information Commission ruling that brought them under the RTI Act. Manifestos come from the top, which fits the view of Indian parties as office-oriented rather than policy-oriented.
Why the damage is bounded
- Inter-party competition remains vigorous: turnout was 66.1% in 2024, and voters denied the ruling party a majority.
- Centralisation has uses. It keeps governments cohesive after the “Aaya Ram Gaya Ram” defection era of 1967–85.
- Cadre parties such as the BJP and the CPI(M) still promote workers from modest backgrounds without contested elections.
The regulatory gap
- The Law Commission’s 170th Report (1999) proposed statutory internal elections. The NCRWC (2002) sought a law on how parties function, and the 255th Report (2015) repeated the case.
- The Commission’s recognition powers do not reach internal democracy. Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) denied it power to de-register a party, and Parliament, composed of parties, has not legislated.
Conclusion
Inadequate intra-party democracy has not stopped India working as a competitive electoral democracy. It has, substantially, weakened it as a representative and deliberative one. The remedy is a statute mandating internal elections, candidate-selection rules and audited accounts, enforced by the Election Commission.