Comment: Politics of terrorism in India. (1998, 20 Marks)
Terrorism is violence against non-combatants intended to produce political fear. In India it is political in two senses. The violence serves political ends, from secession to proxy war, and the fight against it is contested over laws, votes, federal powers and rights.
Types and their politics
| Type | Theatre | Political character |
|---|---|---|
| Ethno-secessionist | North-East (NSCN, ULFA) | Identity and autonomy claims; accords such as ULFA’s (2023); insurgent–politician nexus |
| Khalistan | Punjab, 1980s–1993 | Ended by policing and the restoration of elections (1992) |
| Cross-border / proxy war | Kashmir, from 1989 | Pakistan-sponsored; Pahalgam, 22 April 2025, 26 killed |
| Left-wing extremism | Central Indian forests | Maoist aim to seize state power; Salwa Judum struck down (Nandini Sundar, 2011) |
| Jihadi / communal urban | Cities | 1993 Bombay, 2008 Mumbai (26/11); linked to communal riots |
On left-wing extremism, the Union Home Ministry declared on 15 April 2026, after reviewing the 31 March 2026 deadline, that no district remains LWE-affected. This followed the killing of CPI (Maoist) chief Nambala Keshava Rao (Basavaraju) in May 2025 and mass surrenders. Residual incidents persist, and grievances are not yet resolved.
Political dimensions
- Terror as an instrument of state policy: Pakistan’s use of proxies such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and The Resistance Front gives it deniable coercion below the threshold of war.
- Communalisation of the discourse: parties trade charges of “vote-bank” softness on jihadi terror and of a “saffron terror” smear (coined in 2002, voiced officially in 2010). All accused in the Malegaon 2008 case were acquitted in July 2025. The Bombay High Court acquitted all twelve in the 7/11 train blasts case, and the Supreme Court stayed the ruling in July 2025.
- Electoral nationalism: Balakot (February 2019) shaped the Lok Sabha campaign, and the Election Commission advised parties not to use soldiers’ images. Operation Sindoor (7 May 2025) became a campaign theme, while the opposition questioned the terms of the 10 May ceasefire.
The politics of anti-terror law
- TADA (1985–95) made police confessions admissible and lapsed amid charges of abuse.
- POTA (2002–04) was passed at a rare joint sitting of Parliament, and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) repealed it.
- Its core provisions moved into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA): the 2004 amendment added terrorism offences, the 2008 amendment after 26/11 brought 180-day detention and a strict bail bar, and the 2019 amendment allowed individuals to be designated as terrorists.
- Conviction gap: NCRB data placed before the Lok Sabha in December 2025 showed 10,440 UAPA arrests and 335 convictions (2019–23). The Centre counters that NIA-registered cases convict at over 90% of completed trials. The deficit lies in state-registered cases, where process becomes punishment. Watali (2019) read the bail bar strictly; K. A. Najeeb (2021) allowed bail for prolonged delay.
Federal friction
Policing is a State subject (Entry 2, List II). The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) proposal of 2012, with powers of arrest under the Intelligence Bureau, was blocked by Chief Ministers across parties. They included Narendra Modi, then Gujarat’s Chief Minister. Chhattisgarh challenged the NIA Act, 2008 under Article 131 in 2020.
Rights versus security
The Kartar Singh Bench (1994) upheld TADA but warned against its misuse. The death of Stan Swamy in custody in 2021 made the cost of long pre-trial detention concrete. Security that erodes legitimacy supplies the grievances that terrorism feeds on.
Conclusion
Terrorism in India is politics by other means, and its suppression has become politics as well. The LWE collapse shows that security combined with development can work. Kashmir shows that a sponsor’s impunity cannot be managed from within. The lasting answer lies in cross-party consensus, laws that convict rather than merely detain, and cooperative federalism, rather than using terror as an electoral weapon.