Comment: The instability of national politics is due to rising influence of regional politics. (2007, 20 Marks)
The statement reflects the experience of 1989–99, when seven governments under six Prime Ministers held office in ten years and three general elections came between 1996 and 1999. State-based parties meanwhile became indispensable to Union governments. The correlation is real, but the causal claim is weak. The evidence shows that the instability came from the form coalitions took, and that regional parties have since become one of the main supports of stable coalition government.
The case for the statement
- No majorities. Between 1989 and 2009, seven successive Lok Sabha elections produced no single-party majority. As Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar put it, states became the effective arena of political choice, and national verdicts became sums of state verdicts.
- Allies’ veto. The AIADMK’s withdrawal of support defeated the Vajpayee government by one vote (269–270) on 17 April 1999. Regional allies also shaped national policy. Mamata Banerjee blocked the Teesta water agreement with Bangladesh in 2011, and the Trinamool Congress left the UPA in 2012 over foreign investment in retail. The DMK left in 2013 over Sri Lanka.
- Parochial pricing. Support has been bought with portfolios and state packages, ahead of national coherence.
Why the causal claim fails
Who brought governments down?
| Government | Fell | Support withdrawn by |
|---|---|---|
| V. P. Singh | November 1990 | BJP (national) |
| Chandra Shekhar | March 1991 | Congress (national) |
| H. D. Deve Gowda | April 1997 | Congress (national) |
| I. K. Gujral | November 1997 | Congress (national) |
| A. B. Vajpayee | April 1999 | AIADMK (regional) |
Only one of the five collapses was the work of a regional party. The fragile governments of 1989–98 were minority governments that depended on outside support from a national rival. Lawrence C. Dodd (Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 1976) found this form the least durable. The weakness was structural: a national party could withdraw at no cost to itself.
- Stable coalitions with more regional partners. Once pre-poll alliances, coordination committees and a Common Minimum Programme became routine, the NDA (1999–2004) nearly completed its term and UPA I and II (2004–14) each served full terms. They had more regional partners than any earlier government. The gravest threat to UPA-I came from the Left over the Indo-US nuclear deal in July 2008, and the government survived the confidence vote.
- Deeper causes. The Congress’s decline left a vacuum no party could fill for two decades. Before the 91st Amendment (2003) the Tenth Schedule allowed “splits” of one-third, which made defection cheap. Discretion under Article 356 and in inviting parties to form governments destabilised state and national politics alike, until S. R. Bommai (1994) constrained it.
- After 2014. The BJP won majorities of its own in 2014 (282) and 2019 (303). In 2024 it fell to 240, and the NDA’s 293 depends on the TDP (16) and JD(U) (12). The allies’ price appeared in the July 2024 Budget, with special outlays for Amaravati and for Bihar’s roads. Yet the government has governed for over two years without a crisis of survival.
Assessment
Regional influence changed how India is governed: power is now negotiated between the Centre and the states rather than commanded from Delhi. Arend Lijphart’s consensus model treats this bargaining as a strength in plural societies. The instability of the 1990s belonged to a party system in transition from Congress dominance to bipolar coalitions. Once alliances were formed before the vote, regional parties stabilised the system more often than they disturbed it.
Conclusion
The statement mistakes a symptom for a cause. Regional parties exposed the fragility of minority governments; they did not create it. The record since 1999 — full-term coalitions, the decline of Article 356, and a 2024 government sustained by regional allies — shows that regional politics now underpins stable government.