Comment on the emergence of Backward classes in the Indian politics. (2016, 15 Marks)

The Other Backward Classes are the intermediate castes of peasants, herders and artisans, placed below the twice-born and above the untouchables. The Mandal Commission estimated them at 52% of the population and the NSSO at about 41%. Caste has shaped politics since colonial times, but the backward classes came together as one political bloc only late, and at different times in the south and the north.

The Southern Head Start

  • Non-Brahmin politics began under colonial rule. The Justice Party (1916) pressed for communal representation, and the Madras Communal G.O. of 1921 reserved posts by community. E. V. Ramasamy ‘Periyar’‘s Self-Respect Movement (1925) presented the non-Brahmin as Dravidian. The DMK’s 1967 victory put intermediate castes in power.
  • Christophe Jaffrelot explains the gap in timing. In the south the Brahmins were the only upper caste and a small minority, so one mobilisation could defeat them; lower castes asserted a separate ethnic identity. In the north several upper castes held land and office together, and the Arya Samaj drew reform energy towards Sanskritisation instead of confrontation.

The Northern Agrarian Surge

  • Ram Manohar Lohia made caste central to socialist politics. His slogan pichhda pave sau mein saath claimed sixty per cent of power for the backward castes, women, Dalits and minorities.
  • Charan Singh‘s break with the Congress in 1967 organised the Green Revolution peasantry of Jats, Yadavs and Kurmis. Yogendra Yadav calls this OBC exit from the Congress the first democratic upsurge.
  • The Kalelkar Commission (report 1955) was shelved. The Janata government set up the Mandal Commission on 1 January 1979, and it reported on 31 December 1980.

Mandal and the Silent Revolution

V. P. Singh‘s announcement of 7 August 1990 applying 27% reservation in central services made OBC a national identity with a concrete stake. Northern upper-caste students protested; Indra Sawhney (1992) upheld the quota. The Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Janata Dal governed the Hindi heartland. Jaffrelot’s India’s Silent Revolution (2003) describes power passing to lower castes through the ballot without violence. Kamandal politics, the temple movement, was in large part an attempt to reunite the Hindu vote that Mandal had divided.

Reconfiguration after 2014

The BJP has built support among non-dominant OBCs and presented an OBC-origin Prime Minister. It gave the NCBC constitutional status through the 102nd Amendment (2018) and has committed the next census to a full caste count. The opposition answered in 2024 with the Samajwadi Party’s PDA (Pichhde, Dalit, Alpsankhyak) plank.

Significance and Limits

Because the OBCs occupy the middle of the caste order, above Dalits and below the twice-born, their choices will largely decide whether caste is transcended. Their emergence has made Indian democracy more representative. Yet the benefits have gathered in land-owning upper OBCs, while artisan and service castes remain on the margins.

Conclusion

The rise of the backward classes is Indian democracy’s broadest transfer of power. It began in the south, reached the north late, and spread nationwide after Mandal. Whether it continues to widen democracy now depends on the OBCs at the bottom of the category.