Draw the current population pyramid of India. What policy measures would you recommend for population dynamics to achieve sustainability? (2026, 20 Marks)
India’s age structure is no longer a pyramid. With about 1.47 billion people in 2026 and a median age near 30, the base has begun to contract: NFHS-6 (2023-24) holds the total fertility rate at 2.0 and the Sample Registration System 2024 reports 1.9. The task is no longer restraint of numbers but governance of a structure already transformed.
The structure in broad bands
| Age band | Share (about) | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| 0-14 | 24% (~350 million) | base narrowing; cohorts shrinking |
| 15-29 | 26% | widest cohorts; 20-24 the largest |
| 30-59 | 38% | the bulge, moving upward |
| 60+ | 10-11% (65+ alone, 7.6%) | apex thickening |
Drawn, this is a barrel or bell, not a triangle — what demographers call a stationary structure. Working-age (15-64) is about 68.6%, child dependency about 35 and old-age dependency about 11 — the most favourable ratio India will ever record, and a temporary one.
One pyramid, two demographic countries
Kerala reached replacement fertility in 1988, Tamil Nadu in 1993, India as a whole only in 2019; Bihar is projected to arrive around 2039. Birth rates in 2024 ran from Bihar’s 26.8 to Kerala’s 11.1. Kerala’s 60+ share moves from 13% (2011) to about 23% by 2036, Uttar Pradesh’s from 7% to 12%. The national pyramid is an arithmetic average of a near-European south and a still-young north — so a single national instrument is the wrong one.
Policy for demographic sustainability
- Stop treating fertility as the problem. Below-replacement fertility has held across two survey rounds; growth continues only through population momentum, carrying India to roughly 1.7 billion around 2060. What remains is quality — unmet need is 8.5% (NFHS-6) and the method mix is still overwhelmingly female sterilisation. Rights-based reproductive health, not targets, closes that gap.
- Convert the dividend. David Bloom and Jeffrey Williamson showed the East Asian dividend was earned through schooling and employment, not conferred by age structure. India’s binding constraint is women’s work: PLFS 2025 records female labour force participation at 40.0% against 79.1% for men. Childcare, safe transport, skilling and recognition of care work are population policy.
- Prepare for ageing now, while the ratio is favourable — pensions, geriatric care and community support, building on Ayushman Bharat’s extension to all citizens aged 70+ (October 2024).
- Remove the federal penalty on early transition. The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026, introduced on 16 April 2026 and negatived the next day, would have lifted the Lok Sabha ceiling to 850 seats, costing Tamil Nadu seven and Kerala five on 2011 shares while Uttar Pradesh gained nine. Unless representation and transfers are delinked from headcount, states are punished for completing the transition the Union asked of them.
Policy for ecological sustainability
Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren’s I = PAT identity — impact as population multiplied by affluence and technology — is usually cited against India’s numbers; the Indian evidence reverses it. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions were about 2.2 tonnes in 2024; India accounts for 8.27% of current but only 3.57% of cumulative emissions since 1751. The stress is generated by consumption and cropping, not by births: the stage of groundwater extraction stands near 164% in Punjab and 136% in Haryana, a crisis made by paddy, subsidised power and procurement. Sustainability policy belongs in urban form, water pricing and the energy transition.
Conclusion
India’s pyramid has already answered the question the 1970s asked. The question it now poses is different — who, where, and for how long. The window in which a large workforce can finance a growing elderly population is a generation wide and closing unevenly; it will be held open by schools, women’s employment and federal fairness, not by birth control.