Hitler’s Foreign Policy

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Hitler’s foreign policy is a recurring theme in the UPSC History Optional syllabus under World History, particularly in the sections dealing with the origins of the Second World War and the failure of the interwar international order. Understanding how Hitler dismantled the Treaty of Versailles step by step, and how Britain and France responded through appeasement, is essential for both the World History papers and for General Studies questions on twentieth-century international relations.

Aims of Hitler’s Foreign Policy

Hitler aimed to make Germany a great power again, and he hoped to achieve this by:
- destroying the hated Versailles settlement;
- building up the army, something expressly forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles;
- recovering lost territory such as the Saar and the Polish Corridor;
- bringing all German-speaking peoples inside the Reich, which would involve annexing Austria and taking territory from Czechoslovakia and Poland, both of which had large German minorities as a result of the peace settlement.

Historiographical Debate: How Far Did Hitler’s Ambitions Extend?

There is considerable disagreement among historians about what, if anything, Hitler intended beyond these immediate aims.
- Some historians argue that annexing Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland was only a beginning, and that Hitler planned to follow this up by seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and then conquering and occupying Russia as far east as the Ural Mountains.
  - Hitler himself remarked: “National boundaries are only made by man and can be changed by man.”
- The territorial changes Hitler had in mind were meant to secure the Germans what he called Lebensraum (living space).
  - He claimed Germany’s population was far too large for the area into which it was constrained, and that more land was needed both to feed the German people and to provide territory in which the excess population could settle and colonize.
- Hitler had also made clear his hatred of what he called ‘Jewish Bolshevism’, suggesting that war with the USSR was unavoidable at some point in order to destroy communism; the next stage of expansion, in this view, was to acquire colonies in Africa and naval bases in and around the Atlantic.

A.J.P. Taylor’s Interpretation

A.J.P. Taylor disagreed sharply with the view that Hitler pursued a fixed, long-term programme of conquest.
- He argued that Hitler never had any detailed plans worked out for acquiring Lebensraum and never intended a major war; at most, he was prepared for only a limited war against Poland.
- Taylor famously concluded: “Hitler got as far as he did because others did not know what to do with him.”
Many historians in this school held that Hitler’s writings and statements about Lebensraum did not amount to an actual programme that he followed step by step.
- It is more likely that these statements were a propaganda exercise designed to attract support and unite the Nazi party.
- There is very little evidence that Hitler had given serious thought to the practical problems of creating and organising a Nazi empire in Europe.

A Series of Successes

Whatever the truth about his long-term intentions, Hitler began his foreign policy with an almost unbroken series of brilliant successes, which was one of the main reasons for his popularity within Germany.
- By the end of 1938, almost every one of his first set of aims had been achieved without war and with the tacit approval of Britain; only the Germans in Poland remained to be brought within the Reich.
- It was only when Hitler failed to secure this by peaceful means that he took the fateful decision to invade Poland.
Since Germany was still militarily weak in 1933, Hitler had to move cautiously at first.
- He withdrew Germany from the World Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations, on the grounds that France would not agree to Germany having equality of armaments.
- At the same time, he insisted that Germany was willing to disarm if other states would do the same, and that he wanted only peace.
- This combination — acting boldly while soothing his opponents with conciliatory speeches they wanted to hear — became one of Hitler’s favourite diplomatic techniques.

Ten-Year Non-Aggression Pact with Poland (January 1934)

Hitler signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with the Poles in January 1934, at a time when Poland was alarmed that the Germans might try to reclaim the Polish Corridor.
This was something of a triumph for Hitler:
- Britain took it as further evidence of his peaceful intentions;
- it ruined France’s Little Entente, which depended heavily on Poland; and
- it guaranteed Polish neutrality whenever Germany decided to move against Austria and Czechoslovakia.
On the other hand, it also improved relations between France and Russia, both of whom were worried by the apparent threat from Nazi Germany.

Return of the Saar After Plebiscite (January 1935)

The Saar, a region important for coal production that had been removed from German control under the terms of Versailles to weaken Germany industrially, was returned to Germany in January 1935 after a plebiscite resulted in a 90 per cent vote in favour.
- Although the vote had already been provided for in the peace settlement itself, Nazi propaganda made the most of the success.
- Hitler announced that all causes of grievance between France and Germany had now been removed.

Reintroduction of Conscription: First Successful Breach of Versailles (March 1935)

Hitler’s first successful breach of Versailles came in March 1935, when he announced the reintroduction of conscription.
- His stated excuse was that Britain had just announced air force increases and France had extended conscription from 12 to 18 months, itself justified as a response to German rearmament.
- Hitler proceeded to build up a peacetime army of about 600,000 men — six times more than was permitted under the peace treaty.
- Although the Stresa Front (Britain, France, and Italy) condemned this violation of Versailles, no action was taken; the League of Nations proved helpless, and the Front itself collapsed as a result of Hitler’s next success.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 1935)

Recognising how frail the Stresa Front was, Hitler shrewdly detached Britain by offering to limit the German navy to 35 per cent of the strength of the British navy.
- Britain eagerly accepted, signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935; British thinking held that since the Germans were already breaking Versailles by building a fleet, it was better to have that fleet limited by agreement.
- Without consulting either of its allies, Britain had thereby condoned German rearmament, which proceeded to gather momentum.
- By the end of 1938, the German army stood at about 800,000 men plus reserves, the navy possessed 21 large naval vessels (battleships, cruisers, and destroyers) with many more under construction, along with 47 U-boats, and the air force had grown to over 5,000 aircraft.

Remilitarisation of the Rhineland (March 1936)

The Rhineland had long been a key industrial region of Germany, producing coal, steel, and iron resources, and it also formed a natural barrier against France; the River Rhine, if properly defended, would have been a difficult obstacle for an invading force to cross.
- Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was barred from keeping military forces in a 50 km stretch of the Rhineland — a term Hitler resented as leaving Germany vulnerable to invasion, and he was determined to enlarge his military capability and strengthen his borders.
Encouraged by his earlier successes, Hitler took the calculated risk of sending troops into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in March 1936, a clear breach of both Versailles and Locarno.
- Although the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign of French opposition, no resistance was offered beyond the usual diplomatic protests.
- Well aware of the mood of pacifism among his opponents, Hitler simultaneously offered France and Britain a 25-year non-aggression pact and claimed that “Germany had no territorial demands to make in Europe.”

Reactions to the Rhineland Invasion

Britain:
- Britain did not act, as the nation was weak both economically and militarily and did not wish to commit itself to war unless absolutely necessary.
- At the time, Britain was also in dispute with Italy over its military campaigns in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and British forces had been moved into the Mediterranean in case Italy became aggressive, leaving little capacity to respond to Germany.
- A popular view held that the Germans were merely “going into their back-garden” by re-entering their own army into the Rhineland; although the British government denounced the breach of Versailles, it did not consider the matter worth going to war over.
France:
- France also did not act, being politically unstable at the time Germany re-occupied the Rhineland.
- The deeply unpopular Hoare-Laval fiasco — in which France and Britain had tried to appease Mussolini by offering him land in Abyssinia — had already brought down the French government, leaving France unable to act against Germany.
- French military forces had earlier been moved from the Rhine to the Alps and Tunisia because of tensions with Italy, weakening French forces near the Rhineland.
- France would only act against Germany with British support, and Britain’s reluctance to confront Hitler meant France also took no action.
- France instead placed its faith in the Maginot Line, a vast system of fortifications spread along the Franco-German border.

Results of the Rhineland Remilitarisation

Hitler had significantly improved his status, and over the next two years the Germans built up their defences; within 18 months, their rate of rearmament had overtaken that of Britain and France, and Hitler began to consider himself infallible. He also did not agree to an Air Force Pact with Britain.
France continued to strengthen the Maginot Line to safeguard against future German aggression, while its alliance with Britain grew strained on account of British reluctance to stand up to Germany.
France’s alliances with eastern European countries were undermined as France concentrated solely on its own defence against possible German aggression.
Britain, for its part, promised France and Belgium help if they were invaded, thereby reaffirming the Locarno Pact, and also began rearming its own military forces.
Austria now came under greater German pressure.

Other Successes: The Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact

In 1936, Hitler consolidated Germany’s position further by reaching an understanding with Mussolini, forming the Rome-Berlin Axis, and by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan (later joined by Italy in 1937), creating an anti-Communist alliance.
Germany and Italy also gained valuable military experience by helping Franco to victory in the Spanish Civil War.
- One of the most notorious episodes of this war was the bombing of the defenceless Basque market town of Guernica by the German Condor Legion.

Anschluss (Union) with Austria, March 1938

Hitler wanted all German-speaking nations in Europe to be part of Germany, and to this end he sought to reunite Germany with his native homeland, Austria — an act expressly forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles.
- Hitler also wanted control of the largely German-speaking Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia, and Austria, importantly, shared a border with this region.
- He was therefore determined to destabilise Austria and undermine its independence, with Anschluss (union) with Austria as his ultimate goal.

Earlier Setback to Anschluss (July 1934)

In July 1934, Hitler suffered an early setback to his ambitions for Anschluss.
- The Austrian Nazis, encouraged by Hitler, staged a revolt and murdered the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, who had banned the Nazi party and enjoyed the support of Mussolini.
- Since Italy had an agreement to protect Austria from outside aggression, Mussolini honoured this commitment and moved Italian troops to the Austrian border to deter Hitler from invading, causing the revolt to collapse.
- Hitler, taken aback, had to accept that Germany was not yet strong enough to force the issue, and he denied any responsibility for the actions of the Austrian Nazis.

Schuschnigg’s Appeasement and the German-Austrian Agreement (1936)

The new Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, tried to preserve his country from German invasion by avoiding giving Hitler any excuse for aggression, and sought to co-operate with Hitler as far as possible.
- He signed the German-Austrian Agreement of 1936, which recognised Austrian independence but at the price of aligning Austria’s foreign policy with Germany’s, and which also allowed Nazis to hold official posts within Austria.
- Schuschnigg hoped this concession would appease Hitler; it did not.
Schuschnigg’s position was further undermined in 1936 when Hitler and Mussolini formalised the Rome-Berlin Axis during their joint involvement in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), leaving Austria without the protection of Italy and vulnerable to German attack.
- Hitler demanded that Nazis be given key government posts in Austria, and Schuschnigg compromised by making a Nazi member Minister of the Interior.
Hitler then ordered Austrian Nazis to create as much trouble and disorder as possible in order to pressure Schuschnigg, so that Hitler could later claim Austrian law and order had broken down and justify marching German troops into Vienna to “restore peace” — despite having engineered the chaos himself.
- Matters came to a head when the Austrian Nazis staged huge demonstrations that Schuschnigg’s government could not control.
- Realising this could be the prelude to a German invasion, Schuschnigg announced a referendum on whether Austria should remain independent, which infuriated Hitler, since a vote against joining Germany would ruin his excuse for invasion.
- Hitler ordered Schuschnigg to call off the referendum; knowing he would receive no help from Italy, and that France and Britain would not interfere with Hitler’s plans, Schuschnigg conceded, called off the referendum, and resigned.
- German troops then marched into Austria unopposed, and Hitler took control of the country. A month later, a rigged referendum was held that purported to show Austrian popular approval of German control.

Foreign Reaction to the Anschluss

France:
- French politics were in turmoil in March 1938; in fact, the entire French government had resigned just two days before Germany invaded Austria, leaving France in no position to oppose the invasion.
Britain:
- Prime Minister Chamberlain was determined to appease Hitler, and there was no political will within Britain to oppose Germany; the British population was, moreover, strongly against the idea of another European war.
- The Anschluss was not seen as a threat to Britain, and since both nations were German-speaking, there was a widespread sense that no good reason existed for Austria and Germany not to unify.
- Anti-appeasers such as Winston Churchill were alarmed by Germany’s annexation of Austria, arguing that if Hitler had a genuine claim to Austria, he should have pursued it through negotiation and diplomacy rather than force.

Significance of the Anschluss

The Anschluss with Austria in March 1938 was Hitler’s greatest success to date, and a clear triumph for Germany:
- Germany added seven million people and an army of 100,000 to its Reich.
- Germany gained valuable resources such as steel, iron ore, and Austria’s foreign exchange reserves.
- It revealed the continuing weakness of Britain and France, who once again did no more than protest.
- It demonstrated the value of Germany’s new understanding with Italy.
- The balance of power in south-eastern Europe shifted in Germany’s favour, increasing German influence in the Balkans.
- It dealt a severe blow to Czechoslovakia, which could now be attacked from the south as well as from the west and north, leaving it surrounded on three fronts by Germany.
All was now ready for the next stage of Hitler’s expansionist foreign policy — the campaign to acquire the German-speaking Sudetenland, a campaign that would culminate in triumph at the Munich Conference of September 1938.