Eastern Question: Rise and it’s Development

Eastern Question: Rise and Its Development

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The Eastern Question is a central theme in UPSC History Optional (World History), examining the diplomatic crisis triggered by the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting scramble among the Great Powers over its Balkan and Near Eastern territories. This article traces the origins, key episodes, and eventual reopening of the Eastern Question — from the Greek War of Independence and the ambitions of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, to the Crimean War — along with the shifting interests of Russia, Britain, Austria, France, and Germany.

Introduction

• The Eastern Question (or Near Eastern Question) was the diplomatic problem posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the rise of national feeling among the Balkan peoples, the declining Turkish (Ottoman) Empire, and the divergent interests of the Great Powers in the Near East.
  • The central problem of the Eastern Question was: what was to take the place of the Turkish Empire in the event of its disintegration?
• The Eastern Question was always an international question, given the involvement of the interests of many international actors.
  • Any internal change in the Turkish domains caused tension among the European powers, each of whom feared that a rival might exploit the political disarray to increase its own influence.
• This question arose periodically — during the Greek Revolution of the 1820s, the Crimean conflict (1853–56), the Balkan crisis of 1875–78, the Bosnian crisis of 1908, and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.
• In the words of Lord Morley, the Eastern Question may be described as “a shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths.”

Background and Rise of the Eastern Question

The Turkish Empire

• In the 19th century, the Turkish Empire in Europe included the whole of the Balkan Peninsula — the mountainous region between the Danube and the Aegean Sea, home to the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Albanians. Rumania, though situated north of the Danube, is also included among the Balkan states.
• The inhabitants of the Balkans were mostly Christians, with only a sprinkling of Muslim Turkish overlords.
  • Although Turkish rule had not been intolerant in many respects, it was wholly incompetent and unprogressive, and at times ruthlessly cruel.

Balkan Nations Gain Independence from the Ottoman Empire

• Greece — independence recognised, 1829
• Romania — independence, 1881
• Serbia — independence, 1882; Serbia takes territory from Bulgaria, 1912
• Bulgaria — autonomy/independence, 1878
• Montenegro — independence, 1878
• Albania — independence, 1912
• Greece takes further territory from Bulgaria in 1912

Decline of Turkish Power

• In the 18th century, Ottoman power in Europe began to decline perceptibly; Turkey had already lost Hungary in 1699.
• Russia began pressing southwards, driving back the Turks, and by the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) acquired Bessarabia, thereby advancing her territory to the river Pruth, on the west side of the Black Sea.

Increased Interest of the Powers in the Eastern Question

• The interest aroused by Turkey’s decline and Russia’s southward advance was not, at first, general enough to become a matter of European diplomacy — it concerned mainly the Powers in the immediate neighbourhood, namely Austria and Russia.

Napoleon familiarised the Eastern Question to Europe

• It was Napoleon who turned Europe’s gaze towards the East.
  • His attempt to seize Egypt and Syria, together with his oft-repeated insistence that Constantinople meant “the empire of the world,” helped familiarise European statesmen with the importance of the question.

Fear of Russian designs

• There was a general fear that the balance of power would be fatally upset if Turkey, as a result of her increasing weakness, was completely absorbed by the expanding power of Russia.
  • The Russians were next door to the Balkans, shared the same Slav race as most of Turkey’s subjects, and belonged to the same Orthodox Greek Church as most of Turkey’s Christian subjects.
  • Added to this was Russia’s well-known ambition to control the Black Sea and the Straits, in order to command a passage to the Mediterranean.
• It was this sense of Russian danger that stimulated Europe’s increased attention to the affairs of the Near East, making the fear of Russian aggrandisement at Turkey’s expense one important aspect of the Eastern Question.

New Factors of the Eastern Question in the 19th Century

• With the changing attitude of the Powers, new developments began to confront Europe with fresh aspects of the problem.
  • Turkey’s weakness, besides inviting external aggression, encouraged subject nationalities and powerful vassals to make a bid for independence.
  • The 19th-century ideal of nationality began to touch the Balkan Peninsula, and the Christian nations under Turkish rule grew restive under its inspiration, seeking to free themselves from the Turkish yoke — with the result that wars and atrocities became almost chronic in the Balkan region.
• The Ottoman Empire was thus threatened both from within and without — by aggression as well as disintegration, by Russia as well as by its own Christian subjects.
  • This two-fold aspect of the problem, and the resulting conflict of interests, introduced new factors into the Eastern Question.
  • The Eastern Question took different shapes at different times, but one of its constant factors remained the ambition of Russia at the expense of Turkey.

Interest and Attitude of the Major Powers in the Eastern Question

Russia’s Interest in the Balkans

• The ambitions of Russia at the expense of Turkey were a constant factor in the Eastern Question.
  • Russia was bound to the peoples of the Balkans by ties of religion and race, and claimed the right to protect them from Turkish misrule.
  • Russia also wanted to secure access to the Mediterranean by seizing Constantinople from Turkey.
• Russian policy in the Near East thus had two aims: to dismember Turkey and seize Constantinople as the prize; and, if that proved impossible, to dominate Turkey by forcing upon her a series of unequal treaties that would keep her in a state of vassalage under Russian overlordship.

England’s Interest

• Suspicion of Russian designs upon Turkey was the keynote of British policy.
  • Britain saw Russian aggrandisement as a serious menace to British interests in the East, fearing that Russian control over Constantinople would greatly weaken British hold upon India — and so watched every Russian movement with suspicion.
• Over the Eastern Question, a chronic antagonism developed between Britain and Russia. Throughout the 19th century, England stood forth as the champion of Turkey against Russian aggression, with British policy aimed at checking the Russian advance by preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
  • England succeeded in holding Russia in check but could not prevent Turkey’s eventual dismemberment.
  • It is somewhat ironical that, while posing as the champion of Turkish integrity, England managed to secure a valuable share of Turkish spoils for herself.

Austrian Interest

• Austria’s interests in the Balkan region were, in some respects, more vital than those of Russia and Great Britain.
• Austria was Russia’s rival in the Balkans for several reasons:
  • Being a land-locked country with only a short coastline at the head of the Adriatic, Austria badly needed an outlet to the sea — important both strategically and economically for sea-borne trade — and sought expansion towards Balkan ports by checking Russian influence.
  • The great volume of Austrian trade passed along the Danube valley, making it in her interest to prevent Russian supremacy at the mouth of the Danube, which would have followed had Russia expanded towards Constantinople.
  • Austria feared the growth of the Pan-Slavic movement in the Balkans, encouraged by Russia, since it threatened to sap the loyalty of her own Slav subjects. She therefore tried to cripple and confine Serbia, the leading Slav state in the Balkans, whose growing nationalism menaced the integrity of the Austrian Empire.
• In the first half of the 19th century, Austria took no active part in Eastern affairs but kept a vigilant watch on Russia’s movements.
  • Metternich sought to counter Russia’s Balkan ambitions through the doctrine of legitimate dynasties; but after Austria’s expulsion from Italy and Germany, she turned with increasing purpose to the South-East to find compensation at Turkey’s expense.

French Interest

• France’s interest in the East was primarily commercial and religious, rather than political.
  • As the traditional ally of Turkey, France had befriended the Turks and obtained special trading privileges, particularly in Syria and Egypt.
  • France was also the traditional protector of the Roman Catholic Christians in the East under Turkish rule.
• Despite this traditional friendship, France was never a consistent or enthusiastic champion of Turkey — for her, the Eastern Question was mainly a matter concerning her naval and commercial position in the Mediterranean.

German Interest

• The affairs of the East did not appeal to Germany until the last quarter of the 19th century.
  • Bismarck kept himself aloof from the Eastern Question, remarking that the whole matter was “not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.”
• But in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin convened to resolve the Eastern Question, Bismarck posed as an “honest broker,” administering a check on Russia in order to befriend Austria.
  • Thereafter, Germany developed greater diplomatic activity in the East, befriended Turkey, trained her army, and secured permission to build the Baghdad-Berlin Railway.

The Main Factors of Decay and Sickness of the Turkish Empire

Administrative Inefficiency

• Everywhere, Turkish administration was paralysed by insubordination and corruption, with the central government’s control over provincial governors and other agents deplorably defective.
  • The Sultan’s representatives in outlying provinces like Egypt, Algiers, and Tunis behaved more like tributary princes than administrative officials.
  • Thus, the process of dismemberment was already underway in Turkey even before the rise of the Christian nations of the Balkans.

Inability to Weld Together the Diverse Peoples

• Turkey had subdued many races across south-eastern Europe but made no attempt to assimilate them, nor to fuse them into a single body politic.
  • Full of contempt for the conquered peoples, the Turks cared only to exploit them, leaving them in a state of semi-independence as far as administration was concerned.

Decline of Military Power

• The Turkish Empire had been built up by military power, and as this declined, the empire — lacking any other cohesive force — began to fall apart before the onslaught of aggressive Balkan nationalism.

Factors Which Delayed the Dismemberment of European Turkey

Turkey Was Still Militarily Powerful

• Although a declining power, the Turks retained their fighting genius, and could still, as late as 1788, defeat the Habsburg forces.

Geographical Position of Turkey

• By her geographical position, Turkey was remote from the centre of European politics, and Europe was not primarily concerned with her affairs.
  • It was only in the 19th century that the Eastern Question aroused genuine European interest and was elevated into an international problem.

Conflicting Interests and Rivalries of the European Powers

• These rivalries made the question very difficult to resolve and prevented any agreed settlement.
  • Turkey herself was clever enough to exploit the jealousies of the Powers to prolong the longevity of her empire.

British Policy

• Due to suspicion of Russian designs upon Turkey, and fear that Russian control over Constantinople would weaken British hold upon India, Britain watched every Russian movement with suspicion.
  • British policy aimed at checking the Russian advance by preserving the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which in turn prolonged the Empire’s longevity.

Development of the Eastern Question

The development of the Eastern Question was, in essence, the beginning of the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.

Revolt of Serbia

• The first national rising in the Balkan peninsula took place in Serbia in 1804.
  • For a time, the Turks were driven out of Serbia, but they regained control in 1815.
  • Europe, then in the grip of the Napoleonic Wars, could not take notice of this movement, and so the Serbs fought on alone.
• After many years of war and negotiation, Serbia, strongly supported by Russia, secured from Turkey a measure of autonomy.
  • Serbia, though still tributary to Turkey, became autonomous under a hereditary princely house, and was soon placed under Russian protection.

Turkey and Greece

• The second step in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was taken by the Greeks.
  • Among the subject races of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks had been treated with marked favour and toleration — entrusted with high administrative posts and allowed to control a large share of trade and commerce.
  • In the islands and along the coasts of the Aegean, the Greeks enjoyed practical autonomy, and their religion was fully tolerated.
• Towards the end of the 18th century, Greek national consciousness was stimulated by an intellectual revival recalling the glories of ancient times, while the French Revolution had flung broadcast new ideas that awakened aspirations for national independence.
  • A secret society was founded in 1814 with the objective of disseminating nationalist doctrines, expelling the Turks from Europe, and reviving the old Greek empire of the East.
  • The society expected Russian support, since the Greeks and Russians belonged to the same branch of Christianity, and since the downfall of Turkey would contribute to Russian aggrandisement. Relying on this expectation and inspired by the example of Serbia, the society began armed preparations for revolt.

The War of Greek Independence

• The long-awaited opportunity came in 1821, when Ali Pasha, a Turkish governor, quarrelled with the Sultan and went to war with him.
  • Insurrections broke out in Greece. The Greeks expected Russian help but overlooked that Czar Alexander was the founder of the Holy Alliance and, as such, would not countenance a revolution.
• The Greeks began the war with a wholesale massacre of the Turks, an example soon followed by the Turks themselves; the war thus developed into one of mutual extermination, conducted with atrocities on both sides.

Attitude of the Powers: Non-Intervention

• For the first six years (1821–27), the Powers did not intervene, and the Greeks were left to their unaided efforts.
  • The Powers’ concern was less for the Greeks than for the attitude of Russia, who might exploit the situation for her own purposes.
  • Metternich, dreading insurrection against legitimate authority, viewed the Greeks as rebels who must be left to their fate, wishing to let the revolt “burn itself out beyond the pale of civilisation.” He persuaded the King of Prussia and the Czar of Russia to share this view.
  • Great Britain, too, guided by her doctrine of non-intervention and respect for Turkish integrity, followed the same policy of inactivity.

Attitude of the Powers: Intervention

• By 1827, however, a change in the situation made foreign intervention inevitable.
  • The Sultan had called upon his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt, for assistance, which helped break the backbone of Greek resistance.
• With the Greek cause on the point of collapse, a wave of sympathy spread through Europe for a people with such a rich cultural heritage, and loud protests arose against the subjugation of the cradle of European civilisation.
  • This sympathy was reinforced by the Powers’ fear that Russia might take isolated action. Alexander, wavering in his commitment, died in 1825 and was succeeded by his more resolute brother, Nicholas I, who did not consider himself bound by the policy of the Holy Alliance.
  • Canning, who had succeeded Castlereagh at the British Foreign Office, was a firm friend of liberty abroad; his policy was to help the Greek cause without alienating Turkey.
• To prevent independent Russian action, Canning induced France and Czar Nicholas to combine with England in forcing an armistice upon Turkey and compelling her to accept joint mediation by the Powers.
  • A joint note was accordingly dispatched, but the Sultan refused the proposals of armistice — whereupon the allied fleets of France and England completely destroyed the Turkish fleet.
• All the advantages of this joint intervention, however, were reaped by Russia alone. Canning died, and his policy was reversed by Wellington, the new British Prime Minister, who hastened to apologise to Turkey and withdrew England from further participation — leaving Russia a free hand, and the Greek question virtually in Russian hands.
• On her own responsibility, Russia declared war on Turkey and forced her to terms. By the Treaty of Adrianople (1829):
  • Turkey recognised the independence of Greece, and granted practical autonomy to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.
  • To Russia, she granted an increase of territory in Asia, along with increased commercial and political rights.
  • By the Convention of London (1832), the new Kingdom of Greece was placed under the joint guarantee of the Powers. (Note: your source text shows this date as “1932,” which appears to be a typo for the historically correct 1832 — flagging for your confirmation.)

The Treaty of Adrianople was a triumph for Russia

• It gave Russia increased rights and privileges and initiated the process of dismembering Turkey that Russia had long sought.
  • It greatly added to Russian prestige, since it was Russia who ushered an independent Greece into the world under her patronage.
  • England’s policy, by contrast, was cloudy, hesitating, and inconsistent — her support for Greece ran contrary to her general policy of maintaining Turkey, and she let matters drift, allowing Russia’s advance despite her own dread of it.

Importance of the Greek Question

• The Greek Question was highly significant:
  • It afforded the first example of the victory of nationalism since the Congress of Vienna, striking a blow at Metternich’s system.
  • It demonstrated the common interest of the Powers in the Near East, and the practical possibility of a resuscitation of the Christian states.
  • The help Turkey had been forced to seek from Mehemet Ali, together with her defeat at Russia’s hands, exposed her weakness to the world — leading directly to the next development of the Eastern Question.

Mehemet Ali of Egypt

• The next episode in the Eastern Question was opened by the ambition of Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt.
  • He sought to exploit the weakness of Turkey revealed by the War of Greek Independence. Having rendered valuable services to the Sultan against the Greeks, he was rewarded with the governorship of the island of Crete, a reward he considered wholly inadequate.
  • In 1831, he proceeded to tear Syria from his suzerain and threatened to march upon Constantinople.
• The Sultan appealed to the Powers, but only Russia responded, willing and ready to help. However unwelcome, the Sultan had to accept Russian assistance.
  • The spectacle of Russian troops pouring into Turkish dominions made the Western Powers uneasy, and so England, France, and Austria pressured Turkey into buying off Mehemet Ali’s hostility through the cession of Syria, thereby making Russian help unnecessary.
• Russia, however, was not to be denied. She demanded and obtained her price in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833):
  • Turkey agreed to give Russian warships free passage through the Straits, and to close the Dardanelles in time of war to all warships except those of Russia.
  • The Black Sea thus became, in effect, a Russian lake, and Russia virtually secured a protectorate over Turkey.
  • This treaty marked the high watermark of Russian influence at Constantinople, and excited the liveliest apprehension in England, ever hostile to Russian influence in the East.
• England was determined to upset the treaty, and an opportunity arose when the Sultan was defeated for a second time in his premature attempt to recover Syria from his Egyptian vassal. At this point, the Powers intervened.
  • France wanted to support Mehemet Ali and gave him secret aid, hoping to develop her interests in Egypt and Syria while weakening British influence in the Mediterranean.
  • Britain saw in this the possibility of French dominance in Egypt, as dangerous as the Russian dominance recently secured in Constantinople, and so worked to maintain the integrity of Turkey and prevent isolated interference by any one Power.
• Russia found herself in a strange position: the success of Mehemet Ali would replace a weak ruler with a strong one in Constantinople, forcing her to abandon her ambitious projects in the East; yet befriending the Sultan against his powerful vassal would require cooperation with England and the other Powers, at the cost of the advantages already secured from Turkey.
  • Dreading the designs of France and Mehemet Ali, Russia drew closer to England, offering to renounce her special position and agreeing to collective intervention.
• The result was the Convention of London, by which Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia agreed — without France’s knowledge — to force terms upon Mehemet Ali.
  • France, under Louis Philippe, was furious at this slight and threatened war with England but eventually drew back.
  • The successful operations of the allied fleet compelled Mehemet Ali to submit and accept the Treaty of London. (Note: your source text dates this “Treaty of London (1814),” which appears inconsistent with the surrounding 1830s timeline — the historically accepted date for this treaty is 1840. Flagging this clearly for your confirmation before publishing, as it is a factual detail rather than a stylistic one.)
  • By this treaty, Mehemet Ali agreed to give up his claim to Syria, and the Dardanelles were to be closed to the warships of all nations in time of war — a clause that reversed the advantage previously given to Russia and saved Turkey from dangerous dependence upon her.
• The Treaty of London was a great triumph for Britain: it administered a rebuff to France and a check to Russia, making clear that England would tolerate neither a Russian protectorate over Turkey nor a French protectorate over Egypt, while also preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which had been threatened with dissolution by Mehemet Ali’s ambition.

Re-Opening of the Eastern Question: The Crimean War

• The Crimean War (1853–1856) was fought between Russia on one side and Britain, France, Turkey, and Sardinia-Piedmont on the other.
  • The war was caused by Russian demands to exercise protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, and by the dispute between Russia and France over the privileges of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches at the Holy Places within the Ottoman Empire.
  • It reopened the Eastern Question and, more seriously, profoundly disturbed the states system established by the Congress of Vienna — indeed, the Crimean War is often remarked to have been, in a general sense, the watershed of European history.

Quarrel over the Holy Places

• For ten years after the Convention of London, there was relative repose within the Turkish Empire, until this quiet was disturbed by a quarrel between Latin monks and Greek monks over the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.
  • Though apparently trivial, this quarrel led to developments that opened a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question.
• France took up the cause of the Latin monks, and Russia that of the Greek monks.
  • By an old treaty, Turkey had conceded to France the right to protect the Latin monks in her dominions, including guardianship of the Holy Places; but during France’s preoccupation with the Revolution, the Greek monks had gradually encroached upon these Latin privileges.
  • Napoleon III of France revived the French claim, demanding full restoration of Latin rights; Czar Nicholas championed the cause of the Greek monks in response.
  • Turkey at first conceded the demands of Napoleon, but the Czar insisted upon the withdrawal of this concession. Caught between the two Powers, Turkey attempted a compromise that ultimately failed — neither France nor the Greek monks genuinely wished to compromise, since both Napoleon III and Nicholas I had ulterior objectives they hoped to attain under cover of the dispute.

Motives of Napoleon III

• Conscious of the weakness of his usurped position, Napoleon III wanted to signal his accession to the French throne through a spirited foreign policy that would reconcile the French people to his rule.
  • A war with Russia in support of the Latin monks would please the clerical party in France, whose support he considered essential to his position; it would also gratify French national pride by avenging the humiliation of Moscow, and would be an old Napoleonic gesture likely to stabilise his unsteady throne.
  • He also held a personal grudge against Nicholas I, who had slighted him by refusing to address him in the courteous form customary among monarchs.

Nicholas I proposes a partition of the Turkish Empire to England

• The controversy with France over the Holy Places stimulated the ambitions of Czar Nicholas I, who believed Turkey to be the “sick man of Europe” and was firmly persuaded of the impending dissolution of the Turkish Empire.
  • In 1853, in conversations with the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, he declared his intention to arrange with England what virtually amounted to a partition of the “sick man’s” dominions before his death — suggesting England might have Egypt and Crete, while Russia would be allowed to control Constantinople and the Dardanelles, though not in proprietary right.
• England refused to admit that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, or to be party to any scheme of partition, believing instead in the regeneration of Turkey and pursuing a policy of maintaining Ottoman integrity as a check upon Russian aggression.

Russia enlarges her claims: the right to protect Turkey’s Christian subjects

• Nicholas I, bent upon an aggressive policy, dispatched an ambassador to Constantinople charged not only with obtaining satisfaction on the Holy Places, but with demanding recognition of Russia as protector of all Christians of the Greek Church within the Sultan’s dominions.
  • If conceded, this additional demand would give Russia a perpetual right to interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs — effectively transferring the allegiance of a large portion of Turkish subjects from the Sultan to the Czar.
• On the advice of the British ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan kept the two questions apart — agreeing to satisfy Russian demands over the Holy Places, but refusing to recognise a Russian protectorate over Turkey’s Orthodox Christian subjects.

Russia tries to coerce Turkey

• Russian forces occupied the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) to put pressure upon Turkey.
  • Russia’s attitude is significant: having first sought to dismember Turkey outright, and finding this unfeasible, she now sought to control Turkey by interfering in her internal affairs under the pretext of protecting the Orthodox Christians.

The Vienna Note

• Russia’s conduct caused a flutter in the courts of Europe, and the whole question assumed general European importance.
  • England, France, Austria, and Prussia jointly put forward a proposal known as the Vienna Note, presented to both Turkey and Russia, asserting the need to protect the Christian subjects of the Turkish Empire.
  • Russia accepted the Note, interpreting it as “protection by the Czar,” while Turkey, instigated by the British ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, interpreted it as “protection by Turkey.”
• This ambiguity might have been overcome but for the stiff attitude of Lord Stratford, who wanted to force Russia into a specific renunciation of her claims.
  • He virtually overruled the decision of the four Powers, including his own government, causing the rejection of the Vienna Note even after Russia had accepted it — conduct that laid England open to the charge of preventing a peaceful settlement of the question.

Outbreak of the War

• Diplomacy having failed, the question could be settled only by the sword.
  • After rejecting the Vienna Note, Turkey called upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities; when Russia refused, Turkey declared war and took the offensive on the Danube.
  • The Russian Black Sea fleet retaliated by completely destroying the Turkish fleet at Sinope — the “Massacre of Sinope,” which inflamed popular opinion in both England and France.
• The two Powers sent a joint ultimatum to Russia demanding evacuation of the Principalities; when Russia refused to comply, France and England signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey and declared war upon Russia in 1854.
  • The following year, the Allies were reinforced by troops from Sardinia-Piedmont, whose king joined the war hoping to secure the friendship of a great power, especially France.
  • The Allies concluded it was necessary to cripple Russian power to prevent any future threat to Turkey, and so decided to capture Sebastopol, “the very heart of Russian power in the East.”
• The death of Czar Nicholas, the war’s prime author, led to peace negotiations. Sebastopol fell after a year’s resistance, practically bringing the war to a close in 1855.

Treaty of Paris (1856)

• By the Peace of Paris (1856), which closed the Crimean War:
  • Russia lost her protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia, which were made self-governing states under Turkish suzerainty and the collective guarantee of the Powers.
  • Russia renounced her claim to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Turkish Empire.
  • The Black Sea was declared neutral, with neither Russia nor any other Power permitted to maintain warships there or arsenals on its shores.
  • The Danube was internationalised, and its navigation opened to all countries.
  • The Russian frontier was withdrawn from the Danube through the cession of Bessarabia.
  • Turkey was admitted to the Concert of Europe, and her territorial integrity was guaranteed by the Powers, in return for her promise to introduce reforms for her Christian subjects.