Integration of Princely States

Integration of Princely States

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The integration of princely states into the Indian Union stands as one of the greatest administrative and diplomatic achievements of independent India. At the time of independence in 1947, India was not a single unified territory but a patchwork of British-administered provinces and nearly 600 princely states ruled by hereditary monarchs under British paramountcy. The end of British rule meant the end of paramountcy itself, leaving these states technically free to join India, join Pakistan, or remain independent — a situation that threatened to “Balkanise” the subcontinent. Through the political vision of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and the administrative skill of V. P. Menon, working alongside Lord Mountbatten, almost all princely states were persuaded to accede to India, and by 1956, the distinction between former princely territories and former British India had been effectively erased. This article traces that process in full — from the colonial-era relationship between the British Crown and the princely states, through the dramatic accessions of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir, to the four-step legal and constitutional integration that finally welded the states into the Indian Republic, along with the parallel absorption of the French and Portuguese colonial enclaves.

Background: Princely States at Independence

• At the time of Indian independence in 1947, India was divided into two sets of territories:
  • Territories under the direct control of the British Empire, and
  • Territories over which the Crown had suzerainty, but which were under the control of their hereditary rulers.
• In addition, there were several colonial enclaves controlled by France and Portugal.
• The political integration of these territories into India was a declared objective of the Indian National Congress, which the Government of India pursued over the next decade.
• Through a combination of factors, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and V. P. Menon convinced the rulers of the various princely states to accede to India.
  • Having secured their accession, they then proceeded, in a step-by-step process, to secure and extend the central government’s authority over these states and transform their administrations.
  • By 1956, there was little difference between the territories that had formerly been part of British India and those that had been part of princely states.
• Simultaneously, the Government of India, through a combination of diplomatic and military means, acquired de facto and de jure control over the remaining colonial enclaves, which too were integrated into India.

Princely States in British India

• The early history of British expansion in India was characterised by the co-existence of two approaches towards the existing princely states:
  • Annexation — where the British sought to forcibly absorb Indian princely states into their Empire’s provinces.
  • Indirect rule — where the British assumed suzerainty and paramountcy over princely states but conceded to them sovereignty and varying degrees of internal self-government.
• During the early 19th century, British policy tended towards annexation, but the Indian Rebellion of 1857 forced a change in approach by demonstrating both the difficulty of absorbing and subduing annexed states, and the usefulness of princely states as a source of support.
• In 1858, the policy of annexation was formally renounced. British relations with the remaining princely states were thereafter based on subsidiary alliances, under which the British exercised paramountcy over all princely states — with the Crown as ultimate suzerain — while respecting and protecting them as allies and taking control of their external relations.
  • The exact relations between the British and each princely state were regulated by individual treaties and varied widely: some states enjoyed complete internal self-government, others faced significant control over internal affairs, and some rulers were little more than owners of landed estates with little autonomy.
• During the 20th century, the British made several attempts to integrate the princely states more closely with British India:
  • In 1921, they created the Chamber of Princes as a consultative and advisory body.
  • In 1936, they transferred responsibility for the supervision of smaller states from the provinces to the centre, creating direct relations between the Government of India and the larger princely states and superseding political agents.
• A more ambitious aim was the scheme of federation contained in the Government of India Act, 1935, which envisaged the princely states and British India being united under a federal government.
  • This scheme was abandoned in 1939 owing to the outbreak of the Second World War and because the princes themselves were not ready for federation.
• As a result, in the 1940s the relationship between the princely states and the Crown remained regulated by the principle of paramountcy and by the various treaties between the British Crown and the states.

What Happened After Independence?

• Neither paramountcy nor the subsidiary alliances could continue after Indian independence.
• The British took the view that because these arrangements had been established directly between the British Crown and the princely states, they could not be transferred to the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan.
• At the same time, the alliances imposed obligations on Britain — such as maintaining troops in India for the defence of princely states — that it was no longer prepared to carry out.
• The British government therefore decided that paramountcy, together with all treaties between them and the princely states, would come to an end upon the British departure from India.

Why Was Integration Required?

• There were almost 600 princely states. The Saurashtra and Kathiawar regions of Gujarat alone were home to over two hundred princely states, many with non-contiguous territories.
• The termination of paramountcy meant, in principle, that all rights flowing from the states’ relationship with the British Crown would return to them, leaving them free to negotiate relationships with the new states of India and Pakistan “on a basis of complete freedom.”
• Early British plans for the transfer of power, such as the offer produced by the Cripps Mission, recognised the possibility that some princely states might choose to stand outside independent India.
  • This was unacceptable to the Indian National Congress, which regarded the independence of princely states as a denial of the course of Indian history, and consequently viewed this scheme as a “Balkanisation” of India.

Attitude of the Congress Before Independence

• The Congress had traditionally been less active in the princely states because of:
  • Its limited resources, which restricted its ability to organise there, and its focus on the larger goal of independence from the British.
  • The unreadiness of the people of princely states for satyagraha.
  • The complex relationship between the princely states and the British, which risked complicating the larger question of independence.
  • The sympathy of Congress leaders, particularly Mahatma Gandhi, towards more progressive princes as examples of Indians’ capacity to rule themselves.
• This changed in the 1930s, as a result of the federation scheme in the Government of India Act, 1935, and the rise of socialist Congress leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan, prompting the Congress to actively engage with popular political and labour activity in the princely states.
• By 1939, the Congress’s official stance was that the states must enter independent India on the same terms and with the same autonomy as the provinces of British India, with their people granted responsible government.
  • It therefore sought to insist on the incorporation of the princely states into India during its negotiations with Mountbatten, but the British took the view that this was not in their power to grant.

Attitude of Mountbatten

• A few British leaders, particularly Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy of India, were uncomfortable with breaking links between independent India and the princely states.
  • The development of trade, commerce, and communications during the 19th and 20th centuries had bound the princely states to British India through a complex network of interests; agreements relating to railways, customs, irrigation, and the use of ports would otherwise disappear, posing a serious threat to the economic life of the subcontinent.
• Mountbatten was also persuaded by the argument of Indian leaders such as V. P. Menon that integrating the princely states into independent India would, to some extent, help assuage the wounds of Partition.
• Mountbatten had promised “Maximum India” if the Congress accepted Partition. As a result, he personally favoured and worked towards the accession of princely states to India following the transfer of power, as proposed by the Congress.

Accepting Integration

The Princes’ Position

• The rulers of the princely states were not uniformly enthusiastic about integrating their domains into independent India.
  • Some, such as the kings of Bikaner and Jawhar, were motivated to join India out of ideological and patriotic considerations.
  • Others insisted they had the right to join either India or Pakistan, remain independent, or form a union of their own.
• Bhopal, Travancore, and Hyderabad announced that they did not intend to join either dominion.
  • Hyderabad went as far as appointing trade representatives in European countries and commencing negotiations with the Portuguese to lease or buy Goa to give it access to the sea.
  • Travancore pointed to the strategic importance of its thorium reserves to Western countries while seeking recognition.
  • Bhopal attempted to build an alliance between the princely states and the Muslim League to counter Congress pressure on rulers.
• Some states even proposed a subcontinent-wide confederation of princely states as a third entity alongside India and Pakistan.

Why This Resistance Failed

• A number of factors contributed to the collapse of this initial resistance, leading nearly all non-Muslim-majority princely states to accede to India:
  • Lack of unity among the princes — smaller states did not trust larger states to protect their interests.
  • Many Hindu rulers distrusted Muslim princes, particularly Hamidullah Khan, the Nawab of Bhopal and a leading proponent of independence, whom they viewed as a Pakistani agent.
  • Others, believing integration to be inevitable, sought to build bridges with the Congress, hoping to gain a say in the final settlement — resulting in an inability to present a united front, which significantly reduced their bargaining power.
• The Muslim League’s decision to stay out of the Constituent Assembly proved fatal to the princes’ plan to build an alliance with it against the Congress.
  • Attempts to boycott the Constituent Assembly altogether failed on 28 April 1947, when Baroda, Bikaner, Cochin, Gwalior, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala, and Rewa took their seats in the Assembly.
    • Baroda was the first to join, and Bikaner’s appeal led several Rajputana states to follow.
• Many princes were also pressured by popular sentiment favouring integration with India, leaving little support for their plans of independence.
  • The Maharaja of Travancore, for example, abandoned his plans for independence after an attempted assassination of his dewan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer.
• In a few states, the chief ministers or dewans played a significant role in convincing the princes to accede.
• Ultimately, the key factors leading states to accept integration were the combined efforts of Lord Mountbatten, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and V. P. Menon — the latter two being, respectively, the political and administrative heads of the States Department, which handled relations with the princely states.

Mountbatten’s Role

• Mountbatten played an important role in convincing reluctant monarchs to accede to the Indian Union, believing that securing the states’ accession was crucial to reaching a negotiated settlement with the Congress for the transfer of power.
• As a relative of the British King, he was trusted by most princes and was a personal friend of many, especially Hamidullah Khan, the Nawab of Bhopal.
  • The princes also believed he would ensure independent India adhered to any agreed terms, since Nehru and Patel had asked him to become the first Governor-General of the Dominion of India.
• Mountbatten used his influence to push the princes towards accession by:
  • Declaring that the British Government would not grant dominion status to any princely state, nor accept them into the British Commonwealth — meaning states would sever all connections with the Crown unless they joined India or Pakistan.
  • Pointing out that the Indian subcontinent was one economic entity, and that the states would suffer most if the link were broken.
  • Highlighting the difficulties princes would face maintaining order amid threats such as communal violence and communist movements.
• Mountbatten stressed he would act as the trustee of the princes’ commitment, as he would serve as India’s head of state well into 1948.
• He engaged in personal dialogue with reluctant princes, such as the Nawab of Bhopal, whom he asked, through a confidential letter, to sign the Instrument of Accession.
  • Mountbatten kept the signed document locked in his safe, to be handed to the States Department on 15 August only if the Nawab did not change his mind — which he was free to do. The Nawab agreed and did not renege.
• Several princes complained they were being betrayed by Britain, whom they regarded as an ally; Sir Conrad Corfield resigned as head of the Political Department in protest at Mountbatten’s policies.
  • Mountbatten’s policies were also criticised by the opposition Conservative Party; Winston Churchill compared the language used by the Indian government to that used by Adolf Hitler before the invasion of Austria.

Pressure and Diplomacy

• Vallabhbhai Patel, as Minister for Home and States Affairs, had the responsibility of welding the British Indian provinces and the princely states into a united India.
• By far the most significant factor leading the princes to accede was the policy of the Congress, and in particular of Patel and Menon.
  • The Congress’s stated position was that the princely states were not sovereign entities and, notwithstanding the end of paramountcy, could not opt for independence — they must accede to either India or Pakistan.
  • In July 1946, Nehru observed that no princely state could prevail militarily against the army of independent India.
  • In January 1947, he said independent India would not accept the “divine right of kings.”
  • In May 1947, he declared that any princely state refusing to join the Constituent Assembly would be treated as an enemy state.
  • C. Rajagopalachari argued that since paramountcy “came into being as a fact and not by agreement,” it would necessarily pass to the government of independent India as successors of the British.
• Patel and Menon, charged with the actual negotiations, took a more conciliatory approach than Nehru, adopting a policy of carrot and stick.
  • Patel’s official policy statement of 5 July 1947 made no threats — it emphasised the unity of India and common interests, reassured princes about Congress intentions, and invited them to join independent India “to make laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties as aliens.”
  • He reiterated that the States Department would not seek domination over the princely states; unlike the British Political Department, it would be a medium for conducting business between the states and India as equals.

Instruments of Accession

• Patel and Menon backed up their diplomatic efforts with treaties designed to be attractive to rulers of princely states. Two key documents were produced:

Standstill Agreement

• It confirmed that the agreements and administrative practices that existed between the princely state in question and the British would be continued by India.

Instrument of Accession

• By this document, the ruler of a princely state agreed to the accession of his kingdom to independent India and to granting India control over specified subject matters — the nature of which varied depending on the acceding state:
  • States that had had internal autonomy under the British signed an Instrument ceding only three subjects to the Government of India — defence, external affairs, and communications — each defined in accordance with List 1 to Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Rulers of states that were, in effect, estates or talukas — where substantial administrative powers were exercised by the Crown — signed a different Instrument, vesting all residuary powers and jurisdiction in the Government of India.
  • Rulers of states with an intermediate status signed a third type of Instrument, preserving the degree of power they had under the British.
• The Instruments of Accession also implemented several safeguards:
  • Clause 7 provided that princes would not be bound to the Indian Constitution as and when it was drafted.
  • Clause 8 guaranteed their autonomy in all areas where authority was not expressly ceded to the Government of India.
• This was supplemented by a number of promises to rulers who agreed to accede:
  • Their extra-territorial rights, such as immunity from prosecution in Indian courts and exemption from customs duty, would be protected.
  • They would be allowed to democratise slowly.
  • None of the eighteen major states would be forced to merge.
  • They would remain eligible for British honours and decorations.
• In discussions, Mountbatten reinforced Patel and Menon’s statements by emphasising that the documents gave the princes all the “practical independence” they needed.
  • Mountbatten, Patel, and Menon also sought to convey that if the princes did not accept the terms then, they would later have to accede on substantially less favourable terms.
  • The Standstill Agreement was itself used as a negotiating tool, as the States Department categorically ruled out signing one with any princely state that did not also sign an Instrument of Accession.

The Accession Process

• The limited scope of the Instruments of Accession, combined with the promise of wide-ranging autonomy and other guarantees, gave sufficient comfort to many rulers, who saw this as the best deal available given the lack of British support and mounting popular pressure.
• Between May 1947 and the transfer of power on 15 August 1947, the vast majority of states signed Instruments of Accession.
  • A few held out or delayed — Piploda, a small state in central India, did not accede until March 1948.
• The biggest problems arose with a few border states:
  • Jodhpur, which tried to negotiate better deals with Pakistan.
  • Junagadh, which actually did accede to Pakistan.
  • Hyderabad and Kashmir, which declared their intention to remain independent.

Border States: Jodhpur

• The ruler of Jodhpur, Hanwant Singh, was antipathetic to the Congress and saw little future for himself in India.
  • Along with the ruler of Jaisalmer, he entered into negotiations with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s designated head of state.
  • Jinnah, keen to attract larger border states to compensate for the loss of half of Bengal and Punjab, offered to permit Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to accede to Pakistan on any terms they chose, even giving their rulers blank sheets of paper to write their own terms.
  • Jaisalmer refused, arguing it would be difficult to side with Muslims against Hindus in the event of communal problems.
  • Hanwant Singh came close to signing, but the general atmosphere in Jodhpur was hostile to accession to Pakistan.
• Mountbatten pointed out that the accession of a predominantly Hindu state to Pakistan would violate the two-nation theory on which Partition was based, and was likely to cause communal violence.
  • Persuaded by these arguments, Hanwant Singh somewhat reluctantly agreed to accede to India.

Integration of Junagadh

• Junagadh was a princely state located in present-day Gujarat.
  • Its Nawab, Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, a Muslim whose ancestors had ruled Junagadh for some two hundred years, decided that Junagadh should join Pakistan — despite an overwhelming Hindu majority population.
• The Nawab acceded to Pakistan on 15 September 1947, against Mountbatten’s advice, arguing that Junagadh could join Pakistan by sea if not by land.
  • Although states were theoretically free to choose, Mountbatten held that “geographic compulsions” meant only states sharing a border with Pakistan could realistically accede to it.
• The principalities of Babariawad and Sheikh of Mangrol reacted by claiming independence from Junagadh and acceding to India, prompting the Nawab to militarily occupy these states.
  • Neighbouring rulers reacted angrily, sending troops to the Junagadh frontier and appealing to the Government of India for assistance.
• When Pakistan accepted the Nawab’s Instrument of Accession on 16 September, India was outraged that Jinnah — who argued Hindus and Muslims could not live as one nation — would accept it; this was seen as a strategy to secure a plebiscite precedent applicable to Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state with a Hindu ruler.
• Sardar Patel believed that if Junagadh went to Pakistan, it would exacerbate communal tension in Gujarat.
  • Menon met Samaldas Gandhi, a Rajkot journalist related to Mahatma Gandhi, and unfolded the scheme of the “Aarzi Hukumat” (Provisional Government).
  • Samaldas Gandhi formed the Aarzi Hukumat as a government-in-exile for the people of Junagadh.
• Patel offered Pakistan time to reverse its acceptance and hold a plebiscite, then ordered the forcible annexation of Junagadh’s three principalities and reoccupied Mangrol and Babariawad.
  • Pakistan agreed to discuss a plebiscite subject to Indian troop withdrawal, a condition India rejected.
• India closed all its borders to the landlocked Junagadh, stopping goods, transport, and postal movement, causing trade to cease and the food position to become precarious.
• Facing the worsening situation, the Nawab and his family left for Karachi on 25 October 1947, establishing a provisional government there.
  • On 27 October 1947, Bhutto, as Chief Minister of Junagadh, wrote to Jinnah explaining the state’s critical situation.
  • When hopes of Pakistani assistance were lost, Bhutto telegraphed the Nawab on 1 November 1947, warning of danger to life and property; the Nawab authorised him to act in the best interests of Junagadh’s Muslim population.
  • The Junagadh State Council decided the Indian Government should be requested to take over administration to protect citizens from Provisional Government forces.
  • Facing financial collapse and lacking resistance capacity, the state government invited India to take control; Bhutto left for Karachi on the night of 8 November 1947.
• A plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948, in which 99% of the population voted to join India.
• Later arrangements: Junagadh became part of Indian Saurashtra State until 1 November 1956, when Saurashtra became part of Bombay State; following the 1960 division of Bombay into Gujarat and Maharashtra, Junagadh is now a district of Saurashtra in Gujarat.

The Kashmir Problem

• The Pashtun Durrani Empire ruled Kashmir in the 18th century until its 1819 conquest by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh.
  • Following the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–1846), Kashmir was ceded to the East India Company under the Treaty of Lahore, which soon sold it via the Treaty of Amritsar to Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, who thereafter received the title Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
• From then until the 1947 Partition, Kashmir was ruled by Hindu Maharajas, though the population was majority Muslim except in the Jammu and Ladakh regions.
• At the transfer of power, Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu ruling a Muslim-majority state, was hesitant about acceding to either dominion, as either choice risked provoking adverse reactions within his kingdom.
  • He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, proposed one with India, but announced Kashmir’s intention to remain independent.
  • His rule was opposed by Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of the National Conference, who demanded his abdication.
• Pakistan, attempting to force the issue, cut off supplies and transport links; the Punjab chaos following Partition had already severed transport links with India, leaving air travel as Kashmir’s only link to either dominion.
  • Rumours of atrocities against the Muslim population of Poonch by the Maharaja’s forces caused civil unrest.
• Pathan tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, crossed from the North-West Frontier Province into Kashmir and made rapid progress towards Srinagar.
  • The Maharaja wrote to India requesting military assistance. However, India and Pakistan had signed a non-intervention agreement, so India required the signing of an Instrument of Accession and the setting up of an interim government headed by Sheikh Abdullah in return for aid.
  • Although tribal fighters had entered Jammu and Kashmir, there was no solid legal evidence proving official Pakistani involvement, so India could not legally intervene unless Kashmir formally acceded.
• With Pakistani tribesmen approaching Srinagar and the Maharaja desperate for military assistance, India insisted on completing negotiations to cede Jammu and Kashmir before providing aid.
  • The resulting cession agreement was signed by the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten.
• National Conference volunteers worked with the Indian Army to drive out the Pakistanis. Indian troops secured Jammu, Srinagar, and the valley during the First Kashmir War, though fighting flagged with the onset of winter, which made much of the state impassable.
  • Nehru, recognising international attention on the dispute, declared a ceasefire and sought UN arbitration, arguing India would otherwise have to invade Pakistan itself given its failure to stop the tribal incursions.
  • Sheikh Abdullah opposed India’s decision to seek UN intervention, believing the Indian Army could have freed the entire state from invaders.
• Following the setup of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948, imposing an immediate ceasefire and calling on Pakistan to withdraw tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, and on India to reduce its forces to minimum strength, after which conditions for a plebiscite on accession would be established.
  • However, India and Pakistan failed to reach a truce agreement due to differences over demilitarisation procedure — including whether the Azad Kashmiri army should be disbanded during the truce or plebiscite stage.
  • In November 1948, though both governments agreed to hold the plebiscite, Pakistan’s failure to withdraw its troops violated the agreed conditions, and the process stalled.
• The plebiscite was never held. On 26 January 1950, the Constitution of India came into force in Kashmir, but with special provisions.
  • India did not secure administrative control over all of Kashmir — the northern and western portions came under Pakistan’s control in 1947 (today’s Pakistan-administered Kashmir), while China occupied Aksai Chin during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and continues to administer it.

Accession of Hyderabad

• Hyderabad was a landlocked state stretching over 212,000 sq km in southeastern India. While 87% of its 17 million people were Hindu, its ruler, Nizam Osman Ali Khan, was Muslim, and its politics were dominated by a Muslim elite.
  • The Muslim nobility and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, a powerful pro-Nizam party, insisted Hyderabad remain independent, standing on equal footing with India and Pakistan.
  • Accordingly, in June 1947, the Nizam issued a firman announcing that on the transfer of power, his state would resume independence.
• The Government of India rejected the firman as a “legalistic claim of doubtful validity,” arguing that Hyderabad’s strategic location — astride main communication lines between northern and southern India — could easily be exploited by “foreign interests,” making it a national-security concern; it also argued that the state’s people, history, and location made it unquestionably Indian.
• The Nizam was prepared to enter a limited treaty offering Hyderabad safeguards beyond the standard Instrument of Accession, including neutrality in any India–Pakistan conflict. India rejected this, fearing other states would demand similar concessions.
  • A temporary Standstill Agreement was signed as a stopgap even though Hyderabad had not agreed to accede — unlike other states, it only guaranteed that Hyderabad would not join Pakistan.
• Negotiations were opened through K. M. Munshi, India’s envoy and agent-general to Hyderabad, and the Nizam’s envoys, Laik Ali and Sir Walter Monckton, with Mountbatten presiding — several proposed deals were rejected.
• By December 1947, India accused Hyderabad of repeatedly violating the Agreement, while the Nizam alleged an Indian blockade, which India denied.
  • India accused Hyderabad of importing arms from Pakistan; Hyderabad had given Rs 200 million to Pakistan and stationed a bomber squadron there.
  • India further claimed Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting its Indian securities, banning Indian currency, halting groundnut exports, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and recruiting new members to its army and its irregular Razakar forces.
• In summer 1948, Indian officials, especially Patel, signalled an intention to invade; Britain encouraged a non-military resolution but refused the Nizam’s requests for help.
• In June 1948, Mountbatten prepared the “Heads of Agreement” deal, offering Hyderabad autonomous-dominion status under India, requiring restriction of its regular forces and disbanding of voluntary forces, while allowing the Nizam to remain executive head pending a plebiscite and general elections for a constituent assembly. The Hyderabad government would administer its own territory, ceding only foreign affairs to India.
  • Although the plan was approved and signed by the Indians, the Nizam rejected it, demanding either complete independence or dominion status under the British Commonwealth.
  • The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek arbitration from US President Harry S. Truman and intervention from the United Nations.
• The Nizam was further beset by an uprising in Telangana led by communists, beginning in 1946 as a peasant revolt against feudal elements, which he was unable to subjugate; the situation deteriorated further in 1948.
  • The Razakars, a militia affiliated with the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and set up under Muslim radical Qasim Razvi, supported the Muslim ruling class against Hindu upsurges, intensified their activities, and were accused of intimidating villages.
  • The Hyderabad state police and Razakars put down armed revolts by communists and peasants, committed atrocities against the Hindu population, and even eliminated Hyderabadi Muslims such as Shoebullah Khan, who advocated merger with India.
  • The Nizam encouraged the Razakars to terrorise Hindus and change the state’s communal complexion through forced conversions and by inviting outside Muslims to settle.
  • The Hyderabad State Congress Party, affiliated with the Indian National Congress, launched a political agitation; matters worsened as communist groups, having initially supported the Congress, switched sides and began attacking Congress groups.
• Attempts by Mountbatten to find a negotiated solution failed, and in August, the Nizam, claiming fear of imminent invasion, attempted to approach the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.
  • Patel insisted that allowing Hyderabad’s continued independence would tarnish the Government’s prestige and leave neither Hindus nor Muslims secure; he famously described an independent Hyderabad as “an ulcer in the heart of India” which had to be removed surgically.

Operation Polo (Hyderabad Police Action)

• On 13 September, the Indian Army entered Hyderabad under Operation Polo (Hyderabad Police Action), on the grounds that the law-and-order situation threatened the peace of South India.
  • It was termed a “Police Action” as it was considered an internal matter of India.
• The troops met little resistance from the Razakars and took complete control of the state between 13 and 18 September.
• On 16 September, facing imminent defeat, the Nizam summoned Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali and requested the resignation of the entire cabinet, which was delivered.
• At noon on 17 September, the Nizam summoned India’s Agent-General K. M. Munshi, stating: “The vultures have resigned. I don’t know what to do.”
  • Munshi advised the Nizam to secure citizens’ safety by issuing orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major General El Edroos, which was immediately done.
• In his radio broadcast of 23 September 1948, the Nizam explained that a small quasi-military group under Qasim Razvi had, by duress, compelled his trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on him, taking control of the State “by methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany” and rendering him helpless.
• The Nizam was retained as head of state, as with other acceding princes.
  • He disavowed his UN complaints, and despite strong protests from Pakistan and criticism from other countries, the Security Council did not pursue the matter further — Hyderabad was absorbed into India.

Completing the Integration

• The Instruments of Accession were limited, transferring control of only three subjects to India, and would by themselves have produced a loose federation with significant differences in administration across states.
• Full political integration, by contrast, required political actors in the various states to be “persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center” — the Republic of India. This was not an easy task.
  • While some states such as Mysore had legislative systems based on a broad franchise, comparable to British India, in others political decision-making took place in small, limited aristocratic circles.
• Having secured accession, the Government of India, between 1948 and 1950, turned to welding the states and former British provinces into one polity under a single republican constitution.

Merger Agreements

• The first step, carried out between 1947 and 1949, was to merge smaller states not seen as viable administrative units either into neighbouring provinces or with other princely states.
  • This was contentious, since it involved dissolving states whose existence India had only recently guaranteed through the Instruments of Accession.
• Patel and Menon emphasised that without integration, state economies would collapse and anarchy would follow if princes were unable to govern properly, pointing out that many smaller states lacked the resources to sustain their economies and growing populations, and imposed tax rules that impeded free trade.
• Given that merger involved breaching guarantees personally given by Mountbatten, Patel and Nehru initially intended to wait until after his term as Governor-General ended.
  • An adivasi uprising in Orissa in late 1947, however, forced their hand.
• In December 1947, princes from the Eastern India Agency and Chhattisgarh Agency were summoned to an all-night meeting with Menon, where they were persuaded to sign Merger Agreements integrating their states into Orissa, the Central Provinces, and Bihar with effect from 1 January 1948.
  • Later that year, 66 states in Gujarat and the Deccan — including the large states of Kolhapur and Baroda — were merged into Bombay. Other small states were merged into Madras, East Punjab, West Bengal, the United Provinces, and Assam.
• Not all states that signed Merger Agreements were integrated into provinces:
  • Thirty states of the former Punjab Hill States Agency, lying near the international border, were instead integrated into Himachal Pradesh, a distinct entity administered directly by the centre as a Chief Commissioner’s Province for security reasons.
• The Merger Agreements required rulers to cede “full and exclusive jurisdiction and powers” for governance of their states to the Dominion of India, in return for guarantees:
  • An annual privy purse payment as compensation for surrendering their powers and dissolving their states.
  • Protection of private property, personal privileges, dignities, and titles (state property was taken over, but private property protected).
  • Guaranteed succession according to custom.
  • Provincial administrations were obliged to retain princely-state staff with equal pay and treatment.
• Although principally intended for smaller states, Merger Agreements were also applied to some larger states lying along international borders:
  • Kutch in western India and Tripura and Manipur in the Northeast became Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.
  • Bhopal, whose ruler feared losing his administration’s identity if merged with neighbouring Maratha states, and Bilaspur, much of which was likely to be flooded upon completion of the Bhakra dam, also became Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.

The Four-Step Integration Process

The bulk of the larger states, and some groups of smaller states, were integrated through a different, four-step process:

1. Merger

• Merger Agreements — merging smaller, non-viable states into neighbouring provinces or directly under the Central Government as Chief Commissioners’ Provinces (as explained above).
• Covenants of Merger — convincing groups of large states to combine and form a “princely union”, e.g., PEPSU, Saurashtra, United States of Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin.
  • Under the Covenants of Merger, all rulers lost their ruling powers save one, who became the Rajpramukh of the new princely union.
  • The other rulers were associated with two bodies: the Council of Rulers (rulers of salute states) and a Presidium (partly elected by rulers of non-salute states, the rest by the Council).
  • The Rajpramukh and his deputy, the Uprajpramukh, were chosen by the Council from among Presidium members.
  • The Covenants provided for a constituent assembly for the new union, charged with framing its constitution.
  • In return, rulers received a privy purse and guarantees similar to those under the Merger Agreements.
  • Through this process:
    • Patel achieved the unification of 222 states in the Kathiawar peninsula of Gujarat into the princely union of Saurashtra in January 1948, with six more joining the following year.
    • Madhya Bharat emerged on 28 May 1948 from a union of Gwalior, Indore, and eighteen smaller states.
    • In Punjab, the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) was formed on 15 July 1948 from Patiala, Kapurthala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Malerkotla, Nalargarh, and Kalsia.
    • The United State of Rajasthan was formed through a series of mergers, the last completed on 15 May 1949.
    • Travancore and Cochin were merged in mid-1949 to form Travancore-Cochin.
  • The only princely states that signed neither Covenants of Merger nor Merger Agreements were Kashmir, Mysore, and Hyderabad.

2. Democratisation

• Merging the administrative machineries of each state was not easy, particularly given the history of rivalry between many merged states.
  • In the former Central India Agency, whose states had initially been merged into the princely union of Vindhya Pradesh, rivalry between two groups of states became so severe that the Government of India persuaded the rulers to sign a Merger Agreement abrogating the old Covenants, taking direct control as a Chief Commissioner’s State.
• As such, the mergers did not meet the expectations of the Government of India or the States Department.
  • In December 1947, Menon suggested requiring rulers to take “practical steps towards the establishment of popular government.” The States Department accepted this and implemented it through a special covenant signed by the Rajpramukhs, binding them to act as constitutional monarchs.
  • This meant their powers became de facto no different from those of Governors of former British provinces, giving their territories the same measure of responsible government as the rest of India.
• This process has been described as, in effect, an assertion of paramountcy by the Government of India over the states in a more pervasive form.

3. Centralisation and Constitutionalisation

• Democratisation still left an important distinction between former princely states and former British provinces: since princely states had signed limited Instruments of Accession covering only three subjects, they remained insulated from government policies in other areas — which the Congress viewed as hampering its ability to frame policies for social justice and national development.
• In May 1948, at V. P. Menon’s initiative, a Delhi meeting between the Rajpramukhs of the princely unions and the States Department resulted in new Instruments of Accession, giving the Government of India power to legislate on all matters within the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Subsequently, each princely union, as well as Mysore and Hyderabad, agreed to adopt the Constitution of India as their own state constitution — placing them in exactly the same legal position vis-à-vis the central government as the former British provinces.
  • The only exception was Kashmir, whose relationship with India continued to be governed by its original Instrument of Accession and its own state Constituent Assembly’s constitution.
• The Constitution of India classified constituent units into four classes:
  • Part A states: former British provinces, plus princely states merged into them.
  • Part B states: the princely unions, plus Mysore and Hyderabad.
  • Part C states: former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces and other centrally administered areas (except Andaman and Nicobar Islands).
  • Part D: the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
• The only practical difference between Part A and Part B states was that Part B states’ constitutional heads were Rajpramukhs appointed under the Covenants of Merger, rather than Governors appointed by the central government.
  • The Constitution also gave the central government significant powers over former princely states, providing that “their governance shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions… as may from time to time be given by, the President.” Apart from this, the form of government in both was identical.

4. Reorganisation

• The distinction between Part A and Part B states was only intended to last for a brief, transitional period.
• In 1956, the States Reorganisation Act reorganised the former British provinces and princely states on the basis of language.
  • Simultaneously, the Seventh Constitutional Amendment removed the distinction between Part A and Part B states, both now treated simply as “states,” with Part C states renamed “Union Territories.”
  • The Rajpramukhs lost their authority, replaced as constitutional heads of state by centrally-appointed Governors. These changes finally brought the princely order to an end.
• In both legal and practical terms, the former princely territories were now fully integrated into India and did not differ in any way from those formerly part of British India.
  • The personal privileges of the princes — the privy purse, exemption from customs duty, and customary dignities — survived, only to be abolished in 1971.

Carrot and Stick: Patel’s Method of Integration

Carrot

• Aroused the spirit of nationalism in rulers.
• Promised protection of their traditional rights (during accession).
• Promised autonomy in internal matters, asking only for surrender of defence, external affairs, and communications.
• Assured that the provisions of the new Constitution would not apply to them.
• Offered privy purses, retention of personal property and titles, and inducements such as Governorships as “Rajpramukhs” (during integration).
• Emphasised that without integration, their economies would collapse, resulting in anarchy.

Stick

• Used the threat of popular protest.
• Encouraged praja mandals to agitate for accession to India — in Travancore, Mysore, Kathiawar, and Orissa.
• Cut off critical supplies and communication lines to Junagadh.
• Used the threat, and eventually application, of military action and military occupation — as in Junagadh.
• Used police action — as in Hyderabad (Operation Polo).
• In Kashmir, the threat of proxy war diminished Patel’s role in the resolution; the problem still lingers.

Post-Integration Issues

The Princes

• Although the integration of princely states into India was largely peaceful, not all princes were happy with the outcome.
  • Many had expected the Instruments of Accession to be permanent and were unhappy about losing the autonomy and guaranteed continued existence of their states.
  • Some felt uneasy about the disappearance of states their families had controlled for generations, while others regretted the loss of administrative structures they had worked to build and believed to be efficient.
• The majority, however, despite the “strain and tension” of adapting to life as private citizens, were content to retire on the generous pension provided by the privy purse.
  • Several took advantage of their eligibility to hold public office under the central government — the Maharaja of Bhavnagar, Col. Krishna Kumarasingh Bhavasingh Gohil, for instance, became Governor of Madras State, while several others were appointed to diplomatic posts overseas.

Colonial Enclaves

• The integration of princely states raised the question of the remaining colonial enclaves in India.
• At independence:
  • Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanam, Mahe, and Chandernagore remained colonies of France.
  • Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Goa remained colonies of Portugal.

France

• An agreement between France and India in 1948 provided for an election in France’s remaining Indian possessions to choose their political future.
  • A plebiscite held in Chandernagore on 19 June 1949 resulted in a vote of 7,463 to 114 in favour of integration with India.
  • It was ceded to India de facto on 14 August 1949 and de jure on 2 May 1950, later merging with West Bengal on 2 October 1955.
• In the other enclaves, the pro-French camp, led by Edouard Goubert, used the administrative machinery to suppress pro-merger groups.
  • Popular discontent rose, and in 1954 demonstrations in Yanam and Mahe resulted in pro-merger groups assuming power.
  • A referendum in Pondicherry and Karaikal in October 1954 favoured merger, and on 1 November 1954, de facto control over all four enclaves transferred to India.
  • A treaty of cession was signed in May 1956, and following ratification by the French National Assembly in May 1962, de jure control was also transferred.

Portugal

• Portugal, unlike France, resisted diplomatic solutions, viewing its Indian possessions as a matter of national pride; in 1951, it amended its constitution to convert them into Portuguese provinces.
• In July 1954, an uprising in Dadra and Nagar Haveli threw off Portuguese rule:
  • On 24 July 1954, “The United Front of Goans” took control of the enclave of Dadra.
  • The remaining territory of Nagar Haveli was seized by the Azad Gomantak Dal on 2 August 1954.
  • Portuguese attempts to send forces from Daman to reoccupy the enclaves were prevented by Indian troops.
  • Portugal took the matter to the International Court of Justice, seeking to compel India to allow troop access; the Court rejected its complaint in 1960, holding India was within its rights to deny military access.
  • In 1961, the Constitution of India was amended to incorporate Dadra and Nagar Haveli into India as a Union Territory.
• Goa, Daman and Diu remained an outstanding issue.
  • On 15 August 1955, five thousand non-violent demonstrators marched against the Portuguese at the border and were met with gunfire, killing 22; many revolts were quelled by force and leaders eliminated or jailed.
  • India closed its consulate in Panjim (operating since 1947) and imposed an economic embargo against Portuguese Goa.
  • The Indian Government adopted a “wait and watch” attitude from 1955 to 1961, making numerous representations to the Salazar government and raising the issue internationally.
  • In December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly rejected Portugal’s contention that its overseas possessions were provinces, formally listing them as “non-self-governing territories.”
  • Although Nehru continued to favour a negotiated solution, the Portuguese suppression of a revolt in Angola in 1961 radicalised Indian public opinion and increased pressure for military action; African leaders also urged Nehru to act in Goa.
• On 18 December 1961, following the collapse of an American attempt to find a negotiated solution, the Indian Army entered Portuguese India under Operation Vijay (styled as a police action) and defeated the Portuguese garrisons.
  • Portugal took the matter to the Security Council, but a resolution calling on India to withdraw was defeated by a USSR veto; Portugal surrendered on 19 December.
• The Citizenship Act, 1955 empowered the Government of India to define citizenship; accordingly, the Goa, Daman and Diu (Citizenship) Order, 1962, issued on 28 March 1962, conferred Indian citizenship on all persons born on or before 20 December 1961 in these territories — ending the last of the European colonies in India.

The Goa Opinion Poll

• Goa celebrates its “Asmitai Dis” (Identity Day), or Opinion Poll Day, on 16 January — the date in 1967 when Goans voted against merging with Maharashtra and chose to remain a Union Territory. Though called an “opinion poll,” the vote was in fact a plebiscite.
• Soon after Goa’s liberation in 1961, murmurs began of a merger with Maharashtra on grounds of cultural similarity, with proponents arguing that Konkani was a dialect of Marathi rather than an independent language.
  • With several Indian states already demarcated on a linguistic basis, the demand split Goans into those backing Konkani who wanted to remain independent of Maharashtra, and those favouring Marathi who wanted to merge.
• Nehru had promised Goa would decide its own future, but he passed away in May 1964; delegations met Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, but he too passed away in Tashkent in January 1966 before a decision could be made.
• In May 1966, Sequeira and Goa Congress president Purshottam Kakodkar convinced new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that Assembly elections could not serve as a referendum on merger, and that a formal opinion poll was necessary.
  • In December 1966, Parliament passed the Goa, Daman and Diu (Opinion Poll Act), 1966.
• The poll was held on 16 January 1967: the pro-merger group received 1,38,170 votes, while 1,72,191 voted against.
• Demands for statehood followed, and on 30 May 1987, Goa became India’s 25th state; Daman and Diu continue to be Union Territories.

Sikkim

• The former princely state of Sikkim, strategically located on the India–China border, was integrated into India in 1975 as its 22nd state.
• Three princely states bordering India — Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim — were not integrated into the Republic of India between 1947 and 1950.
  • Nepal had been recognised by the British and the Government of India as de jure independent.
  • Bhutan had, in the British period, been considered a protectorate outside India’s international frontier; the Government of India entered a treaty with Bhutan in 1949, continuing this arrangement and providing that Bhutan would abide by India’s advice on external affairs.
  • Sikkim, historically a British dependency with a status similar to other princely states, had been considered within India’s colonial frontiers.
• On independence, however, the Chogyal of Sikkim resisted full integration.
  • Given its strategic importance, India signed first a Standstill Agreement and then, in 1950, a full treaty with the Chogyal, effectively making Sikkim a protectorate outside India, with India responsible for defence, external affairs, communications, and law and order, while Sikkim retained full internal autonomy.
• In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal, supported by the minority Bhutia and Lepcha upper classes, attempted to negotiate greater powers, particularly over external affairs, to give Sikkim more international personality.
  • This was opposed by Kazi Lhendup Dorji and the Sikkim State Congress, representing the ethnic Nepali middle classes, who took a more pro-Indian view.
• In April 1973, an anti-Chogyal agitation broke out demanding popular elections; unable to control the demonstrations, Dorji asked India to intervene under its law-and-order responsibility.
  • India facilitated negotiations producing an agreement reducing the Chogyal to a constitutional monarch and providing for elections based on a new ethnic power-sharing formula.
  • The Chogyal’s opponents won an overwhelming victory, and a new Constitution was drafted associating Sikkim with the Republic of India.
• On 10 April 1975, the Sikkim Assembly passed a resolution calling for full integration into India, endorsed by 97% of votes in a referendum on 14 April 1975.
  • The Indian Government subsequently amended the Constitution to admit Sikkim as its 22nd state.

Critical Perspectives on the Integration Process

• The integration process repeatedly brought Indian and Pakistani leaders into conflict.
  • Jinnah, representing the Muslim League, strongly supported the right of princely states to remain independent — an attitude diametrically opposed to Nehru’s and the Congress’s stance, reflected in Pakistan’s support for Hyderabad’s bid for independence.
• Post-Partition, the Government of Pakistan accused India of hypocrisy, arguing there was little difference between the Nawab of Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan (which India refused to recognise) and the Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to India — for several years, Pakistan refused to recognise the legality of India’s incorporation of Junagadh, treating it as de jure Pakistani territory.
• Different theories explain the designs of Indian and Pakistani leaders in this period:
  • It has been suggested that an ideal deal in Patel’s mind was that if Jinnah let India have Junagadh and Hyderabad, Patel would not object to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan.
    • Jinnah sought to link the questions of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir, believing that if India demanded a plebiscite in Junagadh and Hyderabad, the same principle would have to apply to Muslim-majority Kashmir, which he believed would vote for Pakistan.
    • A speech by Patel at Bahauddin College in Junagadh, where he said “we would agree to Kashmir if they agreed to Hyderabad,” suggests he may have been amenable to this idea — though Patel’s personal opinions were not India’s official policy, nor were they shared by Nehru.
  • Both Nehru and Patel were angered by Jinnah’s courting of the princes of Jodhpur, Bhopal, and Indore, which led them to take a harder stance on any deal with Pakistan.
• Modern historians have re-examined the role of the States Department and Lord Mountbatten during the accession process:
  • Many argue that Congress leaders never intended the settlement in the Instruments of Accession to be permanent, even at signing, and always privately contemplated the complete integration that ensued between 1948 and 1950.
  • They point out that the mergers and cession of powers between 1948 and 1950 contravened the terms of the Instruments of Accession and were incompatible with Mountbatten’s express assurances of internal autonomy and the preservation of the princely states.
  • Menon, in his memoirs, stated that changes to the initial terms of accession were freely consented to by the princes with no coercion — a claim many disagree with, since foreign diplomats at the time believed princes had been given no real choice, and some expressed unhappiness with the arrangements.
  • Mountbatten’s role has also been criticised: while he stayed within the letter of the law, he arguably had a moral obligation to act on behalf of the princes once it became apparent the Government of India was altering the terms of accession, and should not have lent his support to a bargain he could not guarantee would hold after independence.
• Many argue that one reason the princes ultimately consented to the demise of their states was that they felt abandoned by the British and saw themselves as having little other option.
  • Older historians, by contrast, hold that the princely states could not have survived as independent entities after the transfer of power, and view their demise as inevitable — regarding the successful integration of all princely states into India as a triumph for the Government of India and Lord Mountbatten, and a tribute to the sagacity of the majority of princes, who jointly achieved in a few months what the Empire had unsuccessfully attempted for over a century: uniting all of India under one rule.

Conclusion

The integration of princely states was among independent India’s most complex and consequential political achievements. It combined the diplomatic finesse of Mountbatten, the firm resolve of Patel, and the administrative precision of V. P. Menon to transform a fragmented subcontinent of nearly 600 princely states and multiple colonial enclaves into a unified republic. The process unfolded through both persuasion — Instruments of Accession, Merger Agreements, and Covenants of Merger — and, where necessary, decisive action, as seen in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and later Goa. The four-step process of merger, democratisation, centralisation, and reorganisation ensured that by 1956, the legal and administrative distinction between former princely territories and British India had disappeared entirely. Yet the process was not without contested legacies — the unresolved status of Kashmir, debates over Mountbatten’s role, and questions about the true voluntariness of accession continue to be examined by historians. For UPSC History Optional aspirants, this episode offers a rich case study in statecraft, negotiation, and the use of both incentive and coercion in nation-building — a defining chapter in the making of modern India.